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Abstract 
Many countries are looking to health insurance to improve access to medical care for low- 
income groups and to raise additional revenues for a depleted health sector. In Rwanda, 
concerns about a sharp drop in demand for medical services after the re-introduction of user 
fees in 1996, motivated the government to design and pilot-test micro-health insurance (MI I) 
in three districts. This thesis compares the performance of the current Rwandan MHI with the 
user fee system and against principles of egalitarian equity and sustainability. It draws from 
the economic and social literature related to health insurance, equity and sustainability; and 
uses cross-sectional routine and survey data collected on insured and uninsured population 
groups from health centres, MHI, households, patients and focus groups during the Rwandan 
pilot phase (7/1998-6/2000). It aims to contribute to the research on equity and sustainability 
in health financing and utilisation by evaluating and comparing the implications of MHI and 
of user fees for households and on the health sector. The analysis comprises three main 
components. First, it examines the demand for health insurance in a binary choice model. 
Second, following egalitarian equity principles and the minimum standard approach, it 
evaluates the impact of utilisation and financing of health care on the financial situation of 
insured and uninsured households. Third, it uses an econometric cost function that allows 
identification of payer-specific outputs to analyse and compare the cost and efficiency 
implications of MHI with capitation payment versus user fees in health centres, in order to 
test the hypothesis that providers adjust the treatment intensity to the expected payment 
mechanisms. Based on findings, a MIR insurance design is derived to scale up risk-pooling 
and improve equity and sustainability in the district health system. 
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Part I 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Although additional resources were needed to reach the goal of "Health for All" by the year 
2000, economic disturbances, currency devaluation, growing foreign debts, increasing fiscal 
deficits, and an upsurge in inflation have kept public health spending low in many low- 
income countries (Abel-Smith 1992; Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 1998). In response to 
diminishing public revenues, medical providers started to charge user fees to patients to 
maintain revenue levels in the public sector. However, user fees have been criticized as 
insufficient to finance increasing medical costs and strengthen the health system's financial 
sustainability (Nolan and Turbat 1995; Gilson 1996). 
At the same time, socio-economic crises have made household income volatile. In 1998, the 
share of the population who live on less than USD 1a day was estimated at 46 percent in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, 40 percent in South Asia, and 16 percent in Latin America (World Bank 
2000). Concerns arose about access to medical care among the poor when user fee levels 
caused an increasing proportion of the population to reduce their medical service use (Abel- 
Smith 1992; Gilson 1996; Bennett et al. 1998). Weakly defined and implemented exemption 
mechanisms have perpetuated the situation (Willis and Leighton 1995; Gilson 1996). These 
factors suggest that the current way health care is financed has not been effective in 
improving access to care and has caused many low- and middle-income countries (LMIC) to 
rethink the financing and organisation of their health care systems. 
Many countries are looking to health insurance as an alternative mechanism for financing 
health care and as a way to improve access to medical care for low-income groups (Abel- 
Smith 1992; Diop et al. 1995; Bennett et al. 1998; Yip and Berman 2001). Health insurance 
collects funds to pool and reduce the individual financial risk caused by the uncertainty about 
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future health status (Hurley 2000). Insurance lowers the out-of-pocket price for medical care 
at the time of purchase by smoothing payments across individuals and time (Barr 1992). 
However, the degree to which health insurance contributes to financial sustainability by 
reducing the financial pressure on public health care systems and improves access to care for 
the poor are empirical questions which have yet to be addressed by policy makers and 
research. 
Different types of health insurance systems exist and have been influenced by country- 
specific health policy objectives, institutional and market contexts, the population's socio- 
economic and cultural backgrounds, and the demand for insurance. In middle-income 
countries with strong formal sector employment, compulsory, state-organized health 
insurance systems, and voluntary, private health insurance are predominant. These insurers 
contract with or provide medical care in public and private health facilities (World Bank 
1992). 
In low income countries, problems related to information and contract enforcement limit the 
effectiveness of insurance markets, and have caused the poor to devise their own informal 
pooling and lending mechanisms to protect themselves against financial risks. Commonly, 
these risk-protection mechanisms are referred to as micro-health insurance (MHI), 
community-based, community-managed, or community-financed insurance schemes, mutual 
health organisations, "mutuelles", or prepayment schemes (PPS). 
Like standard health insurance, these risk-sharing schemes pool members' financial risk 
related to health by collecting small amounts of revenue from each member, to improve their 
financial access to health care and to raise resources for a financially depleted health sector 
(Bennett et al. 1998). Most of these informal risk-sharing mechanisms are: based on mutual, 
non-written agreements; monitored and enforced by group members; and organized on a 
community, a health facility's catchment area, cooperative, or workers' union level (Bennett 
et al. 1998). Besley (1995) sums them up as non-market institutions "... that make little use of 
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formal contractual obligations enforced through a codified legal system. There can, however, 
be well-defined rules of operation among the members of the institution, which are either 
embodied in a constitution or time-honoured tradition i' (Besley 1995). 
In Rwanda, concerns about a sharp drop in demand for medical services after the re- 
introduction of user fees in 1996, motivated the government to design and pilot-test micro- 
health insurance in three health districts before introducing it nationwide. Technical 
assistance was provided by the Partnerships for Health Reform (PHR) project. By offering 
insurance in a predominantly user fee financed health sector, the government aimed to 
improve access to health care, quality of care and contribute to the system's financial 
sustainability. Another objective was to have community representatives actively participate 
in designing their insurance schemes to ensure that MHI responds to the needs of this rural 
population (Schneider et al. 2000a). 
Designing health insurance involves choices about insurance features to balance the tradeoffs 
between risk-sharing and incentives. While risk-sharing through health insurance leads to 
gains in form of better access to care, some insurance features set behavioural incentives to 
market agents, which may lead to inefficiency and endanger the financial sustainability of 
insurance (Arrow 1963; Zeckhauser 1970; Manning and Marquis 1996; Cutler 2000). These 
incentives arise because of asymmetric information: the inability of insurers to monitor the 
actions of the insured and the provider. They include adverse selection, moral hazard, and 
supply-side induced demand. Adverse selection is caused by individual enrolment when 
primarily high-risk individuals insure themselves, resulting in high-risk pools. Moral hazard 
occurs when the insured overuse medical services because they co-pay a reduced price for 
care at the time of use. Supply-side induced demand results when providers oversupply care 
as a result of being reimbursed based on the number of services provided under fee-for- 
service (FFS) provider payment. One way the insurer can respond to these incentives is to 
`Pages 115-116. 
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shift part of the insurance risk to the insured and providers, who as a result will bear more 
risk than they would like (Cutler 2000). 
An extensive body of literature describes issues related to design, organisation, functioning, 
and the financial performance of MHI (Abel-Smith and Dua 1988; Diop et al. 1995; Atim 
1998; Bennett et al. 1998; ILO/PAHO 1999). In 2000, the ILO published an overview of 130 
MIR schemes from 26 countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America (ILO STEP 2000). 
Bennett et al. (1998) collected and evaluated information on the organisational, management, 
and financial features of 82 rural and urban non-formal sector health insurance schemes in 
Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Atim et al. (1998) gathered data from an inventory of 50 
mutual health insurance schemes in six West and Central African countries2 (Atim et al. 
1998). A report on 15 health insurance cases examined the requirements related to 
institutional and economic factors to extend insurance coverage in developing countries (La 
Forgia and Griffin 1993). ILO/PAHO synthesized eleven case studies on micro-health 
insurance in Latin America and the Caribbean (ILO/PAHO 1999). In a more recent report, 
ILO evaluated the impact on health policy goals of 258 community-based health 
organisations (ILO 2002). 
One common finding in these studies is the lack of data and analytical work on MHI. Hence, 
it is not surprising that in the absence of evidence on their effectiveness, the contribution of 
MIR to equity in financing and delivery of care or to sustainability in the health sector has 
been questioned. 
In addition, many risk-sharing schemes have emerged without the necessary technical 
assistance during the design phase. This has resulted in insurance designs that cause 
inefficiency in the consumption and supply of care, and negatively affect the financial 
viability of MIII (ILO/PAHO 1999; Liu and Mills 1999). To protect their financial situation, 
some MHI tend to sacrifice equity goals by increasing premium levels and adopting measures 
Z Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali, Senegal, Togo 
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to deter the sick from enrolling. As a result, poor households have been excluded from 
enrolment, as they cannot afford to pay increasing premiums and co-payments, or because 
they are economically active in the informal sector, where MHI is less likely to be offered 
(Abel-Smith and Dua 1988). 
These concerns about the effectiveness of MHI have created a need for research on risk- 
sharing strategies to examine how MHI can become an effective alternative to user fees and 
contribute to health policy objectives including better quality of care, the efficient use of 
limited resources, equity in financing and utilisation of care, and sustainability in the health 
sector (Mills 1983; Diop et al. 1995; Bennett et al. 1998; Gilson et al. 2000). 
This thesis aims to contribute knowledge about health insurance in a low-income context, and 
respond to this research need by assessing the performance of the Rwandan MHI against 
principles of equity and sustainability. 
Equity in financing and utilisation of health care is defined according to the egalitarian equity 
principle: health care is financed according to households' socio-economic background; and 
medical care is allocated based on patients' health need promoting equality in health status 
(Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 1998). A sustainable MIII is considered as a function of two 
components. First, an insurance design that sets incentives for efficient production and 
consumption of medical care, and for efficient MHI management; and second, a mix of 
funding from private, public and donor sources that ensures equity in health financing. 
Together, these components reflect a socially sustainable MIII, whose credibility will attract 
regular funds from donors and government to complement premium revenue and ensure 
equity in financing and covering of full operational cost on a sustainable basis (Uvin et al. 
2000). 
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1.1 Aims and objectives 
This thesis puts forward evidence on the Rwandan prepayment schemes and their impact on 
equity and sustainability in the health sector. It draws from the economic and social literature 
related to health insurance, equity and sustainability; and uses routine and survey data 
collected on insured and uninsured groups from providers, MHI, households, patients and 
focus groups in Rwanda over the period July 1998 to September 2000 to evaluate the 
contribution of the current MHI to equity in health financing and medical service use, to the 
protection of poor households' socio-economic situation against unforeseen financial shocks 
related to ill-health, and to sustainability in the health sector. Based on findings, a MHI 
design is proposed with risk-pooling on a district level. 
Two specific objectives have guided the research: 
Objective 1- Based on the economic and social literature on decision-making under risk, 
health insurance, equity and the minimum standard approach and by using data collected 
during the Rwandan prepayment phase, to evaluate whether MEl responds to egalitarian 
equity principles in health financing and in medical service use, and protects the socio- 
economic situation of the poor against financial shocks related to ill-health. 
First, to identify socio-economic and demographic characteristics that determine the 
demand for MHI among households who have the option to insure or remain 
uninsured. 
Second, to examine the degree to which MIR contributes to horizontal equity in 
utilisation, compared to user fees. 
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Third, to quantify and compare the progressivity and redistributive effects of MHI 
and of user fees to see which system better responds to the egalitarian equity notion 
in utilisation and financing of health care. 
Fourth, based on the minimum standard approach to evaluate and compare the 
impact of MHI and of user fees on households' socio-economic situation. 
Objective 2- To develop a sustainable risk-sharing design on a district level. 
First, based on payer-specific cost analysis, to examine and compare the impact on 
recurrent cost and efficiency in health centres of MHI with capitation payment and 
of user fees paid by the uninsured. 
Second, based on the equity, cost and efficiency results from the above analysis, to 
derive a MHI design for an eventual scale up of MHI coverage and benefits. 
The literature and existing evidence from the Rwandan pilot phase experience are used to 
support the findings of this research. Previous PHR analysis on MHI membership and 
utilisation and financing conducted tabulated mean values by insurance status. Results were 
presented to the Ministry of Health and the project financer (Schneider et al. 2001 a). This 
thesis differs from previous PHR analysis (see Annex Table 4). 
The thesis contains eight chapters divided into four parts, and an appendix. The next Chapter 
begins with a literature review on concepts related to equity, sustainability, and health 
insurance, and derives the analytical framework. The third Chapter describes the study area, 
survey methods and data sources. Chapter 4 advances on the PHR report (Schneider and Diop 
2001) by conducting additional specifications and checks on the demand for insurance. The 
analytical Chapters 5 and 6 are completely new. Chapter 5 evaluates the implications of MHI 
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and user fees on horizontal equity in utilisation, the progressivity and the redistributive effect 
of health financing; and following the minimum standard approach, the extent to which MHI 
and user fees protect households' socio-economic situation against the financial risk related 
to ill-health. Chapter 6 uses an econometric approach to conduct a payer-specific cost- 
analysis in health centres. Based on these analytical results and a review of the scale up 
literature, Chapter 7 discusses overall findings and concludes with recommendations for 
policy-makers and implications for further research. The appendix contains information in 
support of the thesis; and a list of articles written on the basis of this analysis that have been 
submitted to peer-reviewed journals. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This Chapter begins with an overview of the literature on theories related to equity, 
sustainability and health insurance, which leads to deriving the analytical framework 
2.1 Equity in health financing and utilisation 
2.1.1 Theories of equity 
Equity is a normative concept, grounded in the principle of distributive justice (Le Grand 
1991). A distribution or allocation is "... an assignment of objects to specific individuals P, 3 
(Young 1994). According to Le Grand (1991), equity in a distribution needs to be evaluated 
considering an individual's personal choice-set between different goods. If goods are 
distributed unequally due to personal choice, then the result is not considered as inequitable. 
However, it will be inequitable if this happens for reasons beyond personal control, including 
individuals' socio-economic and initial endowment situation and to some extent their 
`cultural' preferences. Also, chance or bad and good luck affect an individual's choice and 
how equitable a distribution is (Le Grand 1991). 
A distribution involves three decisions: the amount to be allocated, the allocation rule, and an 
individual's reaction to the distribution (Young 1994). Applied to health, it implies 
identifying the amount of medical care made available to different groups (Gwatkin 2001), 
and defining how the burden of health financing is distributed among the population. 
An allocation rule is a "... method that allocates any given supply of goods among any 
potential group of claimants according to the salient characteristics of these claimants' 
(Young 1994). It invokes principles to justify the allocation. The three main distribution 
concepts are parity, proportionality, and priority. Parity means that all individuals are treated 
equally, mainly because they are equal. Under proportionality, differences among people are 
3 Page 7. 
' Page S. 
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recognized and service is provided in proportion to these differences. Priority causes the 
person with the greatest claim (e. g. the sickest) to receive the service (Young 1994). Health 
financing and delivery mechanisms can be designed such that they respond to parity, 
proportionality or priority rules. 
Finally, an individual decides how to react to the allocation depending on his or her 
preferences (Young 1994). In circumstances of certainty or full information, individuals' 
choices are rational when determined by a rational set of preferences. However, due to 
asymmetric distribution of information in health care, patients tend not to be fully informed 
about their options (Arrow 1963). In addition, moral constraints, preferences shared within 
communities, power situations, and peer-pressure by others (Fukuyama 1995) may influence 
individuals' reactions to distributions and distributive outcome. In health, this may cause 
patients to receive inferior quality care with traditional healers instead of treatment by a 
professional medical provider. 
Different equity theories suggest how goods can be distributed. They go back to Aristotle, 
who said that `goods should be divided in proportion to each claimant's contribution' (Young 
1994). Other notions are the utilitarian and the libertarian views, Rawls' theory of justice, and 
the egalitarian view. 
All these theories, and most obviously utilitarianism, assign an important place to 
conceptions of individual good, welfare, or well-being, which tend to be measured by levels 
of utility or of preference-satisfaction. This preference-satisfaction view has been questioned. 
In applied work, more objective measures like income are used to proxy preference- 
satisfaction. Rawls' theory of justice proposes an alternative conception of well-being. Well- 
being is measured by an "index of primary social goods", which includes all-purpose goods 
such as rights, opportunities, wealth, income and education. This index does not serve as a 
proxy for utility level. Rather, it reflects a basis for reaching a social agreement on the 
important components of well-being (Hausman and McPherson 1993). 
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Sen (1997) sees Rawls' primary social goods approach as incomplete. He suggests that not 
only external goods, but also individuals' internal features and capabilities such as their 
health status, affect their well-being. Being in good health may be impaired by internal 
obstacles (being handicapped) and external ones (lacking the money to pay for care). 
Following Sen, well-being should be defined in terms of the set of "functionings" an 
individual achieves. It requires assigning relative weights to different capabilities and 
"functionings" (Sen 1997). These different approaches show that although income is by no 
means the only way to measure well-being, practically, it is one of the easiest. 
Utilitarianism is distribution-indifferent and does not allow distinguishing between different 
individuals. It has an aggregative focus on equality, aiming to maximize some function of the 
sum of individuals' welfare. The assumption is that everybody's initial capacity is equal. 
Thus, everyone should be treated the same way in arriving at simple aggregates (Sen 2001). 
Utilitarianism implies allocating resources efficiently according to the likelihood of success, 
and in order to maximize social welfare. The utilitarian notion has been criticized as ethically 
questionable: it might impose harm on a few to improve the situation for many (Young 
1994). Non-utilitarian views that emphasize the notions of fairness and justice understand 
fairness and justice in the sense of treating the interest of different individuals accordingly, 
which might involve avoiding harm to other people (iausman and McPherson 1993). 
The libertarian equity view is concerned with free choices. It advocates the distribution of 
goods according to individuals' choice and willingness to pay for the different type of goods 
they want. In health, free choice `gives people the freedom' to purchase the lind and quality 
of health care they like and are willing to pay for (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 1993). This 
freedom can be limited by rights. 
Rights may justify imposing a variety of duties on individuals. The right to health could be 
justified on the grounds of overall well-being, and invoke the duty of seeking care with 
professional medical providers only, which limits freedom of choice (Hausman and 
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McPherson 1993). This is relevant in a low-income context. Traditional healers could offer 
ambiguous quality of care and fail to inform people about the causes of illness. In such cases, 
the libertarian view of `free provider choice' could be considered as dangerous, and 
individuals' care-seeking behaviour as driven by `cultural preference', leading to inequitable 
distributions. 
According to Rawls' theory of justice, a distribution should invoke a social minimum that is 
comparable to a basic "safety net" to those who cannot support themselves, or a minimum 
standard. This social minimum involves two principles. First, people have equal rights to the 
most extensive basic liberties (principles of priority of liberty). Second, social and economic 
inequalities should be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, and attached to positions 
open to all under fair equality of opportunity (difference principle) (Hausman and McPherson 
1993). 
The "maximin" interpretation of Rawls focuses on the difference principle. It suggests that 
society should maximize the primary goods for the least well-off representative individual. 
This would result in income of the least well-off being maximized, based on principles of 
justice and not of charity. Thus, Rawlsian justice and utilitarianism provide scope for 
redistributive activities to raise average welfare or to protect the least well-off (Hausman and 
McPherson 1993). 
The egalitarian twin principle of equity is based on the Marxist principles `from each 
according to his ability' and `distribution according to need' (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 
1993). The underlying rationale is that health is a precondition for people to live as human 
beings. Health is generally affected by unforeseen shocks and health care is perceived as the 
solution to restore health status following a shock (Culyer and Wagstaff 1993). 
The egalitarians consider a system as equitable if it is financed according to individuals' 
income situation or ability to pay, and if treatment is distributed based on patients' need to 
achieve better health, as judged by providers and unrestricted by patients' income and wealth. 
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Individuals' `ability to pay' as revealed by socio-economic status has always served as a base 
to define financial contributions, e. g. taxes (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 1993; Young 1994). 
`Need' as expressed by reported illness or health status tends to be juxtaposed with treatment 
received; though this connection is controversial as the poor might ignore illness more (out of 
necessity) than rich individuals do (Van de Walle 1994). 
Equity theories focus on the distribution of delivery and financing of health care, and are less 
concerned about the poverty implications of health care payments. But health and poverty are 
intertwined. An illness that is unprevented or untreated for reasons like poverty, rather than 
personal choice, has a particular negative relevance to equity (Sen 2001). 
Poverty tends to be described by the ability to purchase a given bundle of goods in absolute 
terms, or by people's perception of the amount of money needed to get along in relative 
terms. Absolute poverty serves to derive a fixed poverty line (PL), comparable to a minimum 
living standard for survival, according to which the poor are classified below and the non- 
poor above the line (Deaton 1998). Financial shocks caused by ill-health may affect 
individuals' consumption as well as earning capacities, and push them into or further below 
the poverty line (Wagstaff 2001). 
The minimum standard approach (MSA) is concerned with medical expenditures causing 
households' initial endowment or income to exceed or fall short of a threshold, defined in 
proportional or in absolute terms of income. A proportional threshold implies that health care 
payments do not exceed a pre-specified fraction of income, and excess spending would be 
considered as catastrophic. The poverty line is an example of a threshold defined as a 
minimum in terms of the absolute level of income (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 2001). 
Based on the moral position that no one ought to spend more than a given fraction of income 
on health, the MSA aims to ensure that households have enough money to pay for other 
goods (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 2001). This position relies on basic human rights, such 
as the universal entitlement `to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of 
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oneself and one's family, including food, clothing, housing, and medical care's (Pogge 2002). 
Thus, health financing action or inaction leading to poverty, or failure to respond to health 
financing conditions that perpetuate poverty, reflect violations of basic human rights (WHO 
1978). 
This thesis considers both the utilitarian and libertarian equity principles as inappropriate in 
the health insurance context researched. They may cause harm or grant access to medical care 
of ambiguous quality. Rawls' theory of justice is dismissed on the grounds that the focus of 
this thesis is on equity in financing and utilisation, rather than on procedural justice; however, 
it is recognized that the maximin interpretation of Rawlsian justice reflects egalitarian equity 
principles. The thesis applies the egalitarian view to examine equity in delivery and financing 
of health care, and the minimum standard approach to analyse the financial implications of 
health financing and whether MHI is a means to effectively protect households' income 
against financial shocks created by ill-health, compared to user fees. 
2.1.2 Equity in health 
Health is seen as a precondition for people to flourish as human beings. A population's health 
is affected by a set of proximate determinants including a country's accumulated `stock of 
capital' like medical capital, sanitation, and access to safe water (Creese and Newbrander 
1992); and citizens' financial and geographical access to quality care like surgery and 
treatment of infectious diseases (Wilkinson 1996); the distribution of financial and human 
assets among citizens; and community factors like social values, lifestyle, and attitude 
towards risk (Wagstaff 2001). 
Health inequalities have widened within many societies and mostly to the disadvantage of the 
poor (Wagstaff 2001); and become an inequity problem if a society disagrees with the rich 
Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, approved and proclaimed as resolution 217 
A (III) by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1948. 
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receiving superior care. Health inequity is embedded in a larger understanding of justice (Sen 
2001). It reflects the systematic differences across socio-economic groups in one or more 
aspects of health (Macinko and Starfield 2002), including achievement of health, the 
capability of achieving health, and the distribution of health (Sen 2001). Pursuing equity in 
health means eliminating health disparities between different socio-economic groups, which 
requires correcting the fundamental causes of disparities (Wilkinson 1996). 
Thus, health inequalities cannot be surmounted by health financing reforms alone, but need to 
be addressed on a macro-economic level through broader socio-economic reforms. MHI may 
improve access to care and narrow the health inequity gap among its members over time. 
However, in Rwanda, detailed longitudinal data on health status would be needed to conclude 
on the association between MIR membership, members' health status and health inequalities. 
Health inequalities will therefore not be investigated in this thesis. 
2.1.3 Equity in utilisation 
The rationale for looking at equity in utilisation of medical care is based on the presumption 
that health care is the appropriate way to restore ill-health (Culyer and Wagstaff 1993). 
According to the egalitarian equity notion, equity in utilisation of care means that those in 
equal need use care equally. This implies that health personnel provide care according to 
patients' health status. As suggested by the priority principle, it results in preferential care for 
the severely ill, in order to reduce health differences between them and the less sick (Young 
1994). 
The egalitarian perception that equity in utilisation should not adversely affect the living 
standard of households serves as a link to equitable health financing (Wagstaff and Van 
Doorslaer 2001). 
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2.1.4 Equity in financing 
The use of medical care can be expensive and endanger households' ability to purchase other 
goods and services they need to flourish as human beings, such as food or clothing (Culyer 
and Wagstaff 1993). In this thesis, a fair distribution of utilisation and financing of health 
care relies on two conditions: (1) the egalitarian equity principles of progressive health 
financing and utilisation of health care based on patients' health status; and (2) the minimum 
standards approach. 
Following methods used in the taxation literature, equitable financing of health care can be 
based on horizontal and vertical equity concepts (Kakwani 1977; Aronson, Johnson and 
Lambert 1994). Horizontal equity in health financing implies that individuals with equal 
income make equal payments, independent of health status, gender, or place of residence 
(Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 1993). 
Vertical equity in financing recognizes that the initial income and wealth distribution is 
inequitable. The resulting financing policy aims to correct for these inequities by setting 
progressive income-dependent financing rates, with higher income groups contributing a 
higher rate of their income to health than poorer groups (Le Grand 1991). Regressive health 
financing (a growing share of income as income decreases) would contribute to inequitable 
health financing. For example, social insurance leans towards regressivity if it is a fixed 
proportion of earning up to a maximum (Van Doorslaer and Wagstaff 1993). The justification 
for using the progressive financing principle in this thesis is that the richer can absorb the 
costs of paying a higher rate more easily than the poor (Young 1994). 
In the context of already high levels of poverty, it would be considered as unjust if health 
financing would have an adverse affect on poor households' disposable income and push 
them further into poverty. This has been suggested based on evidence from Asia, where user 
fee payments have pushed more near-poor into poverty and the poor further into poverty (Liu 
and Hsiao 2001; Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 2001). Hence, in a very poor society, 
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progressive health financing may be insufficient to protect the poor. Therefore, this thesis 
also uses the minimum standard approach to evaluate the impact of health financing on 
insured and uninsured households' socio-economic situation. 
2.2 Sustainability through MHI 
Whether a health financing mechanism is sustainable depends on the financial, organisational 
and institutional context, which is presented in this section. 
2.2.1 Financial and organisational sustainability 
The notion of sustainability has changed over time. In the seventies, donors argued that 
sustainability is "the capacity of the health system to function effectively over time with 
minimum external input "6 (LaFond 1995). The term `minimum external input' has been 
interpreted as health systems becoming self-reliant. From this donor point of view, a project 
was perceived as sustainable when - once initial start-up costs were financed by donors - 
governments take over donor responsibilities, including operational costs, and are able to 
cover project costs independent of donor assistance (LaFond 1995). This narrow, financial 
notion of sustainability has been mostly abandoned. 
The focus has shifted from `input' only to include sustainable `output'. In 1995, the World 
Bank defined sustainable health financing as "the capacity to generate, over time, sufficient, 
reliable resources to deliver continued and improved health for a growing population with a 
minimum of external inputs. It requires sufficient inputs into the health system, the effective 
and efficient use of these resources, and the delivery of services on a continuous basis"7 
(World Bank 1998). This sustainability definition acknowledges the need for some external 
inputs and for capacity building "to redress existing inefficiencies in resource use and to 
6 Page 17. 
7 Page 10. 
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enable any additional revenue to be used effectively over time... "8 (Gilson 1996). It relates 
financial with organisational sustainability. 
A definition from 1997 suggests that financial sustainability reflects "the extent to which 
national or local health expenditures are funded from national resources, or more flexibly, as 
the medium to long term stability of a mix of funding sources "9 (McPake and Kutzin 1997). 
Such a funding mix includes taxation, social insurance contributions, user fees, private health 
insurance, and loans and grants from donors. The emphasis is on the stability of a funding 
mix, which can include external sources. 
More recently, sustainability definitions focus on long-term donor financial commitment and 
strengthening of human, organisational and institutional capacity. Sustainable health services 
are defined as "... operated by an organisational system with the long-term ability to 
mobilize and allocate sufficient resources for activities that meet individual or public health 
needs" (Olsen 1998). The sustainability of health services is affected by (1) the socio- 
economic environment; (2) the health sector's activity profile such as the health services to be 
delivered; and (3) organisational capacities for service delivery (Olsen 1998). 
This concept highlights the system's performance while acknowledging various constraints. 
It leads to the definition of `social sustainability', meaning that an organisation is seen as 
socially sustainable if its credibility and quality of performance attract durable funds from 
donors and government to complement market-derived income to meet full operational cost 
on a sustainable basis (Uvin et al. 2000). 
A sustainable health insurance scheme needs a large and growing membership pool. 
Insurance enrolment may be affected by consumers' trust in insurers' and providers' 
performance, as expressed by their adherence to professional practices and standards 
(Mechanic 1996). This trust-enrolment-sustainability link also highlights the fragility of 
8 Page 36. 
9 Page 40. 
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health systems when performance is weak. Consumers' placement of trust in insurance may 
be conditional upon consumers' trust in providers who contract with the insurance. Hence, 
withdrawing trust by one actor may have a domino effect throughout the system and threaten 
its sustainability (Coleman 1984). 
Applied to the MHI context, organisational and financial sustainability are important issues. 
MHI tend to serve a population who is too poor to finance its own medical service use and 
insurance premium; and MHI mainly operate in low-income areas, where organisational and 
human capacity is limited and illiteracy rates are high (Bennett et al. 1998). 
This suggests that the financial sustainability of MIII relies on the medium to long term 
stability of a mix of funding sources. In addition, as poor people lack resources, human 
capacity, information, and access to outside sources for help to run complex organisations, 
the organisational sustainability of MHI requires technical and financial assistance to develop 
organisational capacity and skills in management, administration, negotiation, information 
systems, and evaluation. 
As resources are fungible, the financial sustainability of MHI should be monitored and 
evaluated within the broader health system. A health sub-system, such as MHI, might appear 
to be financially sustainable but in fact, could be drawing resources from other sources, 
including from uninsured patients (McPake and Kutzin 1997). 
2.2.2 Sustainability within the institutional context 
The market and institutional context within which a health system operates may affect its 
sustainability. The institutional context contains the formal rules and informal norms which 
define how agents interact in a market, and may support equitable health financing and the 
efficient use of resources (Mills et al. 2001). The market structure sets behavioural incentives 
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to insurers, thereby influencing the extent to which they compete with each other for 
population groups and better quality providers (Kutzin 2001). 
In the context of MHI, quality competition may be less relevant. This is because there are few 
MHI and providers in a local market and financial constraints limit poor consumers' choice 
of MHI and providers. But if competition does improve a system's effectiveness, then its 
absence highlights the importance of effective institutions. 
Figure 2.1 visualizes this relationship. It depicts four insurance features (discussed in the next 
section) within the institutional context and the health market structure (Kutzin 2001). 
Figure 2.1: Insurance within the institutional and market context 
Institutional, Insurance features: 
Regulatory, Socio- - Fund collection mechanism Market structure for 
economic, and - Fund pooling health insurance and Informational - Purchasing mechanism edical providers Context - Service provision 
(Source: adapted from Kutzin, 2001) 
To be sustainable within this environment, insurance should adapt to area- and trade-specific 
living and working conditions of its target population, and be responsive to political opinion 
leaders and the communities within which it operates (Bennett et al. 1998; Gilson et al. 2000; 
Wagstaff 2001). Governments play an important role by ensuring an institutional, 
administrative and legal framework that supports the sustainability of organisations. 
Considering the socio-economic and institutional context within which MHI operates, a 
sustainability concept is derived for this thesis that sees MHI as a function of three 
components. First, an organizationally sustainable MIR relies on human capacity and 
organisational self-reliance. In a context of poverty and high illiteracy rates, this 
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organisational component requires technical and financial assistance, and structures that 
develop and support existing capacities (e. g. MHI managers) on an ongoing basis. Second, 
the insurance design sets incentives for efficient production and consumption of medical care. 
Third, MIR attracts a mix of funding from private, public and donor sources that ensures 
equity in health financing. 
Together, these components reflect a socially sustainable MHI meaning that technical and 
financial assistance targeted to skill and organisation building will enhance the quality of 
performance of member-managed and -owned MIR. The resulting MHI credibility will 
attract durable funds from donors and government to complement premium revenue and 
ensure equity in financing and covering of full operational cost on a sustainable basis. 
2.3 MHl features and their relationship with equity and 
sustainability 
Health insurance features include: fund collection, pooling, provider payment, and service 
provision (Kutzin 2001). They set behavioural incentives that affect equity and sustainability 
in health financing and delivery. Table 2.2 at the end of this section provides an overview. 
2.3.1 Fund collection 
Insurance funds include voluntary and compulsory premiums paid by individuals and 
employers, and subsidies from donors and governments (Kutzin 2001). 
Due to the asymmetric distribution of information in health systems, premiums may set 
incentives to insurers and individuals that lead to adverse selection and risk selection (Mas- 
Collel, Whinston and Green 1995). Adverse selection by individuals is comparable with 
`lemons' or inferior quality cars in an automobile market. Individuals know that they are 
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`lemons' or high risks, which they can hide from the insurer, who does not know whether the 
premium charged reflects individuals' risk level. Rational high-risk individuals aim to enrol 
at an average premium level that underestimates their risk (Akerlof 1970). Low-risks will opt 
for low premium with higher co-payments, or choose not to insure if the premium is too high 
relative to their risk status (Hurley 2000). 
Individuals' self-selection allows insurers to estimate their loss probability, and select risks 
by encouraging or discouraging individuals from enrolling. Insurers' seeking of favourable 
risks is referred to as "cream-skimming", whereas "dumping" means shedding bad risks 
(Ellis 1998). Risk selection hampers equity objectives if the poor are high-risk patients and 
the premium becomes unaffordable for them (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976). 
Premiums are either calculated based on community rating, risk rating, or income (Barr 1992; 
Sheldon and Smith 2000). Adverse selection is problematic under community rating as all 
pay the same premium, independent of their health risk and income. Private insurers charge 
risk-basedi° premiums by accounting for consumers' risk of service use to prevent adverse 
selection and high risks from enrolling (Begg et al. 2000). Income-dependent premiums are 
defined independent of individuals' health. Like taxes, income-dependent premiums can be 
set as proportional or progressive rates of income. The purpose of progressively set rates is 
twofold: first, to ensure equity in health financing; and second, to redistribute finances within 
an insurance pool by cross-subsidising care from richer "low-service users" to poorer "high- 
service users" (Sheldon and Smith 2000). This latter objective may not be reached, if the 
richer happen to be high service users. 
Insurance that serves a poor population is likely to generate insufficient revenue from total 
premiums to cover insurance expenditures, necessitating some form of external subsidy. 
Generally, governments subsidize the supply-side of medical care, mainly in hospitals, which 
10 Rates are generally defined proportional to individuals' expected cost based on observable 
characteristics, mainly gender and age. The US federal Medicare program, for example uses age, 
gender, welfare status, and county-of-residence adjusters to set prices to managed-care plans. 
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raises equity concerns if the poor use less subsidised care than richer groups (Castro-Leal et 
al. 2000). 
An alternative mechanism for delivering a subsidy is through the demand-side by targeting 
the poor through subsidised insurance premiums. Subsidizing insurance of the poor can be 
justified by efficiency arguments related to the merit good nature of health insurance and the 
positive externalities generated by improved access to health care, which could prevent the 
spread of infectious diseases (Begg et al. 2000). 
Although subsidies contribute to cost recovery and equity, MM and providers still have the 
behavioural incentive to "cream-skim" or shift costs across different payers, for example by 
increasing premiums and co-payment levels for the insured, or user fees for the uninsured. 
2.3.2 Pooling of insurance funds 
Insurance pools and spreads different and independent financial risks related to illness over a 
large number of pool members, aiming to reduce each member's stake at risk (Begg et al. 
2000). In voluntary health insurance, the pooling and collecting organisations are identical, 
whereas in a compulsory system, health insurers may pool funds and the government collects 
them (Kutzin 2001). 
The insurance pooling equilibrium may become unstable due to adverse selection and cream- 
skimming, and endanger insurance sustainability. In a competitive market, a pooling 
equilibrium is unstable when other insurers bid away the low-risks by offering them a lower- 
price policy (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976; Barr 1992). In practice, some pooling with 
heterogeneous individuals exists and high-risk, rather than low-risk, individuals are excluded 
from insurance, mainly due to pre-existing conditions. Nonetheless, insurers' risk-segregation 
in a given institutional setting will increase their contract costs (e. g. for establishing specific 
plans). Thus, only a limited number of plans will be offered in a local market, and some 
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individuals may not find a welcoming insurance plan (Newhouse 1996), leading to equity 
concerns if these are mainly poor individuals. 
Unstable pooling can be avoided by compulsory insurance, and limited in voluntary schemes 
by risk-adjusted premiums, group enrolment, waiting periods (e. g. of one month after 
enrolment before insured has right to use benefits), open enrolment, and by extending the 
enrolment time (Barr 1992). 
2.3.3 Purchasing mechanisms 
Purchasing is the transfer of pooled funds from the insurer to providers for contracted 
services provided to patients. This relationship is characterized by a multiple principal-agent 
problem, arising from asymmetric information. It involves delegation of responsibilities, 
decision-making authority and funds from an ill-informed principal (insurer) to a well- 
informed agent (provider) (Ellis and McGuire 1993). Both try to maximize their utility, while 
having asymmetric information, different attitudes towards risk, and different objectives 
(Mas-Collel et al. 1995). 
Provider payment methods are either retrospective or prospectively defined. Under a 
retrospective or cost-based reimbursement (e. g. fee-for-service and per diem payment), 
insurers reimburse providers a negotiated price for each service provided. It imposes the 
fmancial risk on the insurer and gives no incentives to providers to improve their 
productivity. Rather, providers are encouraged to increase the quantity of services delivered, 
thereby contributing to patients' moral hazard behaviour and medical cost increases. Insurers 
will try to finance cost increases by setting higher premiums, or demand public sources to 
maintain financial viability (Barr 1992). Equity concerns arise if higher premiums exclude the 
poor from enrolment. 
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Prospective provider payments such as diagnosis related groups (DRGs) and capitation 
payments are lump-sum payments to providers. They are calculated by episode of illness, or 
by the size of population groups (Barr 1992). Prospective payment imposes the full financial 
risk on providers and sets the incentive to produce efficiently, that is to use the least 
expensive combination of inputs to produce a given amount and quality level of care 
(Barnum and Kutzin 1993). It discourages moral hazard behaviour and supply-side induced 
demand for care. But providers also have an incentive to avoid high cost patients if they 
receive the same capitation amount for each patient (Ellis 1998), and to under-provide care if 
patients are poorly informed and the marginal revenue of a service is less than marginal costs 
(Newhouse 1996). Risk-adjusted capitation payment reimburses providers higher amounts for 
more severely ill patients, independent of their socio-economic situation. This creates an 
incentive to provide the efficient level of services by reducing the returns to risk selection by 
providers. 
Providers whose revenue sources come from several payment systems (e. g. user fees, fee-for- 
service, capitation, and patients' co-payment) have less incentive to be productive. Rather, 
they may try to shift costs across different payment systems (Newhouse 1996). If capitation 
payment does not cover providers' medical expenditures for the insured, providers may react 
by increasing user fees, aiming to cross-subsidize from uninsured to insured services. While 
such cost shifting will increase prices and limit access to care for the uninsured, it also sets an 
incentive to insure. 
Providers may shift costs to the insured by increasing co-payment levels (Ellis 1990). Higher 
co-payment levels may limit moral hazard behaviour and enrolment choice in a competitive 
market; and create equity concerns if it limits treatment for the poor insured. It may also lead 
to contract re-negotiations between providers and insurers to adjust reimbursement rates, or 
limit the effect of mixed payment systems. 
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Thus, provider payments may set incentives that create inefficiencies and cost escalation. It 
leads to equity concerns if the less informed, among them the poor, are excluded from care. 
2.3.4 Provision of health care services 
Greater insurance coverage implies less risk bearing by the insured, who can buy more 
medical services than when paying user fees (Zeckhauser 1970; Cutler 2000). Providers use 
the money received from insurers to finance care allocated to insured patients. This allocation 
is characterized by asymmetric information: providers are better informed about diagnosis 
and treatment options than patients. 
In the provider-patient relationship, insurance may create behavioural incentives that lead to 
inefficiencies, such as moral hazard and supply-side induced demand. Supply-side induced 
demand occurs when providers, knowing that patients do not pay the full price of treatment, 
have an incentive to increase the quantity as well as price of services provided, if they are 
reimbursed retrospectively (Hurley 2000). Moral hazard is treatment where marginal cost 
exceeds marginal benefit. It arises ex ante if insured individuals adapt a riskier behaviour and 
affect the probability of loss; and ex post if insured individuals affect the size of loss by 
inappropriate use of care as insurance reduces their expenditures (Zeckhauser 1970). 
Moral hazard and supply-side induced demand threaten insurers' financial sustainability. 
Insurers will aim to limit related inefficiencies through demand-side cost sharing strategies, 
such as co-payments; or supply-side mechanisms (Hurley 2000). Patient co-payments affect 
care-seeking behaviour, but have little influence on providers' cost of care. Alternatively, 
some services may be excluded from insurance coverage, creating equity concerns if these 
services are mainly used by the poor. Supply-side cost sharing like capitation payment sets an 
incentive to providers to produce efficiently (Newhouse 1996). But it may also have negative 
quality effects on aspects of treatment not easily monitored by patients (Hurley 2000), which 
will most likely harm the less informed who tend to be the poor. 
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Table 2.2 presents an overview of the four insurance features and the underlying theories. 
The features can take different forms, which will result in different incentives to market 
agents and affect equity and sustainability in health care. 
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2.4 Analytical framework: Equity and sustainability implications 
of MHI 
Designing health insurance involves choices about different insurance features, which set 
financial incentives to providers and the insured. Insurance features can be designed such that 
they balance eventual losses and gains created by health insurance. 
Zeckhauser (1970) uses a conceptual approach to compare the welfare loss from moral hazard 
and the welfare gain from increased risk-sharing and reduced uncertainty. He examines risk- 
sharing and appropriate insurance incentives and recommends defining insurance features 
(e. g. co-payment levels, benefit package) to prevent frivolous service use and over- 
expenditure (Zeckhauser 1970). 
Manning et al (1987) replicate this `optimal' insurance problem based on empirical data 
collected in the RAND study. Their findings uphold Zeckhauser's results: demand-side cost- 
sharing in form of an optimal co-payment rate should equalize the marginal gain from 
increased risk pooling and the marginal loss from increased moral hazard (Manning et al. 
1987). Newhouse (1996) examines the supply-side, and suggests that tradeoffs between 
efficiency in the production of care and insurers' risk-selection behaviour can be affected by 
the amount of supply-side cost sharing, for example through prospective provider payment 
(Newhouse 1996). 
The literature review on equity, sustainability and health insurance serves to derive the 
analytical framework employed in this thesis, presented in Figure 2.3. The tradeoffs created 
between welfare gains caused by reduced uncertainty and losses from risk-sharing are 
recognized. Given the equity and sustainability concerns related to micro-health insurance in 
a low-income context, this thesis examines three insurance features and their equity and 
sustainability implications in the current MIR design and in a scale up: first, insurance funds 
in form of premiums and subsidies; second, members' sharing of cost of the benefit package; 
and third, provider payment mechanism. The institutional, socio-economic and health 
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situation in a health system affect these features, which is described in Chapter 3 in the 
context of the study area. 
Greater equity implies that premium levels are set by considering households' socio- 
economic situation. On the other side, premium levels could induce insurers to prevent the 
poor from enrolling if their medical costs endanger insurance sustainability. Chapter 4 
estimates the determinants of the demand for MITI, based on expected utility theory, and aims 
to understand whether premium levels exclude the poor from MHI. 
MHI members' cost-sharing level in form of co-payment captures the tradeoff between gains 
though risk pooling and inefficiencies in the demand for care (e. g. moral hazard). But, 
patients' cost-sharing level may create inequities in service utilisation, and combined with 
premiums, cause regressive health financing. As a result MHI could fail to protect poor 
households' income against impoverishing health spending. Based on the egalitarian equity 
notion and the minimum standard approach, Chapter 5 examines whether MHI is a health 
financing tool that is equitable and protects members' socio-economic situation against 
financial shocks related to ill-health. 
The sustainability of insurance is endangered by cost increases due to inefficient provision of 
care, which may cause insurers to prevent the sicker and the poorer from enrolling, or to shift 
the insurance financial risk to providers. This tradeoff between efficiency in the production of 
care and risk selection is captured by the amount of supply-side cost sharing through provider 
payment (Newhouse 1996). Chapter 6 examines the supply-side. The cost and efficiency 
implications of two provider payment mechanisms in health centres are compared: MIII with 
capitation payment and user fees paid by the uninsured. 
The incentives created by these three insurance features ought to be balanced in order to 
achieve equity and sustainability. Based on the results from the three analytical chapters and a 
review of the literature on scaling up, Chapter 7 proposes an insurance design for an MHI 
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scale up to improve equity and sustainability in the health district. Organizational and 
institutional implications are discussed. 
Figure 2.3: Analytical framework 
Institutional context 
Social sustainability notion 
Sustainability 
- Risk selection 
- Efficiency in D for care 
- Efficiency in S of care 
Expanding health 
insurance features: 
- Fund collection 
- Fund pooling 
- Purchasing 
- Benefit package 
Regulatory context 
Socio-economic context 
Egalitarian equity notion 
Minimum standard approach 
Equity 
- Demand for MFR 
- Utilisation of care 
- Health financing 
Income protection 
Health context 
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Chapter 3: Study Area, Survey Methods, and 
Data Sources 
3.1 Socio-economic situation 
With an estimated nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of USD 250 in 1999, 
Rwanda is one of the poorest countries in the world. Real GDP grew 6 percent in 1999, and 
real average annual growth has been projected to remain on this level until 2005. The annual 
growth rate of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) was 2 percent in 2000 and negative the year 
before (Ministry of Economics and Finance 2000). Annex Table 1 presents an overview of 
the Rwandan Economic and Development Indicators for the years 1998 - 2000. 
Rwanda has a population of about 8 million, of which half are below the age of 20. The 
annual population growth rate was 2.8 percent in 1998, the same level as reported for sub- 
Saharan Africa as a whole. The average level of illiteracy is 44 percent among the adult 
population, ranging from 39 percent among the better-off to 51 percent among households in 
lowest consumption quintile. The religious composition of the population is estimated to be 
5% Muslims, 95% Christians and 0.5% Animists (Ministry of Economics and Finance 2002). 
Before the 1994 genocide, according to the previous government, the population belonged to 
different ethnic groups: about 15 % Tutsis, 84% Hutus and 1% Twas (Pygmies); however, 
this ethnic identification system has been completely abandoned by the new government and 
replaced by the single category "Rwandans"". 
11 There is no information about whether religious or ethnic characteristics would affect people's care 
seeking behaviour or group enrolment. 
Approximately 90 percent of Rwandans are active in agriculture, the most labour intensive 
and least productive sector, which produces approximately 37 percent of the country's GDP. 
Industry and manufacturing constitute about 23 percent of GDP and employ 2 percent of the 
labour force, whereas 7 percent works in the service sector producing 40 percent of GDP. 
Agricultural products, mainly coffee and tea, account for 80 percent of the country's exports. 
In spite of this, most agricultural activity remains at the subsistence level with produce 
consumed primarily by households and the community (Ministry of Economics and Finance 
2000). A household survey conducted in 1983 describes the average land area farmed by 
Rwandan households as very small with 1.24 ha. Households produced an average value of 
agricultural product of USD 51 per capita per year, 90 percent of which was used for self- 
consumption (Muller 1997). 
Rwanda is a heavily indebted poor country (HIPC). Since the 1994 civil war, Rwanda's 
economy has been recuperating mainly due to external resource inflow, and less to the 
recovery of domestic production. Rwanda's external and domestic debt rose rapidly from just 
under USD 400 million in 1985 to about USD 1 billion in 1996, and to USD 1.4 billion in 
total debt stocks (including arrears) by the end of 1998, equivalent to 72 percent of GDP. In 
1997, Rwanda received almost twice as much external aid per capita (USD 42.6) as the sub- 
Saharan African average (USD 26). In 1998, the Rwandan government spent on a per capita 
basis USD 6.80 on debt service compared to USD 1.25 per capita on health care (Ministry of 
Economics and Finance 2000; Schneider et al. 2000b). 
Income inequality has widened within Rwandan society and to the disadvantage of the poor. 
In 1983, Rwanda had one of the lowest Gini-coefficients (0.289) in sub-Saharan Africa'2 . In 
2000, the Gini reached 0.45 1, indicating that the income distribution has not only become 
more unequal, but that inequality is among the highest in sub-Saharan Africa (Ministry of 
Economics and Finance 2002). 
12 In 1983, the Rwandan Gini was 0.289. Source: Chen, Shao-hua, Gaurav Datt and Martin Ravallion. 
Is Poverty Increasing in the Developing World? Policy Research Department, the World Bank, Data 
Appendix, updated version, 1995,40: 359-76 
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From 1994 until 1996, about 2 to 3 million of the population lived in refugee camps and were 
assisted by international organisations. In 1996, people began to migrate back to their areas, 
find a place to live, re-build houses, work their fields, and establish market activities. In 1998, 
the World Bank Poverty Note estimated that 70 percent of the Rwandan population fell below 
the poverty line. Compared to before the war, the poverty gap has increased with the poor 
becoming poorer (World Bank 1998). 
The Household Living Conditions Survey (HLCS) was conducted in 1999-2001, and 
collected data on households' socio-economic and demographic situation, education, and 
health, etc. The HLCS estimates a national average level of consumption13 of RWF 78,000 
(USD 177 in 2001) per adult per year. There is a clear urban/rural poverty divide, with three 
times higher average consumption levels in urban compared to rural areas (Ministry of 
Economics and Finance 2002). 
Two poverty lines (PL) were derived in the HLCS. The overall poverty line of RWF 64,000 
(USD 145 in 2001) per adult per year is based on a consumption basket that reflects the 
minimum requirements of 2,500 kcal per adult equivalent per day and by adding an 
allowance for non-food, based on the average proportion of the budget devoted to non-food 
items by households around the poverty line. According to this PL measure, 66 percent of 
rural and 12 percent of Kigali urban residents are classified as poor. Most of those below the 
PL live in rural areas (98%). The depth of poverty - the average proportion by which the poor 
fall below the overall PL - is considerably higher in rural areas (42%) than in Kigali (26%) 
(Ministry of Economics and Finance 2002). 
The food poverty line of RWF 45,000 (USD 102 in 2001) per adult per year is estimated 
based on the cost of purchasing a basket of food reflecting the average consumption pattern 
of the poorest 60 percent of the population identified by the overall PL. Based on the food 
13 Total consumption expenditures includes purchase of food and non-food items, consumption of own 
production, expenditures made in lind, the imputed rental value of owner-occupied dwellings and 
other imputed transactions. 
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poverty line, 46 percent of the rural and 5 percent of the Kigali population live in extreme 
poverty (Ministry of Economics and Finance 2002). 
Poverty is highest and deepest among female-headed households, agricultural wageworkers, 
the unemployed, and those farming on their own account. Cattle-ownership is the most 
important socio-economic indicator in rural areas. The poorest own on average considerably 
fewer cattle (0.26) compared to households in the highest consumption quintiles (1.94). 
According to people interviewed in the HLCS participatory poverty assessment (PPA), the 
non-poor have advanced because they found paid employment, received credit from a bank, 
or became members of an association (Ministry of Economics and Finance 2002). 
These findings from various data sources suggest that despite the immense influx of 
international monies, the economic situation for the poor, who are the large majority of the 
population, has even become worse in relative terms compared to before the 1994 war. 
3.2 Health situation 
The Rwandan government is the major provider of health services, with religious 
organisations being important partners, especially in rural areas. The role of for-profit private 
providers is still limited but has been growing, mostly in urban areas. Health care is provided 
at three levels, in two public referral hospitals, 28 district hospitals, and 283 health centres, 
40 dispensaries, and nine health posts. Health centres serve an average population of 23,030 
individuals, while a district hospital covers around 217,428 inhabitants (Schneider et al. 
2000b). 
Communicable diseases dominate the burden of illness in health centres where poor people 
seek care. The Ministry of Health (MOH) reports that of the 2.3 million patient contacts for 
curative care services at health centres, 88 percent are for malaria, fever, intestinal diseases, 
respiratory infections, pneumonia, and skin lesions. A population-based nutrition survey 
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estimated that 43 percent of children below the age of five suffer from nutritional stunting 
(Ministry of Health 2002). 
Rwanda's health sector is heavily donor-funded. Table 3.1 presents National Health Accounts 
(NHA) information from 1998 for the public and private health sector. 
Table 3.1: Summary statistics Rwanda National Health Accounts (NHA) 1998 
Total Health Expenditures (NHA 1998) USD 99,931,321 
Total per Capita Health Expenditure, by sources of 
funds RWF 4,019 (USD 12.68) 
Public RWF 396 (USD 1.25) 
Private Out-of-Pocket RWF 1,592 (USD 5.02) 
International sources RWF 2,030 (USD 6.40) 
Total Health Expenditures as Percent of Nominal 
GDP 5% 
Public 0.5 % 
Private Out-of-Pocket 2% 
International 2.5 % 
Sources of Funds Distribution: 
Public 9.2 % 
Public Firms 0.7% 
Private Out-of-Pocket 39.6 % 
International 50.5 % 
Uses of Funds: 
Public sector 66 % 
Church-owned sector 10 % 
Private sector 24 % 
Source: NHA Rwanda (Schneider et al. 2000b). Exchange Rate: USD1=RWF 317 in June 
1998. 
Total health expenditures are USD 12.7 per capita, which corresponds to about 5 percent of 
GDP. About half of the total health sector is donor-funded, and 40 percent by out-of-pocket 
spending. This leaves the government to finance the remaining 10 percent of overall health 
expenditures. About two-thirds of total health expenditures are spent in the public sector. 
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While health centres offer care to the majority of the population, only 11 percent of total 
health expenditures are spent on this primary health care level14 (Schneider et al. 2000b). 
User fees were initiated in Rwanda in 1978, at public and church facilities (Shepard et al. 
1993). After the war, between 1994 and 1996, care was financed by external aid, and user 
fees were largely suspended. In 1996, providers in public and church facilities reintroduced 
fees at pre-war levels for services and drugs. From 1996 to 1999, utilisation of primary health 
care services dropped from 0.3 to 0.25 consultations per capita per year. To improve their 
financial accessibility to care, the rural population started to develop their own risk-sharing 
mechanisms: `mutuelles' as people commonly call them. In response, the MOH identified 
financial accessibility to health care as a key problem requiring improvement by changing the 
way care was financed (Schneider and Diop 2001). 
3.3 Development and implementation of Prepayment Schemes 
(PPS) 
This thesis uses the Rwandan prepayment experience as a case study. In 1998, the MOH 
expressed concerns about the low utilisation rates in health facilities, and decided to develop 
and implement micro-health insurance (MHI)ls as a pilot with four specific objectives. First, 
to improve the population's financial accessibility to care; second, to improve quality of care; 
third, to strengthen community participation in organizing and managing health care services; 
and fourth, to strengthen the financial sustainability in health facilities and MHI (Schneider 
and Diop 2001). The USAID-funded Partnerships for Health Reform (PHR) project, 
14 See Figure 4 in 1998 NHA Report for distribution of total health expenditures: 30% of total health 
expenditures occurs in district and tertiary hospitals and 28% at the MOH and in MOH vertical 
programs. IS Micro-health insurance schemes - referring to their membership size - are also called mutuelles, 
mutual health organisations, community-based health financing, or prepayment schemes, etc. In this 
thesis, I will use the terms MHI and PPS interchangeably. 
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administered by Abt Associates, provided technical and financial assistance to the MOH 
during the entire pilot phase. 
The design phase of the Rwandan MHI started in 1999 and took place in collaboration with 
the MOH and the district population. At the central level, the MOH created a steering 
committee with representatives from the government, donors and NGOs. The committee 
selected three districts, Kabutare, Byumba and Kabgayi, to pilot-test MHI. Selection criteria 
for the districts were the extent of existing health infrastructure, the repeated demand for 
technical assistance from the population in developing MHI, and the district authorities' 
political will to participate in the pilot test. Altogether, the three districts have three hospitals 
and 54 health centres serving a rural population of about one million people, or one-eighth of 
the country's population (Schneider et al. 2000a). 
During the MHI design phase, from March until June 1999,28 workshops were held in the 
three districts, and up to 100 community representatives attended each workshop. Participants 
discussed and agreed upon the MIII organisational system and health insurance features, 
including provider payment, benefit package, membership categories and premium levels. 
The population attended community gatherings during which their representatives discussed 
the MHI design with them. Proposals stemming from district workshops and community 
meetings were shared with the central steering committee at the MOH, which provided 
feedback to the communities. This on-going discussion between the central and local level 
resulted in the final MHI design, and the development of legal, contractual, and financial 
tools to guide implementation. In addition, the workshops served to train about 300 
participants to manage the 54 MIR systems (Schneider et al. 2000a). On July 1,1999, each of 
the 54 public and church-owned health centres in the three districts signed a contract with one 
of 54 MHI. Thereafter, the district population started to enrol. 
Under the auspices of the Rwandan law, MIR are deemed as mutual health associations, 
owned and managed by their members. Members meet at least once per year during their 
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general assembly, share information, and elect their representatives for the MHI executive 
bureau. Each MHI is headed by its executive bureau with four volunteers (president, vice- 
president, secretary and treasurer), elected by and among all members during a general 
assembly. The MIR by-laws and contractual agreement with providers define in 17 articles 
the rules of collaboration between MHI and providers. These documents were accepted 
during the schemes' general assemblies in each district and signed by their representatives 
before their implementation in July 1999. Issues related to the contract enforceability and 
MHI management are discussed during the MHI general assembly. 
On a district level, the MHI have formed a federation. Six members have been elected by and 
among all MHI executive bureau representatives in their general assembly to constitute the 
MHI district federation. The federation has signed a contract to become the partner to the 
district hospital and other authorities. 
Table 3.2 presents the MIII design which, as a result of the discussions with the population, is 
slightly different in Kabgayi than in the two other districts (Schneider et al. 2000a). 
Annual premiums were set to take account of the population's financial capacities and levels 
of existing user fees. At the time of enrolment, which can be at anytime during the year, 
citizens pay an annual premium of RWF 2,500 (USD 7.50 in 1999) per family of up to 7 
persons to the secretary of the MIR affiliated with their "preferred" health centre. A higher 
premium for individual enrolment encourages group and household enrolment. This is 
intended to prevent the enrolment of only sick individuals (adverse selection) and the 
exclusion of high-risk patients (cream-skimming); and it inhibits men from joining as 
individuals before women and children. A one-month waiting period following enrolment 
was instated to discourage enrolment of individuals who need immediate medical care. 
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Table 3.2: Insurance features of Prepayment Schemes In Rwanda 
MHI Features Kabutare and Byumba Districts Kabgayl District 
Fund Annual Individual: RWF 2,000 Individual: RWF 2,200. 
Collection flat rate Household: RWF 2,500 up to 7 people; if Household: RWF 2,600 up 
premium 8+ persons: RWF 530 for each to 7 people; if 8+ persons: 
additional person RWF 550 for each 
Groups (with 8+ people): RWF additional person 
530/person Groups (with 8+ people): 
RWF 550 per person 
Subsidies None For hospital care by donor 
Risk- Manage- Executive bureau with members elected during members' assembly 
pooling ment of Waiting period: one month after enrolment to discourage adverse 
risk-pool selection 
Risk Health centre risk: MHI member pool (health centre catchment's area) 
sharing Hospital risk: on a district level 
Provider Health Capitation payment per month, calculated based on total number of 
Payment Centre members enrolled in MHI 
Co-payment: RWF 100 per first curative visit to prevent moral hazard 
Hospital Per episode; and fee-for-service Per episode of illness 
MHI In Health Preventive and basic curative care, and hospitalization at health centre 
benefit Centre Drugs on essential drug list of MOH 
package (HC) Ambulance transfer to district hospital if referred by nurse 
District Consultation with physician (FFS) Full treatment per episode: 
Hospital, Overnight stay (FFS) Caesarean-Section 
covered Full treatment per episode: Caesarean- Paediatric cases (<5 years) 
with HC 
referral 
Section per episode) Malaria (>5 years) 
Note: FFS=fee-for-service provider payment. 
The MHI health centre risk is pooled and shared on a HC's catchment area level, and the 
hospital risk on a district-level. MHI keep their premium fund in a local bank account. The 
monthly MHI disbursement equals one-twelfth of the total premium fund, and is divided as 
follows. Each MHI withholds 5 percent of the monthly disbursement to pay for MHI 
administrative costs, and forwards 5 to 15 percent to the district MM federation. The 
federation reimburses the district hospital for care provided to the insured. Each MHI pays its 
partnering health centre a monthly capitation payment, according to the total number of 
members enrolled. Members continue to pay user fees for hospital care not covered by MHI 
(drugs, surgery, exams) (Schneider et al. 2000a). 
The MHI benefit package covers all services and drugs provided in a "preferred" health 
centre, and ambulance transfer to the district hospital, where Caesarean-sections, 
consultations and overnight stays are covered in Kabutare and Byumba. The Kabgayi hospital 
package is slightly different and covers the full episode of Caesarean-sections, malaria and all 
non-surgical diagnostics for children up to the age of five years. Health centres play a 
gatekeeper function to dissuade members and providers from frivolous use of more expensive 
hospital services, which are covered only with health centre referral. Members pay a 100 
RWF (USD 0.30 in 1999) co-payment for a curative health centre visit, to limit moral hazard. 
MHI Membership: 
Table 3.3 presents enrolment numbers for the first four operational years, and annual 
enrolment rates based on the estimated population size. A total of 88,303 individuals enrolled 
during the first year (7/1999 - 6/2000). During the subsequent three years, membership 
continued to grow, though at a slower pace. Annex Table 2 lists all 54 MHI and their first 
year enrolment rates, which varied largely, ranging from 1 to 50 percent of the population in 
their target areas. 
Table 3.3: MHI membership (1999 - 2003) 
Total MHI Byumba Kabgayl Kabutare Total 3 Districts 
Members Persons % of Persons % Persons % Persons % of 
pop of of pop 
pop pop 
Total population, 
June 2000 459,329 368,020 288,160 1,115,509 
MHI members 
June 2000,1st 48,837 11% 21,903 6% 17,563 6% 88,303 8% 
year 
MHI members 
June 2001,2 45,185 10% 33,181 9% 15,186 5% 93,552 8% 
year 
Annual growth 
rate 2nd year -7.50% 51.50% -13.50% 5.90% 
MHI members, 
June 2002,3rd 67,448 48,810 17,714 133,972 
year 15% 13% 6% 12% 
Annual growth 
rate 3`d year 49.30% 47.10% 16.60% 43.20% 
MHI members, 
June 2003,4th 100,734 22% 63,190 17% 25,722 9% 189,646 17% 
Year 
Annual growth 
rate 4' year 49% 29% 45% 42% 
Note: Data Source: MHI enrolment data. 
3.4 Informal Payments by Patients to Providers 
The issue of informal payments made by patients to health care providers is an important one 
and discussed in previous PHR reports 16. Health centres purchase drugs at the district 
pharmacy following the MOH recommendations. Health centres may add a5 percent mark- 
up on their purchase price to arrive at the price at which they sell drugs to patients. Health 
centres use this profit to pay for other costs, such as staff and operational costs. The regular 
monitoring of drug prices in health centres has revealed that several health centres, mainly in 
Kabgayi, have added mark-ups that are considerably higher than the recommended 5 percent. 
This finding is supported when comparing providers' drug expenditures with patients' 
payments. For example, patient exit interview results from Kabgayi suggest that an uninsured 
16 Chapter 3.4 in PHR report TR 61 for extensive discussion. 
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patient pays on average 778 RWF for drugs per visit; while health centres declare average 
drug expenditures of 363 RWF for an uninsured visit. The difference reflects a mark-up or an 
informal payment of more than 100 percent on drugs. Since MHI covers all drugs and 
services at the health centre, insured patients should not be asked to pay this difference, and 
there is therefore a potential reduction in provider income associated with the replacement of 
fee-for-service patients with MHI-covered patients. 
However, there is also additional income paid to providers under the MIR system. During 
the Rwandan pilot phase, health centres were advised by the MOH to pay a monthly quality 
bonus to all staff members from the capitation amount received from MHI. This bonus was 
supposed to depend on the health centres' performance with respect to the availability of 
drugs, the number of preventive and curative care consultations, administrative collaboration 
and the number of public health promotion meetings (e. g. on HIV/AIDS prevention) 
organised at health centres for the community (Schneider et al. 2000a). However, in practice 
the quality bonus of 5% of total capitation revenue has been paid to personnel in health 
centres independently of performance according to the suggested indicators. Hence, the 
resulting incentive is to increase the number of MHI members which will result in larger 
quality bonuses for staff. 
Despite this bonus, providers could still try to charge informal payments to insured patients, 
for example by explaining that their health facility is experiencing financial problems. 
However, a MIR member has the option of presenting this issue for discussion with providers 
during the MHI general assembly. 
On the positive side, the largest MHIs, Bungwe and Rushaki, have reported important 
additional income due to the large monthly capitation payment from MHI. They have used 
this surplus to finance latrine building in the community, purchase a sterilisation machine for 
the health centre, and to pay salaries of newly hired staff. Other health centres have used their 
financial surplus to subsidise the purchase of mosquito nets for MHI members. 
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3.5 Theory on survey methods 
This section introduces issues on data and sampling methods that are relevant in the context 
of this thesis. Then, the data sources used are presented. 
3.5.1 Survey data in low-income context 
Assessing sustainability in a health system requires health facility and insurance data. In 
some countries, monthly summaries on utilisation and finance data are collected in health 
facilities by a health information system and stored centrally. However, in many health 
systems this central data collection does not collect data by patients' insurance status. 
Analysis of the equity situation among insured and uninsured population groups requires data 
on households' socio-economic, demographic, health, and insurance situation (Akin et al. 
1985). In low-income countries, this data has been collected in a number of large scale, 
population based surveys, among which the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) and the 
World Bank Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS) are best known. Generally in 
surveys, the validity of data is influenced by respondent's self-perception, relative 
comparison system, and the length of the recall period (Grosh and Glewwe 1995). 
Methodological issues arise related to the use of (1) non-cash income, (2) monetary and non- 
monetary consumption, and (3) assets when assessing socioeconomic status in low-income 
contexts. First, in the absence of income data, non-cash income is estimated as few rural 
households receive a regular monthly income from wages. Non-cash income includes 
agricultural home production and consumption, which may free up cash-income to be spent 
on discretionary goods, such as medical care. Assessing non-cash income is particularly 
relevant when providers and traditional healers accept in-kind payments (Akin et al. 1985). 
Second, real consumption tends to be used as a proxy for household income, where cash and 
non-cash income of households is seasonal, and households live from subsistence farming. In 
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addition, seasonal and transitory income shocks force households to smooth their 
consumption over bad and good times, which might result in surveyed households reporting 
their income for a certain period to be zero. Therefore, household consumption is separated 
into durable and non-durable goods, and detailed data may be collected on certain 
expenditure goods of interest, such as expenditures for health care, education, transport, food, 
and luxury goods (Deaton 1998). 
The quality of consumption data has been criticized. It may be difficult to disentangle 
production from consumption. Rural households self-consume a large part of their 
production, and they use part of their production to pay in-kind for goods and services they 
buy. Generally, local market prices are used to value household production, which may 
generate additional measurement errors, with `market prices' being different in different 
contexts (Deaton 1998). 
Third, in the absence of consumption or income data, an asset indicator can be computed 
based on the present value of household assets, to serve as a proxy for household socio- 
economic status. Assets represent a potential claim to goods, which can be sold or mortgaged, 
and are generally positively related to past income. Asset variables pose methodological 
challenges. Their use as a proxy is based on the assumption of uniformity in taste and ignores 
the fact that households may prefer other investments, such as education. The present value 
of assets is calculated by adding up the respondents' estimates of the value of their personal 
assets owned (house, furniture, vehicles, etc). Asset ownership tends to correlate with the age 
of the household head. This might lead to underestimating cash income of younger household 
heads. For example a relatively high income-earning teacher might score comparatively 
lower than a farmer with a substantial amount of land but lower cash-income (Akin et al. 
1985). 
Researchers used principal component analysis to construct weighted indices of assets and 
housing characteristics to proxy wealth. Empirical results suggest that this method is at least 
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as reliable as conventionally measured consumption expenditures (Filmer and Pritchett 
2000). 
3.5.2 Probability sampling 
Survey tools collect data from a population sample. A household survey sample is generally 
selected from an existing sampling frame, which is a list of sampling units (e. g. households or 
villages) that are used as primary sample units (PSU). Sampling frames, such as a population 
census or labour force surveys, cover the entire survey universe, and prevent biased samples 
(Deaton 1998). 
Sampling and non-sampling errors in surveys affect the validity of results. Sampling errors 
occur when outdated censuses are used as sampling frames, or when households living in a 
house are included in the sample while homeless people, who reflect the poorest in a society, 
are excluded. Sampling errors can be corrected for by increasing the sample size (Korn and 
Graubard 1999). 
Non-sampling errors are caused by (1) measurement errors, (2) non-response errors, or (3) 
data coding and entry errors. Poorly designed questionnaires lead to measurement errors. 
Non-response errors occur because respondents are not a representative subset of the 
population. If data entry errors are at random, it does usually not bias the sample (Mukherjee 
et al. 1998; Korn and Graubard 1999). Regression analysis captures non-sampling errors in 
the error term (Deaton 1998). 
The five sample techniques used to draw samples from a population include (1) simple 
random sample, (2) stratified random sample, (3) systematic random sampling, (4) cluster 
random sampling, and (5) multi-stage sampling (Korn and Graubard 1999). 
The first three random sampling methods are most commonly used in mail or telephone 
surveys. In a simple random sample, each household or individual is selected with the same 
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known probability. In a stratified random sample, the population is first subdivided into 
homogeneous subgroups, from which a simple random sample is drawn. Stratified sampling 
will lead to smaller variability within groups than within the population and yield more 
statistical precision than random sampling. Small subgroups can be randomly over-sampled 
and adjusted for in the analysis by weighting the subgroups by their proportionate sampling 
fraction. Systematic random sampling requires that the population (N) be listed in a random 
order. The sample (n) will be drawn from the ordered population by starting with an integer 
and by continuing by the interval size (l=N/n), which is the inverse of the sampling fraction 
(f-n/N)'7 (Korn and Graubard 1999). 
In surveys with direct interviews, the preferred method is cluster or area sampling, in order to 
economize on survey cost. Cluster sampling can be combined with other sampling methods, 
yielding multi-stage sampling. The number of sampling stages depends on the sampling 
frame available and the sample population to be investigated (Deaton 1998). 
Cluster sampling requires dividing the population into a number of clusters, which represent 
geographic areas. First, clusters are either selected by simple random or by systematic 
sampling. Clusters may vary in size, which can be controlled for by giving each cluster a 
selection chance, depending upon its size (e. g. number of households living in a cluster). In 
the second stage, the same number of households is selected within each cluster (Deaton 
1998). 
The standard two-stage cluster survey with a self-weighting design is compatible with a 
population survey in which each household has the same probability to be selected. If the 
probability of selecting a household differs across clusters, then the sample is not self- 
weighted and sampling weights are required. The weights are proportional to the inverse 
probability of a household being selected (Deaton 1998). 
17 For example, if the integer 4 is chosen and the interval size is 5, then the 4th, the 91, the 14th, etc. unit 
would be sampled until the desired sample size is reached. 
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The cluster effect refers to the intra-cluster correlation between households, and its impact on 
regression analysis. The clustering of observations implies observations are not independent. 
Clusters in developing countries are often villages where households live close to each other 
and are ethnically and socio-economically similar. This similarity may cause positive 
correlation between observations leading to increased variances. The extreme case would be 
the case of identical households in a cluster, where the number of clusters would be the 
effective sample size and not the number of households sampled (Deaton 1998). STATA7 
offers survey estimation commands (svy) to produce variance estimates based only on 
computations at the cluster level, allowing for correlation between sampling units within the 
cluster. The resulting variance estimates are approximately unbiased or biased towards larger 
standard errors (StataCorp 2001). 
3.6 Data used in this thesis 
The data used for this thesis were collected by the PHR project during the prepayment pilot 
phase (1998-2000) in three Rwandan districts18. PHR Rwanda developed and implemented 
an extensive data collection based on a quasi-experimental evaluation design to evaluate the 
performance of prepayment in reaching the four MOH objectives: improved access to care, 
quality, financial sustainability and community participation. The data collected include 
monthly routine data from health facilities and MHI; a household survey; a patient exit 
interview survey; and two focus group surveys. Annex Table 3 presents an overview of the 
data collection and Annex Table 4 lists the PHR reports that have been published based on 
this data with respect to the MOH objectives. 
Data collection, cleaning and storage was done during the prepayment pilot phase in Rwanda. 
All routine and survey data collection tools and interviewer guides were taken from the Niger 
study on cost-recovery (Diop 1994) and adapted to the Rwandan MHI context. Routine and 
18 See Annex Table 3. 
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survey data were stored and analysed in Excel and SPSS 10 for previous analysis. Results of 
the prepayment pilot phase were presented to the MOH and the PHR project financer 
USAID. 
3.6.1 Health facility data 
Monthly data in health centres and district hospitals were collected over two years in five 
collection periods. The first period included the full base year before providers started to treat 
MHI patients (August 1,1998-July 31,1999). The remaining four data collections covered 
each of the four quarters of the pilot year from August 1,1999 until July 31,2000. Health 
centre managers and hospital administrators learned, during workshops, how to answer the 
questionnaires. Health facilities were asked to report service use by insured and uninsured 
patients, expenditures and revenues on a monthly basis. Health centres reported drug costs 
documenting the price paid and quantity bought at the district pharmacy, and valued drug 
donations based on district pharmacy prices. Each district selected supervisors to assist health 
centres in filling in the questionnaires. 
If questionnaire responses were missing, a PHR agent would assist the responsible health 
facility staff person. Following the Niger example, the routine data entry form was set-up in 
Excel to store and analyse all routine data. Data entry was done by a PHR Rwanda local 
colleague, using Excel computer software. Descriptive analysis was conducted in Excel and 
results presented in a PHR Technical report (Schneider et al. 2001b). 
3.6.2 MHI data 
Since July 1999, monthly MHI data have been collected in each MHI and the three district 
federations. Information was collected on the composition of their executive bureau, number 
of new members, premium revenues, and their uses of funds. MIR executive bureau members 
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were trained to fill in these questionnaires, and were supervised by their district federation 
and PHR. Data entry was done by PHR in Excel. Analysis was conducted in Excel and results 
presented in a PHR Technical report (Schneider et al. 2001b). 
3.6.3 Household survey 
The household survey used in this analysis was conducted in September 2000 by the Office 
National de la Population (ONAPO). Based on a weighted two-stage cluster design, the 
sample was drawn by selecting cells from the sampling frame used for the Rwandan DHS 
2000. Cells that were primary sample units for the DHS were selected from sample cells 
identified for the Household Living Condition Survey (HLCS), conducted by the Ministry of 
Finance in 2000/1 (Ministry of Economics and Finance 2002). 
The PHR household survey was divided into two strata according to the MIR enrolment rate 
of the population and with the objective of sampling 3,400 households: 2,500 households 
were sampled from stratum 1, consisting of cells with 10 percent and higher MIR enrolment 
rates; and 900 households were selected from stratum 2, consisting of cells with below 10 
percent enrolment rates (Schneider and Diop 2001). 
Each cell contains a different number of households. Therefore, cells were divided into sub- 
cells of 110 households. Overall, M,, households had to be drawn for inclusion in the sample 
of the strata x. The number of sub-cells SC,; in a given strata x and cell i is: 
(1) SCw=Mx; /l10, 
where M,,; is the number of households in cell i of strata x. 
In a first step, cells (PSU) were sampled from the DHS frame with a probability proportional 
to the number of sub-cells per cell as defined in equation (2). The probability to include a cell 
i of strata x in the first draw from the list of PSU of the DHS is: 
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(2) Pl, a = SC,, * (SC, /Y, SC1) = (MX/110) * (MX; /ZM, ) 
Second, from each of these cells one sub-cell was drawn according to the probability defined 
in equation (3). The probability to include a sub-cell in the sample in the second draw at the 
level of cells selected in the first draw is: 
(3) P2 =1/SCx; = 11 OfM, u 
All 110 households identified in a sub-cell and selected on the second level from a cell were 
interviewed. Combining equations (2) and (3) gives the probability of selecting a household 
in strata x: 
(4) Px = Pixy * Pzw = (MX/ MXi) 
The fmal weight of households for each cell results from multiplying P,, by the sampling 
fraction of the PSU of the DHS. The analysis is weighted by these final weights. The analysis 
controls for intra-cluster correlation by using survey estimation commands in STATA7 
(StataCorp 2001). 
Of the 3,400 households sampled from the DHS survey, 3,387 were identified and 
interviewed in the three districts with MHI (Byumba, Kabgayi, and Kabutare). Overall 3,139 
questionnaires were valid and retained (93%). Among them are 354 MHI member households 
(Schneider and Diop 2001). 
The household survey contains two structured modules: a household and a curative care 
module. Individuals were interviewed in the national language, Kinyarwanda. The household 
module was addressed to the head of household to gather information on the household and 
members' socio-demographic and economic characteristics including household expenditures 
for consumption goods, health, and education, and MHI enrolment. The curative care 
questionnaire was addressed to household members who were sick in the two weeks prior to 
the interview. It elicited information on the incidence of sickness, prevalence of symptoms, 
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utilisation of providers, and mode and amount of payment for medical care (see Annex B). 
Previous analysis has been conducted based on this household survey in SPSS 10 and 
presented in a PHR Technical report (Schneider and Diop 2001). 
3.6.4 Additional information 
Additional information is used in this thesis to interpret quantitative findings in the analytical 
chapters. This includes the PHR Rwanda focus group survey and results from a patient exit 
interview survey. These surveys have been analysed and presented in the PHR final report 
(Schneider et al. 2001 a). 
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Part II: Equity 
Equity is addressed in Chapter 4 by examining the socio-economic and demographic 
determinants of demand for MHI. Following principles of egalitarian equity and the 
minimum standard approach, Chapter 5 compares the implications of financing and 
utilisation for insured and uninsured individuals. 
Chapter 4: Demand for MHI 
4.1 Introduction 
Many low- and middle-income countries promote MHI with the aim to improve equity in 
access to health care. However, little empirical information exists on the factors that affect 
poor households' decision to insure (ILO 2002). As the term "micro" indicates, MHI tend to 
be small, and cover a small percentage of the target population. Among the largest schemes 
are those founded under government initiative19 (Atim et al. 1998; ILO/PAHO 1999). 
The small size of many MHI suggests that there are factors that impede households from 
enrolling who otherwise would be inclined to insure. They include the flat-rate premium, 
which may be unaffordable for the poor; individuals' anticipated medical service use; cultural 
aspects; and their trust in the health care system (Abel-Smith and Dua 1988). The rationale 
for examining the demand for health insurance is that if insurance is meant to improve equity 
in access to care and enrolment remains voluntary, then barriers that limit insurance 
enrolment need to be understood and addressed by health policy. 
Different decision-malting theories exist and can serve to describe the insurance enrolment 
decision. Generally, insurance demand studies use expected utility theory to explain 
19 These include the MUGEF scheme in Ivory Coast with 117,118 members and 368,435 dependents in 
1994; the Cosperanza Health Cooperative in Colombia with 42,000 beneficiaries; and the Trenque 
Lauquen Municipal Social Welfare Scheme in Argentina with 18,000 beneficiaries. 
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individuals' decision to insure or not insure. Under expected utility theory, the demand for 
insurance reflects individuals' risk aversion and demand for income certainty (Schoemaker 
1982). This theory is silent about the association between households' socio-economic status 
and insurance enrolment. The poverty literature suggests that poor households are expected to 
become increasingly risk averse if they move closer to or further below the poverty line 
(Wagstaff 2000). As a result, they would be expected to insure. 
Other economic and social theories can be used to further explain individuals' insurance 
enrolment decision. Among them are state-dependent utility, endowment effect, status quo 
bias, and regret and disappointment paradigms, prospect theory, and theories related to trust 
and social capital. This Chapter draws from these theories to examine the decision-making 
behaviour of households who have the option to insure or remain uninsured. 
As part of the equity analysis, the focus is on the socio-economic factors that influence MHI 
enrolment. It aims to find out whether MHI excludes the poor from enrolment. Based on data 
collected from households at the end of the Rwandan prepayment pilot phase, bivariate and 
multivariate analysis is used to examine socio-demographic and economic factors that 
determine households' enrolment decision. 
The empirical section is unique, mainly because it is based on survey data collected from 
insured and uninsured groups. The lack of detailed household-level data has caused other 
studies of community-based schemes to rely on aggregate data by studying the proportion of 
the population insured or insurance expenditures (Atim et al. 1998; Bennett et al. 1998; 
ILO/PAHO 1999). 
Adverse selection has been identified as one of the main reasons contributing to the failure of 
many MHI (Abel-Smith 1992; Atim et al. 1998; Bennett et al. 1998; ILO/PAHO 1999). In 
this thesis, analysis of adverse selection in MHI is limited due to both data and substantive 
reasons. First, the data do not include variables which would allow the impact of adverse 
selection to be assessed comprehensively (e. g. hospitalisation or severe illness prior to 
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purchase of MIR membership). Second, premiums for group and household enrolment 
categories are substantially cheaper than individual enrolment, which has encouraged group 
and household enrolment, and consequently mitigation of the risk of adverse selection. Third, 
from a policy perspective, adverse selection takes a different meaning in areas where the 
uninsured population reports curative visit rates as low as 0.2 visits per capita per year to 
health centres. In such a context, rather than being seen as a problem to be addressed through 
discouraging excessive utilisation, it should rather be seen as a priority for government to 
address by making sufficient resources available in the public health sector to treat high risk 
groups. 
The next section presents a summary of the literature on the demand for health insurance; 
then a theoretical model of choice is derived, and applied to the Rwandan data. Bivariate 
analysis is used to describe and compare the characteristics of insured and uninsured 
households. Based on multivariate analysis, household demand for MHI is examined by 
estimating the influence of explanatory variables on the probability of MHI enrolment. 
Results are presented in section 4 and discussed thereafter. They inform a discussion about 
possible modification to the MHI design to allow it to better respond to overall equity and 
financial objectives, if the Rwandan government decides to scaleup MHI. 
4.2 Literature review 
4.2.1 Overview of the literature on demand for health insurance 
This literature review summarizes insights from economic and social theories on the factors 
that influence the decision-making process. A theoretical framework is derived to inform the 
analysis on the insurance demand. Empirical findings from other studies are presented. 
Consumer Theory 
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Consumer theory assumes if consumers are perfectly informed, they maximize their utility as 
a function of consuming various goods, given relative prices, their income and preferences, 
which are related to social attitudes, custom and convenience. Consumers are price takers and 
able to rank their consumption bundles according to the perceived utility they give. They will 
pick the affordable bundle that maximizes their utility. Changes in prices and income 
influence whether and how much of different goods rational consumers will buy. Health 
insurance is expected to be a normal good with a positive income elasticity of demand. A 
price increase of a substitute for insurance - e. g. user fees - is expected to raise the insurance 
demand, as is a decrease in premium (Begg et al. 2000). 
Decision-Making under Uncertainty 
The decision to purchase insurance involves uncertainty. Among the theories that analyse 
decision-making under uncertainty are expected utility, state-dependent utility, endowment 
effect, status quo bias, and regret and disappointment paradigms, and prospect theory. 
Under expected utility (EU) theory, insurance demand is a discrete binary choice between an 
uncertain loss that occurs with a probability like paying for an eventual health care bill when 
uninsured, and a certain loss like paying insurance premium (Manning and Marquis 1996). 
EU theory assumes that people are risk averse and make choices between probability 
distributions of wealth. Consumers who insure themselves are uncertain whether they will be 
ill or not. Insurance reduces their utility loss from being exposed to the risk of large health 
care payment. As a result of risk-pooling they can level out their consumption of health care 
over two different states- ill/not ill, which makes the aggregate outcome relatively cert ain. 
This certainty allows the insured to reach a higher utility in case of illness than without 
insurance. Thus, the insurance demand reflects individuals' risk aversion and demand for 
certainty. The more risk averse individuals are the more insurance coverage they will buy 
(Begg et al. 2000). 
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Expected utility theory has been criticized. Although it provides a framework to analyse 
factors influencing individuals' decision under uncertainty, three main weaknesses remain. 
First, when maximizing an outcome, individuals do not structure their choices as 
comprehensively as EU theory suggests, and they do not necessarily evaluate all possible 
events that may occur. Second, when making choices, individuals do not incorporate all 
information, such as linking probabilities with outcomes. Rather, sometimes they ignore low- 
probability events, or focus entirely on the loss, which highlights the importance of 
psychological factors in economic behaviour. And third, laboratory studies have shown that 
the model's prediction of choice behaviour is poor, and additional factors need to be included 
like the societal context about prudent behaviour or regret considerations (Schoemaker 1982). 
Although laboratory experiments indicate that some patterns of preferences are inconsistent 
with EU theory, this theory is most commonly used in models on decision-making under risk 
(Marquis and Holmer 1996). Nonetheless, other theories have emerged that aim to account 
for these weaknesses. 
State-dependent utility theory suggests that consumers' utility level and tastes are influenced 
by their state, such as their health status. Depending on their state, people may have different 
degrees of risk aversion, which may influence their insurance demand (Phelps 1973). As the 
sick and healthy have different preferences, this would imply that it is not individuals' risk 
aversion that reflects their insurance demand but rather the expected pay-off they will receive 
when sick. The magnitude of this expected payoff depends on the state an individual is in 
when the enrolment decision is made. This result has implications for optimal insurance 
coverage. It suggests that as most people insure when they are healthy, their optimal coverage 
is below the full loss coverage, as the anticipated payoff is below the real loss in case of 
illness (Viscusi and Evans 1990; Mas-Collel et al. 1995). Hence, an individual's insurance 
demand is influenced by the anticipated need for medical care given the current state, and the 
magnitude of the related insurance pay-off in case of sickness (Phelps 1973). 
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Prospect theory is a descriptive model of decision-making under risk that questions the 
assumptions made on uncertainty and risk aversion by EU theory. In EU theory, choices are 
made about probability distributions over wealth, while in prospect theory the choice is about 
prospects of gains or losses. The point from which an individual perceives gains and losses to 
occur may influence the choice. Individuals assume an optimal risk level for every level of 
expected value. Gambles of equal expected value are judged in terms of their deviations of 
this optimal risk level. Prospect theory says that with respect to losses, people prefer 
uncertainty than certainty of the same magnitude. Also, they feel much more the displeasure 
of a loss than a pleasure from the same-sized gain (Kahnemann and Tversky 1979). 
Applied to the insurance context, prospect theory suggests that people insure from a gain 
perspective and not because insurance provides certainty. Given a premium level, people will 
first assess their individual health risk level and the eventual deviations from it, (e. g. my 
health is bad and it could get worse, or it is about to improve). They may decide not to insure 
because of a gain prospect, they expect to pay less for their health risk and the deviation from 
it than for their insurance premium. This is a risk because the deviation from the health 
reference point may be greater than expected and cause a loss. It suggests that individuals are 
risk preferring with respect to losses. Individuals will only demand insurance f the loss will 
occur with certainty, and not because they are risk averse as suggested by EU theory 
(Kahnmann and Tversky 1979). 
Cumulative prospective theory combines dependent utility and prospect theory, and suggests 
that people assign different weights to the probability that an event will occur. Empirical 
findings indicate that individuals tend to overweight small probabilities, whereas high 
probabilities are under-weighted. Over-weighting of small probabilities explains why people 
buy lotteries, and insurance. Individuals make choices between prospects in terms of 
weighted probabilities of losses and gains. Their decisions are influenced by weighted value 
maximization, where decision weights differ from probabilities and value is measured in 
terms of gains and losses (Tversky and Kahneman 1992). Applied to the insurance demand, 
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cumulative prospective theory suggests that people insure because they overweight the small 
probability of the event of illness. 
The endowment effect aims to explain why individuals are reluctant to purchase a good by 
describing the discrepancy between the buying and selling price. Presumably, decision- 
making is affected by individuals' risk aversion about something new. People perceive it as 
more painful to give something up than beneficial to achieve something new. Therefore, they 
tend to demand a higher selling price to give something up than they would be ready to pay 
for it. This may be because individuals perceive forgone gains as less painful than an 
eventual loss (Kahnmann et al. 1991), and they do not know whether the benefits of an 
alternative exceed the costs. It makes people stay with the old and well known. The 
endowment effect suggests that individuals insure if they perceive the benefits of insurance as 
higher than the cost related to giving up being uninsured. 
Similar to the endowment effect, the status quo bias is another implication of risk aversion. 
Empirical findings indicate that people consider leaving a status quo as more detrimental than 
beneficial, and with an increasing number of alternatives to choose from, choices become 
more complicated and individuals tend to stay with the status quo (Kahnemann et al. 1991). 
Findings from a discrete choice experiment suggest that consumers prefer the status quo they 
are familiar with instead of undergoing an unknown, innovative medical procedure (Salkfeld 
et al. 2000). 
This `veil of experience' appears to determine choices, especially when lacking full 
information on the alternative. The endowment effect and status quo bias indicate that utility 
is based on changes relative to a neutral reference point. Preference orders are not necessarily 
stable but rather depend on current reference levels (Kahnmann et al. 1991), like the status 
quo. Hence, people are risk averse about new situations. They might prefer not to insure 
because they are afraid to reach a lower utility level compared to being uninsured. At the 
same time, those who have been insured will reluctantly give it up. 
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Regret and disappointment theories are based on the assumption that people have a loss- 
aversion and conservative preferences. When making choices, individuals try avoiding regret 
and disappointment and do not just consider the eventual outcome, as suggested by EU 
theory. They factor in their feelings of regret, in case the decision would have been wrong, 
and of disappointment, if the outcome does not correspond to what they have expected (Bell 
1982; Bell 1986). Individuals may prefer to remain uninsured because they could regret it or 
be disappointed if they will not benefit from insurance payout. Regret and disappointment 
theory may be combined with state-dependent utility theory: an individual in more fragile 
health state may factor in a "smaller amount of regret" when deciding about buying health 
insurance. 
Poverty Literature 
The poverty literature describes additional concepts that influence decision-making, namely 
poor households' time preferences and risk aversion when moving closer to the poverty line. 
Time preferences suggest that people with higher value for future protection than for current 
consumption are more likely to buy insurance (World Bank 2000). However, out of necessity, 
the poor may prefer present over future consumption, and will not insure. 
Instead of insurance, poor households may choose alternative mechanisms to cope with the 
risk of illness. They may perceive shocks that are small but frequent such as transient illness 
as relatively easy to deal with and remain uninsured, because they have access to a money 
lender. Some households may draw from additional income sources including increased 
female and child labour force participation to cope with risk. Or they may decide to shift the 
risk among household members, although this may cause the weaker to carry a larger burden 
(Dercon 2000). 
Households who have access to assets and markets may self-insure through precautionary 
building up of assets in good years to smooth consumption over bad times. It includes 
investing in livestock that can be sold when money is needed, as well as in the education of 
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one family member for the hope of creating a wealthier relative who can be called on for 
emergency funding later on. However, these risk coping mechanisms have their limits in 
protecting the poor against the financial risk related to their health (Dercon 2000). 
The poverty literature also describes that households become increasingly risk averse as they 
move closer to poverty, as any further drop in income can push them below the survival point 
(World Bank 2000). Thus, a higher demand for insurance would be expected if the poor 
perceive insurance as a means to protect themselves against impoverishment. But poor 
households need to be able to trust that their premium payments to an insurance fund will 
ensure their access to medical care during the enrolment period. This highlights the 
importance of information and transparency in insurance fund management for poor 
households. Their level of trust in the insurance system may motivate them to insure. 
Trust and Social Capital 
Trust has been defined as the expectation that arises among citizens of regular, honest and 
cooperative behaviour, based on commonly shared ethical norms and values (Fukuyama 
1995). These norms include reliability, loyalty, solidarity, justice, professional standards and 
codes of behaviour. They are nurtured through tradition, and repeated interaction among 
people, and by a supportive institutional context that fosters trust (Fukuyama 2000). 
The concepts of social norms and trust are related to social capital, though this association 
has been defined variously (Putnam 1993). This thesis follows Fukuyama's definition: social 
norms and values constitute the social capital of a society, and trust is a consequence of social 
capital. The strengthening of social capital is a key for communities to engage in collective 
actions and build organisations and social networks (Fukuyama 1995). 
This suggests a positive relationship between the density of social capital and trust in a 
society and the demand for health insurance. However, a recent study conducted in Rwanda 
highlights the link between poverty and social capital. In areas with high levels of poverty, 
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the study found that social capital has dwindled as described by acts of solidarity and mutual 
assistance (Colletta and Cullen 2000). As social capital is needed for engagement in 
collective actions, the lack of it would support arguments made by poverty literature that the 
poor are less likely to insure. On the other hand, it could also be hypothesised that less 
solidarity among family and friends will cause the poor to insure. 
Table 4.1 summarises these different theories on decision-making. For each theory, it shows 
how individuals' tastes or preferences will affect their motivation to insure, such that they 
reach their desired outcomes as well as the factors that predict insurance purchase (column 3) 
or a decline of health insurance (column 4). 
Factors that stimulate insurance demand include risk aversion, higher income levels, low 
insurance premiums and high user fees, knowing with certainty that a loss will occur, the 
over-weighting of occurrences with small probabilities, risk aversion against 
impoverishment, and trust in insurance. 
Among the reasons for non-insurance are: low user fee levels, individuals' risk-seeking 
behaviour if losses are uncertain, their risk aversion against something new, higher value of 
current consumption, and conservative preferences, including the veil of experience and their 
dislike of eventual feelings of regret and disappointment. With their choice, people aim to 
increase their utility level versus a reference point, and prevent feelings of regret and 
disappointment. 
Table 4.1: Summary of theories on insurance choice 
Theories Motivation Effects predicting Effects predicting 
purchase of insurance decline of insurance 
Consumer Maximize utility High Y; high user fees; Low Y; high premium 
choice Low premium Low user fees 
(insurance) 
Expected Maximize expected Uncertainty Risk seeking 
Utility utility through Risk aversion 
certainty 
State- Weak health and Healthy and anticipate 
dependent anticipate high insurance low insurance payoff 
utility payoff 
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Prospect Prospect of gain in Prospect of loss in Prospect of loss is 
reference to risk level reference to risk level is uncertain 
certain 
Cumulative Prospect of gain Over-weighting small Under-weighting 
prospect probability of illness probability of illness 
Endowment / Higher utility versus Insurance benefits higher Risk-aversion against 
status quo / reference point than costs of insurance new and unknown 
veil of and of giving up user 
experience fees 
Regret and Minimize regret and Loss aversion, Conservative 
disappointment disappointment High probability of illness preferences 
Low probability of 
illness 
Time Maximize utility High value of future High value of current 
preferences protection consumption 
Poverty High risk aversion when Unaffordable premium 
near poverty line 
Trust Trust in insurance mistrust insurance 
Note: Y=Income 
Despite the criticism of EU theories, none of the other concepts has provided superior results 
based on empirical findings on individuals' real market decisions. But a model based on 
expected utility theory may yield inconsistent results if prospect theory better describes 
decision-making under uncertainty (Manning and Marquis 1996). Manning and Marquis 
(1996) conducted a robustness check between expected utility and prospect theory by 
including prospect theory terms in their model allowing for differential responses for gains 
and losses. Findings suggest that the two theories do not affect results significantly. Even if 
risk aversion is not the dominant motivation to insure, the influence of other factors in the 
choice process will not alter results. The following section presents empirical findings from 
other studies. 
4.2.2 Empirical evidence 
The empirical evidence on the demand for health insurance is rather limited. It has been 
mainly analysed by estimating consumers' price and income elasticities of the demand for 
insurance in the USA. 
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Phelps (1973) uses two data sets from the USA to estimate the demand for health insurance: 
first, a cross-sectional set of 1963 survey data; and second, time series data of total insurance 
benefits and premiums from 1929 to 1968 insurance industry publications. Based on cross- 
sectional data, Tobit regression results indicate that the insurance demand has a positive 
income elasticity of 0.8, and is very price-elastic with an elasticity of larger than unity. The 
cross-price elasticity of user fees on the demand for insurance yields contradictory results, 
suggesting that higher user fees do not necessarily lead to increases in the demand for 
insurance. Rather, the demand for insurance is positively correlated with education level, 
urban areas, and white households. The robustness of findings is checked by comparing the 
Tobit with OLS, yielding the Tobit technique as superior (Phelps 1973). However, other 
researchers find that the Tobit model behaves poorly in the presence of minor departures 
from the underlying model assumptions (Manning and Marquis 1996). 
Based on time-series data, Phelps (1973) estimates insurance demand in an OLS model. 
Results indicate a positive relationship between insurance demand, income, user fee levels, 
and higher mean level of illness (represented by the age variable). There is a negative 
association between insurance demand and premium level. Based on these findings Phelps 
concludes that economic variables explain about 40 percent of the variation in insurance 
coverage (Phelps 1973). These findings are consistent with consumer theory, implying that 
low-income groups are less likely to insure than the better-off. 
The RAND study collected data to analyse the demand for medical care in the USA. Marquis 
and Holmer (1996) examine the different theories of consumer choice and the assumptions 
about people's evaluation of outcome when making choices, based on data collected at the 
end of the RAND study. Study participants were randomly assigned to five different 
insurance coverage plans. In a self-administered interview, study participants were presented 
with three hypothetical offers to purchase additional insurance coverage. Findings from the 
discrete choice model suggest that consumers show inertia in plan choice, which may be 
interpreted by the status quo effect or veil of experience. The demand for insurance is price 
inelastic, and families consider losses smaller than USD 200 as irrelevant. It leads to the 
conclusion that when evaluating risky prospects in their demand decision, people evaluate 
them as gains and losses from a reference point (i. e. status quo or health risk) rather than as 
final wealth status. This result is in contradiction with expected utility theory (Marquis and 
Holmer 1996). 
Manning and Marquis (1996) use an indirect utility function to estimate the price and income 
elasticities of the demand for health insurance in a limited information maximum likelihood 
model, and based on data collected at the end of the RAND insurance trial. Participants were 
asked to select from three hypothetical insurance plans with different co-insurance rates. This 
study expands on former studies that estimated the willingness to pay for hypothetical 
insurance by adding the value of medical care to the value of risk avoided in the purchaser's 
utility function. It implies that part of what consumers are willing to pay is attributable to the 
value of additional care they expect to receive when insured. Findings indicate that the 
willingness to enrol in a hypothetical health insurance is inelastic in income and price, with 
elasticities of +0.22 and -0.18, respectively. Robustness checks are conducted by using a 
discriminant function as a non-parametric alternative, yielding similar results (Manning and 
Marquis 1996). 
While the demand for voluntary health insurance has been explored in industrialized 
countries by examining price and income elasticity of the insurance demand, there is virtually 
no evidence from developing countries. Using qualitative information, Bennett et al. (1998) 
evaluate the performance of 98 health insurance schemes that operate in informal markets in 
low- and middle-income countries. According to the schemes' risk-sharing spectrum, the 
schemes are grouped into two categories suggesting that in each category the decision to 
enrol is driven by different motives. 
Table 4.2 presents an overview of these categories and their respective enrolment motives. 
Type I schemes cover high-cost, low-frequency hospital events for consumers who live in a 
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larger catchment's area. It is suggested that the demand for Type I insurance schemes is 
driven by individuals' risk aversion and the risk of high hospital fees. Type II schemes 
operate on a community level and cover low-cost and high-frequency health centre care. 
Demand for Type II schemes may be driven by reasons such as altruism, solidarity, and 
improving the availability of quality care at local health centres. Adverse selection might be 
more of an issue in Type I, and moral hazard in Type II plans (Bennett et al. 1998). 
Table 4.2: Demand motives for different risk-sharing spectrum 
Insurance Issues Type I Schemes Type II Schemes 
- Risk-sharing level Beyond community Within defined community 
- Benefit package Hospital care Primary health care 
- Enrolment motive Risk-aversion Community solidarity 
Paying when cash available 
- Asymmetric information Adverse selection Moral hazard 
(Source: adapted from Bennett et al. 1998) 
Citizens' willingness to pay and join a hypothetical health insurance plan has been assessed 
in India. Findings suggest that households' willingness to join and to pay an annual 
enrolment fee is determined by factors related to socio-economic status and the geographical 
accessibility to the health facility (Mathiyazhagan 1998). Additional factors may affect 
insurance demand, such as education level, gender of the household head, assets and cultural 
variables. 
Evidence from low-income countries shows that compared to the wealthier the poor are 
considerably less protected against risks of income fluctuations. To some extent this may be 
because risk-sharing mechanisms do not exist in low-income areas (Bennett et al. 1998). 
Problems related to information, contract enforcement and absence of formal insurance 
mechanisms have caused the poor to devise their own pooling and lending systems to protect 
themselves against financial risks (Besley 1995). 
Most commonly, poor people pool their risks in "tontines" or rotating savings and credit 
associations (ROSCAs), and use the money to finance investments in production goods. 
ROSCAs exist all over the world20. Their number keeps growing due to a lack of formal 
institutions that guard the security of credits and savings. A number of individuals form a 
ROSCA by committing to regularly put a fixed sum of money to a common pot, which will 
be allocated randomly to one member until each member has won the pot once. It is assumed 
that individuals join ROSCAs because they have identical, inter-temporally additive 
preferences and that the eventual winning of the pot increases their expected utility at the 
time of joining. Their welfare rises because a financial intermediary, the ROSCA, reduces 
every member's utility cost of saving. Factors that contribute to individuals' demand to 
participate in ROSCAs include their rational and forward-looking behaviour, risk aversion, 
the probability that their income may be hit by a non-synchronous shock, as well as different 
timing of consumption needs (Besley 1995). 
According to direct interviews conducted with poor individuals, institutional characteristics 
influence whether the poor perceive an institution as effective, which will influence their 
decision to join. People value qualities, such as trustworthiness, participation, caring, 
compassion, respect, honesty, fairness, timeliness, access, hardworking, responsive support 
and contact with the institution. If institutions lack these characteristics, they will not make a 
difference for the poor who will, as a consequence, not participate (World Bank 1999). 
This analysis aims to fill the gap in empirical evidence on the demand for health insurance in 
low-income countries. 
20 They are called Tontines in Western Africa, Chit in India, Hui in Taiwan, and Kye in Korea. 
4.3 Model specification, methods and data 
4.3.1 Specification of demand function 
The rationale underlying this analysis is that the demand for insurance is derived from the 
demand for health and health care, and depends on preferences and ability to pay the 
premium; and that health care is consumed to produce health status, which enters into utility. 
The analytical framework used is based on EU theory. The demand for health insurance is a 
discrete binary choice between an uncertain loss occurring with a probability when uninsured, 
and a certain loss of paying premium (Manning and Marquis 1996). 
Figure 4.3 shows the welfare gain of demand for insurance by risk averse individuals. The 
concave utility curve reflects diminishing marginal utility (MU) of wealth (Hurley 2000). An 
insured person seeks to maximize her expected utility, given her level of wealth (m). An 
uninsured's expected utility is obtained from an uncertain wealth of (mu) when healthy, or 
when sick (mH-L). An uninsured healthy person with zero loss reaches a utility level of 
(UmH) at wealth (ma) with a probability of (1-7t). If sickness and loss (L) happen with a 
probability of (n), then the person reaches utility (UmL). Over time, the uninsured's expected 
average wealth will be (p. ) that is (mu -irL), yielding the expected utility level E(U) with an 
uncertain outcome, and at a risky wealth level of (A). 
The corresponding expected utility function E(U) without insurance is: 
(1) E(U) = (1-n) U(mH) +n U(mH-L). 
The first part (1-it) U(mH) in the equation describes the probable utility level reached at (m) 
and when healthy. The second part shows the corresponding utility level achieved when sick 
and accounting for the loss caused by paying out-of-pocket user fees (mH-L) (Jack 1999). 
Figure 4.3: 
Utility 
UmH 
Uli 
E(U) 
Um, 
Welfare effects of demand for insurance under risk aversion 
Wealth (m) 
(Source: Barr, 1998; Jack, 1999; Hurley, 2000). 
To reach certainty in wealth (µ) instead of facing a risky wealth level (A), the uninsured may 
insure and pay an actuarial premium P that is equal to the expected loss TtL (Hurley 2000): 
(2) P=7tL 
Figure 4.3 shows an insured individual will be at a wealth level (µ), corresponding to wealth 
when healthy (mu) minus premium (nL), and achieve with certainty a higher utility level 
(Uµ) 
(3) Uµ =u (mH-ltL) 
Thus, insurance is welfare-improving. It increases an individual's expected utility level by the 
amount of Uµ - E(U). This result depends on the assumption that the utility of wealth is 
independent of health status. If state-dependent utility theory is right and the utility of wealth 
is health-state-dependent, then the optimal level of insurance is unknown (Hurley 2000). 
4.3.2 Model definition 
Purchasing a good or not is a binary choice. When purchasing insurance (or not), information 
is revealed about preferences for avoiding risk (Friedman 1974). 
The analytical strategy employed in this analysis is based on equations (1) and (3). The 
binary choice model used is a logit regression estimated using maximum likelihood methods. 
The logit is the logarithm of the odds of being insured (MHI), reflected by the ratio of the 
number of insured households (MHI) to the number of uninsured households (1 - MHI). In a 
logit regression, the probability P; of MHI enrolment is a sigmoid function of L;, which is a 
function of the explanatory variables X (Mukherjee et al. 1998): 
(4) L; =bl+ b2 X2i + .... + bk Xb 
(5) P; (MHI) = F(L) =1 / (1 + 1/eu ) 
The dependent variable demand for MHI will equal 1 if individuals insure, or zero otherwise. 
The model predicts the conditional probability P that MHI equals 1 for given values of the 
explanatory variables X;, which represent a series of attributes that are assumed to correlate 
with choice, such as socio-economic, demographic, and health factors. Hence, (1-P) is the 
probability that MHI=O. Each estimated coefficient ß; depicts the change in the predicted 
logit as a result of a unit change in the corresponding explanatory variable, ceteris paribus. In 
the case of dummy variables, the explanatory variable is compared against its reference 
category (Mukherjee et al. 1998). 
The probability of enrolling in MHI is a function of L, which is a function of a series of 
dummy and continuous variables: the district of Kabgayi, Byumba, male household head, age 
of household head, school attendance, large household size, household with pregnancy, 
household with small children, time distance to MHI, cattle, radio, bike ownership, and 
monetary expenditure per capita, which is used as a proxy for income. 
The equation to be estimated is: 
(6) P; (MHI) = F(L) =a+ ßl Kabgayi + (32Byumba + $33 (genhh) + $34 (a agehh) + ßs 
(d school) + (36(d si) + (37(hhpreg) + (38 (hhchild) + ß9 (d time) + (;, o (d cattle) + 
ß 11(d_radio) +ß 12(d bike) +ß 13(dquaiý. -1) 
+ß 14(dquarj) +ß is(dgua 3) +a, 
where the variables are defined in Table 4.4. a is a random disturbance term, which includes 
the usual unobservable variables and any measurement errors of recorded quantities. 
4.3.3 Model assumptions 
The model of the demand for insurance relies on the following assumptions. 
First, it is assumed that consumers' utility is defined as a function of health and the 
consumption of other goods, and that it is linear in the probabilities (Marquis and Holmer 
1996). 
Second, a consumer is assumed to have direct control over the choice variable, and certainty 
about the outcome, which is to be insured or not (Gertler and van der Gaag 1990). 
Third, when purchasing insurance consumers do not know whether they will be sick or well 
(Manning and Marquis 1996). They act rationally, maximize their expected utility and 
objectively assess their health risk correctly, suggesting that they consider the insurance 
effect on the eventual demand for care (Phelps 1973). 
4.3.4 Data and variables 
This analysis is performed in STATA7. It uses household survey data collected in Byumba, 
Kabgayi and Kabutare, at the end of the first MHI operational year in October 2000. The data 
set includes 3,173 households, among them 356 insured households. Overall, these are 
14,574 individuals. The questionnaire included questions, typically posed to the head of each 
surveyed household, on the households' socio-demographic, health, economic and insurance 
situation. It is assumed that the head of household makes the MI-11 enrolment decision. Thus, 
the household is the unit of analysis. A household is defined by all individuals who live and 
eat in the same house, including servants, relatives, and orphans. 
Table 4.4 summarizes the variables and characteristics of the sample. Variables have been 
examined in histograms to identify skewness. 
Table 4.4: Variable definition and descriptives (Household survey: 10/2000) 
Variable Definition Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
MHI membership MHI 3,173 0.112 0.316 0 1 
District Kabgayi Kabgayi 3,173 0.263 0.440 0 1 
District Byumba Byumba 3,173 0.521 0.500 0 1 
District Kabutare Kabutare 3,173 0.216 0.412 0 1 
Gender HH head (Male = 1) genhh 3,173 0.684 0.465 0 1 
HH head 30 year+ d_agehh 3,164 0.798 0.400 0 1 
Age HH head agehh 3,164 43.262 15.546 14 94 
HH head attended school d_school 3,173 0.549 0.498 0 1 
Level of study (O=None; 
1=primary; 2=post primary; 
3=secondary; 4=superior) levstudy 3,173 0.677 0.762 0 4 
HH size rhhsize 3,173 4.699 2.337 1 18 
HH with 5+ members d_hh_si 3,173 0.477 0.500 0 1 
HH head with pregnancy in hh hhpreg 3,173 0.287 0.453 0 1 
HH head with child<5 in hh hhchild 3,173 0.575 0.494 0 1 
HH < 30 min. to HC/MHI d_time 3,173 0.335 0.472 0 1 
HH with cattle d_cattle 3,173 0.158 0.364 0 1 
HH with radio d_radio 3,173 0.342 0.474 0 1 
HH with bike d_bike 3,173 0.091 0.288 0 1 
1st monetary expenditure 
quartile dquar_1 3,173 0.250 0.433 0 1 
2nd monet expenditure quartile dquar_2 3,173 0.251 0.433 0 1 
3rd monetary expenditure 
quartile dquar_3 3,173 0.249 0.433 0 1 
4th monetary expenditure 
quartile dquar_4 3,173 0.250 0.433 0 1 
Number of rooms in house nbroom 3,149 3.263 1.170 1 9 
Number of sheep in HH nbsheep 3,173 0.332 0.995 0 16 
Number of goats in HH nbgoat 3,173 0.809 1.484 0 17 
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Number of cattle in HH nbcattle 3,173 0.214 0.725 0 21 
Monetary expenditure per 
capita per month (RWF) rexpcap 3,173 3149.481 7460.573 0 192,950 
Logarithm of monetary 
expenditure per capita per 
month (RWF) LnExp 3,173 7.198 1.428 0 12.170 
Squared logarithm of monetary 
expenditure per capita per 
month (RWF) LnExp2 3,173 53.844 18.782 0 148.114 
Reasons to enrol in MHI 
(I =cheap; 2=precaution; 
3=other) m332 339 1.876 0.641 339 1.876 
Premium level seen by 
member (1 =easy; 2=okay; 
3=expensive) m334 339 2.121 0.73 339 2.121 
How paid MHI premium m335 354 3.585 2.462 354 3.585 
Member will re-enrol in MHI m337 341 0.962 0.192 341 0.962 
Reasons not to re-enrol in MHI 
(1=lack of money; 2=other) m339 14 1.429 0.514 14 1.429 
Why not MHI member m340 2659 1.606 1.331 2659 1.606 
Non-member will enrol m341 2244 0.706 0.456 2244 0.706 
Why non-member will not enrol 
(11 =poverty; 2=expensive; 
3=other) m343 649 1.411 0.791 649 1.411 
Note: Data source: household survey. Non-weighted data. Exchange Rate: USD 1=RWF390 in June 
2000; USD 1=RWF460 in June 2002. 
Dependent Variable 
This is a binary variable: MHI membership of a household at the time of the interview (MHI). 
Demographic Variables 
The model includes dummies for gender (genhh) and age (d agehh) of the head of the 
household, and for household size (d_hlI-si). Rwanda reports a high rate of households 
headed by widows (22%), who are particularly exposed to poverty, illiteracy and low medical 
service use (Ministry of Economics and Finance 2002). Thus, male-headed households are 
expected to be better-off than female-headed households. If male gender turns out to be a 
significant enrolment factor it would suggest the poorer are less likely to enrol. The age cut. 
off point is 30 years for household heads, which is below the average age. 
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Households with three and more children tend to be poorer than smaller households (Ministry 
of Economics and Finance 2002). Therefore, this analysis uses a cut-off point for household 
size of 5 members, at an average household size of 4.5. It is expected that the annual 
premium of RWF 2,500 for households up to 7 individuals provides an incentive for large 
households to insure, although they may be poorer. If household size and income are 
inversely related and if larger households are more likely to enrol, it would imply higher 
enrolment probability among the poorer. 
Health Variables 
Two imperfect health indicators aim to identify households with potentially higher service 
use because of higher need: households with pregnant women (hhpreg), and households with 
children below 5 years (hhchild). These variables might capture potential adverse selection by 
members; and are consistent with predictions of state-dependent utility theory. It is expected 
that households with pregnant women and small children are more likely to insure. However, 
higher enrolment of these groups may have resulted from active member recruiting by nurses 
among pregnant women who sought preventive care services in health centres. 
Geographic Variables 
They include households' district of residence (Byumba, Kabgayi or Kabutare) to estimate 
residence specific factors associated with MHI membership, such as the districts' information 
campaign. The time distance to the health centre and MIR bureau (d time) is analysed 
assuming that households who live within 30 walking minutes of the MIR bureau and health 
centre may know the staff, and may be better informed about MHI, which is expected to 
positively affect enrolment. Enrolment is highest in Byumba (see Table 3.3), presumably due 
to the active information campaign with district authorities. 
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Socio-Economic Variables and Their Robustness 
Socio-economic measures include (1) assets and (2) monetary expenditure data. 
Assets variables include whether the household head attended school (d_school); and 
households' investment and production goods, such as number of rooms (nbroom), 
ownership of cattle (d_cattle), sheep (d sheep), goats (d_goat), radio (djadio) and vehicles 
(d bike). Survey interviewees live predominantly in clay and straw houses with clay or tin 
sheets roofs. Richer, as well as better-educated households are expected to live in houses with 
more rooms. Cattle, radio and bike ownership are signs of wealth. Small stock (sheep, goats, 
fowl) is mostly held for own-consumption and sales. Bicycles are costly and the only 
affordable vehicles for the rural population, though rather difficult to use in hilly areas. The 
distribution of assets in a population is generally skewed, which will affect the sample means 
(Deaton 1998). 
In the absence of income and expenditure data, it is possible to construct an index of assets 
and housing characteristics to proxy wealth using principal component analysis. This 
approach has been validated with datasets that contain both asset and income data. 
Econometric results suggest that the asset index as a proxy of economic status is at least as 
reliable as conventionally measured consumption expenditures for use in predicting school 
enrolment (Filzner and Pritchett 2000). Deaton (1998) recommends that because of the lack of 
an adequate theory on how different socio-economic components should be combined into a 
single aggregated welfare measure, they should be kept separately. Thus, this analysis takes 
each asset variable as an alternative measure of socio-economic status to estimate the 
enrolment probability, as monetary expenditure is probably measured with some error. 
In rural Rwanda, most people live from subsistence farming. They are exposed to seasonal 
and transitory income shocks, causing their income for some periods to be zero, and forcing 
them to smooth their consumption over bad and good times. Thus, monetary and non- 
monetary expenditure is a better measure of households' welfare (Deaton 1998). 
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This data set did not collect information on non-monetary expenditures. Therefore, 
households' total monetary expenditure during the four-week period prior to the interview 
serves as a proxy for household income. It is calculated by summing up households' monthly 
monetary expenditures spent at the market and outside the market (e. g. for rent, transport, 
tobacco), for school fees, and health, including transport costs to health facilities, fees paid 
for traditional and for modern medicine in health facilities and pharmacies. 
The equivalence scale literature does not provide any satisfactory alternative on how to divide 
a household's expenditures by its members. While per capita values give too little to adults 
and too much to children, dividing household expenditures according to each individual's 
need may underestimate the true dispersion of consumption among them. The use of per 
capita values is best practice and considered as conceptually clearer (Deaton 1998). The 
Rwandan HLCS conducted in 2000 uses the same adult equivalence scale that was used in 
the 1983 National Budget and Consumption Survey. The scale contains different weights by 
gender and age group, giving higher values to women than men, due to women's longer work 
hours. The HLCS methodology does not describe the basis for the different weights21; but 
suggests conducting sensitivity analysis with respect to the choice of the equivalence scale in 
a subsequent stage (Ministry of Economics and Finance 2002). Applying an equivalence 
scale and estimating weights for different household members creates additional difficulties 
in Rwanda given the new household composition as a result of the genocide22. Therefore, in 
this analysis, monetary expenditures are reported on a per capita level (rexpcap), by dividing 
total monthly monetary expenditure for the total household by the number of household 
members. 
Previous analysis with this dataset stratified the sample based on household monetary 
expenditure into quartiles, and examined whether the insurance demand differs across 
21 Apparently, weights were chosen based on discussion between the Government and FAO in 1983. 22 Many families have adopted several orphans and taken in survivors without family members. This 
makes it difficult to estimate whether an orphan or a distant relative are treated the same as other family members and to assign the relative weights. 
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quartiles. Logit regression results yielded insignificant differences between quartile 
coefficients on the enrolment probability (Schneider and Diop 2001). This may be related to 
the rather skewed distribution of monetary expenditures across quartiles (implying minimal 
differences between the bottom three groups). 
Table 4.5 summarizes the statistics for monthly per capita monetary expenditures for all 
households at different percentile levels. The distribution is extremely right-skewed: most 
people have relatively low expenditures while fewer and fewer report larger amounts. About 
75 percent of the sample spends below RWF 3,250 (USD 8.33 in 2000) per capita per month 
compared to the maximum amount of RWF 192,950 (USD 495 in 2000). Visual inspection of 
the data reveals that only 3 of 3,139 households report monetary expenditures higher than 
RWF 100,000 (USD 256 in 2000). In rural areas, such high amounts point to measurement 
errors, or to the situation of very few rich23. Some studies exclude outliers and trim the data 
set by one to five percent at the upper and lower end of a distribution (Deaton 1998). 
However, this study includes all data. 
Table 4.5: Distribution of monthly monetary expenditures per capita 
Monetary Min 10th 25th 50th Mean 75th 90th Max 
Expendit. Perc Pere Perc Perc Perc 
In RWF 0 275 637 1,492 2,904 3,250 6,250 192,950 
In USD 0.0 0.71 1.63 3.83 7.45 8.33 16.03 495.1 
Note: Data source: household survey weighted data (9/2000). Exchange Rate: USD 1=RWF390 in June 2000. 
Table 4.6 examines the robustness of monetary expenditure as a socio-economic measure by 
comparing the distribution of monetary expenditures across deciles with the asset distribution 
(Deaton 1998). The first column ranks households in deciles, according to their monetary 
expenditure per capita. The other columns include average school level, various asset 
variables, and average household size across deciles. 
'3 In the absence of an industry and service sector in this area, it could be that these household heads 
are local (high paid) employees of international organisations, or government employees with salary 
mark-ups paid by international organisations. Their health expenditure is paid by their employer. 
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Table 4.6: Socio-economic variables, by monetary expenditure decile 
ME 
Decile 
Monetary 
expenditure 
Level 
school 
Nbr 
cattle 
Nbr 
goats 
% own 
bike 
Nbr 
rooms 
Hh 
size 
1 134.3*** 0.41 0.08** 0.43** 2% 2.87 4.34 
2 397.4*** 0.44 0.19 0.61 4% 3.11 5.04 
3 661.7*** 0.44 0.27 0.75 6% 3.28 4.76 
4 953.3*** 0.64** 0.19 0.71 7% 3.33 4.62 
5 1,314.4*** 0.59 0.25 0.76 8% 3.42 5.14** 
6 1,716.1 *** 0.69 0.26 0.80 9% 3.47 4.64*** 
7 2,336.7*** 0.66 0.22 0.82 9% 3.53 4.76 
8 3,258.0*** 0.78 0.29 0.78 11% 3.54 4.76 
9 4,889.3*** 0.80 0.30 0.85 15% 3.47 4.39 
10 14,416.9*** 1.12*** 0.39 0.86 24%** 3.79** 3.66*** 
N (Hh) 3,173 3,173 3,173 3,173 3,173 3,149 3,173 
Notes: Figures are averages over all households in each decile; households are grouped by deciles of total 
monetary expenditures per capita per month in RWF. Level school: 0=no school, primary, 2= >primary. t-tests 
were performed to compare the difference to the next higher decile. *** significant at 1 percent level ** 
significant at 5 percent level 
All asset variables increase with higher monetary expenditure deciles, with the exception of 
`household size', which significantly decreases in the top group. This relationship between 
monetary expenditure and household size is in line with findings from the HLCS where larger 
households were identified as poorer than smaller households (Ministry of Economics and 
Finance 2002). The gradients shown for assets across deciles are lower than for monetary 
expenditures. In all deciles households own small numbers of assets, suggesting that these 
rural households are quite poor. Even among top decile households, educational attainment is 
low. This asset distribution supports findings from other surveys, according to which 66 
percent of rural households live below the consumption poverty line and only few rural 
households own assets (Ministry of Economics and Finance 2002). For example, cattle are 
culturally the most important asset in Rwanda. However, in this survey, only 16 percent of 
households interviewed own cattle. The average number of cattle owned by these 291 
households is only 1.5. Similarly, households with goats only own on average 2 goats. This 
suggests that the distribution of assets across socio-economic groups is rather small in these 
rural areas. 
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Asset and educational variables only differ significantly between the bottom and top groups, 
and do not seem to have a significant impact on inequalities in the sample population. Three 
assets variables (cattle, goats, and bike ownership) show the same patterns of change, 
suggesting correlation among them with increasing deciles. Similarly, the average number of 
rooms correlates with household heads' educational level. Although monetary expenditure is 
a weak proxy for households' socio-economic background, this variable is retained for the 
analysis: first, it is in line with the distribution of asset indicators; and second, it appears to 
give a more pronounced description of households' socio-economic situation across deciles. 
Household resources such as assets tend to be related to households' composition, including 
the greater earning ability of men (Deaton 1999). Figure 4.7 ranks households by their 
monetary expenditure deciles, against which three variables are distributed: the proportion of 
households headed by a woman, by an illiterate person, and the proportion of households 
with a radio. The graph suggests that households in lowest expenditure deciles are 
considerably worse off than the highest expenditure groups. The proportion of female and 
illiterate household heads tapers off significantly in upper expenditures deciles, while radio 
ownership increases markedly. 
Figure 4.7: Gender, illiteracy and radio ownership, by decile 
® Female HH head   No School Q Own Radio 
U' 0.7 
L 0.6 
0.5 
L 0.4 
0.3 
ö 0.2 
CL 0.1 
IL 
123456789 10 
Monetary expenditure deciles 
Note: F-test shows the significance of results across deciles. Female: F =15.51, p<0.001; School: F-4.76, 
p<0.001; Radio: F= 15.48, p<0.001. 
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Thus, overall with very few exceptions, these households are very poor. They have 
accumulated very few assets. The distribution of assets among them is fairly equal with the 
exception of differences between the top (9 and 10) and the bottom deciles (1 and 2). 
Households in the lowest expenditure deciles are more likely to be headed by a female or 
illiterate person, and have considerably fewer assets than the upper groups. 
Monetary expenditures differ significantly across deciles. This comparison of the distribution 
of monetary expenditures with the distribution of assets across monetary expenditure deciles 
suggests that expenditure is a robust socio-economic indicator, against which MHI enrolment 
and equity in utilisation and financing of care will be analysed. 
Throughout the analysis and for expository convenience, I will refer to households classified 
in the bottom monetary expenditure quartile Q1 as "poor", and the top quartile Q4 as "rich". 
This definition does not follow any of the usual definitions of poverty, which is based on the 
flow of consumption relative to some predetermined poverty thresholds like expenditures 
necessary for the consumption of a determined bundle of goods (Deaton 1998). The "rich" 
are not rich in absolute terms; in this rural context they are just less poor. 
Data Limits 
This household data set includes data on monetary but not on non-monetary expenditures. 
Rural households' production used for own-consumption and in-kind payments reflects an 
important proportion of total income, especially for poor households. Thus, monetary 
expenditure is biased towards the richer and using it as an income proxy will underreport 
socio-economic levels for the poorest. As a result, inequality findings from this data set 
should not be compared with other data sets or used for poverty analysis (Deaton 1998). Such 
a comparison may lead to the erroneous result that inequality is higher among these sample 
households. 
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The data on the "number of rooms" variable is incomplete and is excluded from the analysis 
to prevent a decrease in sample size. Overall, 24 households did not respond to the question, 
among them 20 uninsured households. Due to its correlation with rooms, the school 
attainment variable will serve as a proxy for households' socio-economic situation. The effect 
of including rooms was examined in the multivariate analysis. The significance of 
coefficients was unchanged, however, the model test statistics fare better when excluding it. 
The analysis will not measure health and price related characteristics. Household survey data 
were collected at the end of Mills' first operational year. Thus, information on members' 
self-reported health status (SAH) during the two weeks prior to the interview does not allow 
concluding on adverse selection among members who may have enrolled anytime during the 
year, up to 12 month prior to the interview. The two health variables (households with 
pregnant women or with small children) provide limited proxies for adverse selection. 
There is only one MIII plan with identical premiums in the three districts. Thus, premiums 
are excluded from the demand function, and price elasticity of demand for MHI is not 
estimated. Though, it would be expected that the demand for MHI is highly price elastic for 
the poor. 
4.3.5 Estimation procedures 
This household survey was collected at the end of the first MHI year when about 8 percent of 
the three districts population was insured. It includes data from households who live in these 
districts, which are administratively divided into cells. A two-stage cluster survey design was 
applied. Section 3.5.3 describes the related sampling strategy. 
The clustering of observations within sampling units implies observations are not 
independent, yielding error terms in the regression to be correlated across observations 
(Deaton 1998). Survey estimation commands (svydes) in STATA7 produce variance 
estimates that are approximately unbiased or biased towards larger standard errors. Though, 
model estimation problems may occur when the number of parameters exceeds the number of 
clusters (StataCorp 2001). 
The analysis uses weighted data and STATA7 svydes commands, which allows defining the 
survey set at the onset. It includes (a) two strata areas depending on their average MHI 
enrolment rate24; (b) clusters, as defined by the 22 PSUs; and (c) the probability weight. 
The analysis follows EU theory. Previous analysis showed no link between monetary 
expenditures or health variables and enrolment probability (Schneider and Diop 2001), which 
is contrary to findings from other studies (Morduch 1995; Townsend 1995). This analysis 
investigates previous results to ensure that they are not related to model misspecification or 
an artefact of the data. It contains six steps. 
First, based on bivariate analysis, the uninsured and insured are compared on relevant 
characteristics by estimating the corresponding frequencies, mean values, and proportions. 
Bivariate analysis is limited as the association between enrolment and the variable of interest 
maybe contaminated by omitted variable bias (Deaton 1998). 
Second, multivariate analysis is used to obtain parameter estimates in a logit regression 
model for the probability of MHI enrolment, as shown in equations (4) and (5). The model 
building strategy starts with Models 1 to 3, and focuses on the specification of the monetary 
expenditure variable. Model 1 is estimated with monetary expenditure entering the regression 
in its categorical quartile form to compare whether the demand for MHI differs across 
quartiles. The second model fitted is linear in the logarithm of monetary expenditure 
(LnExp). Model 3 includes the quadratic form of the logarithm of monetary expenditure 
(LnExp2) in order to test for non-linearity of the effect of income (Mukherjee et al. 1998). 
Wald tests are performed to estimate whether the monetary expenditure variables are 
significantly different from zero in the equation (StataCorp 2001). 
24 See section 3.3. 
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Third, two specification problems exist: heteroskedasticity and omitted variables. 
Heteroskedasticity causes inconsistent estimators and inappropriate covariance matrix. 
Although the analysis uses logarithmically transformed25 continuous variables, it rarely 
results in a normal distribution. In models with limited dependent variables, like in logit 
models, the estimation of scale parameters cannot be separated from the estimation of 
location parameters, and as a result, it is not possible to separate the "regression" vectors 
from the "heteroskedasticity" vectors. This has so far limited a straightforward solution to 
deal with heteroskedasticity in binary choice models (Deaton 1998). 
Omitting a relevant variable will cause inefficient coefficients estimates. The magnitude of 
any bias on the coefficients of the included variable depends on the correlation between the 
omitted and the included variables and on the magnitude of the true effect of the omitted 
variable on the outcome (Grosh and Glewwe 2000). 
Specification tests are conducted to identify problems related to heteroskedasticity and poor 
fit. Residual analysis and diagnostic plots serve to examine the goodness of fit of the models. 
The Hosmer-Lemeshow Chi-square test is a residual analysis test for binary choice models. 
The closer the resulting Chi-square is to zero, the better the model fits the data. In a saturated 
model the Chi-square statistics will be zero since all residuals are equal to zero. Results are 
graphically examined to spot unusual data and check the goodness of fit of the model 
(StataCorp 2001). 
Fourth, the model refinement strategy continues in a backward elimination process (Models 
4-6). The model is gradually restricted by setting the least statistically significant variable 
coefficients to zero, until the test statistics identify the most parsimonious model that is 
identifiable, has a high goodness of fit, and is theoretically consistent and coherent 
(Mukherjee et al. 1998). According to the specification tests Model 6 appears to be the most 
25 See Chapter 6 in Literature Review on discussion of logarithmic transformation. In this household 
data set, each monetary expenditure observation has been increased by 1 RWF before logarithmic 
transformation to correct for zero value observations. 
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parsimonious model. Before interpreting the coefficients, a number of alternative 
specifications are tested (Models 7-9) to examine the effect on results of including and 
excluding variables such as rooms, children, and assets. Although some minor changes in 
estimated coefficients are observed, the test statistics confirm Model 6 as the preferred model. 
Fifth, logit regression results of Model 6 serve to estimate marginal effects (ME) at the 
sample means. The ME of a series of explanatory variables X on the enrolment probability p 
can be written as the product of the marginal effect of L on p and of the marginal effect of X 
on L: 
(7) Sp / SXk =dp/dL* SL/SXk =f(L) (3k = 
(8 L/ (1 +8L )2) Rk 
The ME is not constant as it depends on the value of L as described in equation (4), which 
depends on the value of the explanatory values X. Although most of the explanatory and the 
dependent variables are binary, estimating their ME as if they were continuous variables 
yields accurate results (Greene 2000). 
Sixth, qualitative data from households describe their reasons to demand or decline MIII 
membership, which in light of the literature reviewed helps to test the internal coherence of 
the monetary expenditure variable if responses differ across the quartiles. 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Description of the sample group 
Based on bivariate analysis, the socio-demographic and economic characteristics are 
examined across three groups: insured, uninsured and all households. Table 4.8 provides an 
overview. First, demographic characteristics are shown for household heads and the entire 
household, followed by socio-economic variables, including assets and monthly monetary 
expenditure per capita. Two-tailed t-test statistics are presented in the last column. 
Table 4.8: Socio-demographic and -economics by MHI status, proportions 
Proportion of 
MHI Member 
(n 356) 
Non-Member 
(n 2,817) 
All HH 
(n 3,173) t value 
Household head: 
HH headed by man 82.3%*** 4.7% 5.9% . 19 
H head older than 30 0.1% 1.8% 1.7% . 71 
HH head with schooling 2.9% *** 3.0% 4.3% . 55 
Household: 
HH with pregnancy 5.4%** 4.9% 5.6% . 29 
H with child<5 7.2%*** 1.7% 2.8% .0 
HH size 5+ individuals 2.7%*** 3.8% 5.2% . 38 
H is <30 min from HC 8.6% 7.6% 8.4% . 81 
Household asset ownership: 
HH owns radio 8.9%*** 2.8% 4.0% .4 
HH owns bike 18.5% *** . 5% . 3% . 72 
H owns cattle 4.5% 17.7% 18.2% . 98 
Household monetary expenditure quartiles: 
HH in 1st (lowest) quartile 19.9% 6.1% 5.6% 1.82 
HH in 2nd quartile 4.2% 4.7% 4.6% . 19 
HH in 3rd quartile 9.9% 5.0% 5.3% 1.63 
HH in 4th quartile 6.1% 4.3% 4.4% .5 
Note: Household survey, weighted estimates calculated with svyset. Figures are proportions over all household 
each cell; e. g. if 82% of MHI member households are headed by men, then the remaining 18% are headed by 
women. Quartiles reflect per capita monetary expenditure and sum up to 100%. Two-tailed t-tests compare the 
average values of the insured with the uninsured sample. *** significant at 1 percent level, ** at 5 percent level. 
The demographic comparison shows significant differences in gender and education with a 
high proportion of insured households headed by a man, or by a person with some schooling. 
Is in 
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The second panel suggests a bigger share of insured households is from households with 
pregnant women, with children below 5 years, or from larger households. A markedly higher 
proportion of insured households own a radio or a bicycle. 
The fourth panel shows the distribution of households by monetary expenditure quartiles. The 
distribution of insured households across quartiles increases with higher quartiles, but not 
monotonically. There is no statistically significant difference between the proportion of 
insured and uninsured in their respective quartiles. 
Summary statistics on socio-demographic and economic variables are presented in Table 4.9 
for insured, uninsured and all households. The two groups show similar (weighted) average 
ages of the household head, average numbers of cattle, and average monetary expenditure per 
capita per month in RWF. Insured households count on average significantly more 
individuals. 
Table 4.9: Socio-demographic and -economics by MHI status, mean values 
Mean values 
MHI Member 
HH (n 356) 
Non-Member 
HH (n 2,817) 
All HH 
(n 3,173) t 
Age HH head, years 42.5 44.5 44.3 2.03 
HH size, number of individuals 5.47*** 4.5 4.6 4.67 
Number of cattle owned 0.35 0.23 0.24 1.21 
Number of cattle owned by 
cattle owners 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.22 
Monetary expenditure (RWF), 
per month, per capita 3,362.9 2,868.6 2,909 0.94 
Note: Household survey, weighted estimates calculated with svyset. HH - household; MC = Monetary 
expenditure per month per capita; Year 2000: USD 1=RWF 390; Two-tailed t-tests compare the average values of 
the insured with the uninsured sample. *** significant at 1 percent level, ** at 5 percent level. 
Table 4.10 presents insured and uninsured households by monetary expenditure (ME) 
quartiles. In each quartile, mean values are shown for the size of households, the number of 
bikes, and household total monetary expenditure per capita per month. The t-statistics are in 
the last column. 
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Table 4.10: Soclo-economic measures by MHI status and by quartile 
Mean values ME 
MHI Member 
HH (n 356) 
Non-Member 
HH (n 2,817) 
All HH 
(n 3,173) t 
Q1 5.5** 4.6 4.7 2.41 
Household size Q2 5.6 4.7 4.8 1.87 
Q3 5.8*** 4.6 4.7 2.95 
Q4 4.8*** 4.1 4.1 3.06 
Q1 0.09 0.03 0.04 1.15 
Bike owners 
02 0.13 0.06 0.07 1.38 
Q3 0.21 *** 0.09 0.10 2.89 
Q4 0.27 0.17 0.14 1.91 
Q1 347 333 334 0.37 
Monetary expenditure 
er month RWF 
Q2 1,007 1,050 1,047 0.88 
, ( ), p 
per capita Q3 2,056 2,241 2,225 1.73 
Q4 9,367 8,154 8,247 0.86 
Note: Household survey, weighted estimates calculated with svyset. HH a household, Q= monetary expenditure 
quartiles; Exchange rate: USD 1=RWF 390 in Year 2000; Two-tailed t-tests compare the average values of the 
insured with the uninsured sample. *** significant at 1 percent level, ** at 5 percent level. 
The insured in lowest, third and highest quartiles count on average significantly more 
household members, than uninsured households. Insured households in third quartile are 
markedly more likely to own a bike compared to their reference group, the uninsured. The 
insured and uninsured report similar average monetary expenditure across all quartiles. 
This descriptive comparison of household characteristics indicates that insured households 
differ significantly from the uninsured in regard of socio-demographic (larger household size, 
male household head, household with pregnancy and child<5) and socio-economic 
characteristics (household head with schooling, own radio, and bike). However, the two 
groups appear to be similar in regard of monetary expenditures and cattle ownership. 
The following section uses multivariate analysis based on maximum likelihood procedures, to 
examine the independent effects of different variables, while controlling for the impact of 
others. 
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4.4.2 Logit regression results 
To disentangle the determinants of MHI enrolment, a logit regression is estimated with the 
household head's insurance status as the dependent variable. The robustness of socio- 
economic variables is examined. 
Table 4.11 presents three logit models with explanatory variables and their reference 
categories in the first two columns. Standard errors in parentheses and p-values are shown. 
Model 1 is based on equation (6) with monetary expenditures entering the equation in their 
quartile form. The robustness of quartiles is tested in Model 2 and 3. In Model 2, 
expenditures enter the equation in its continuous, logarithmically transformed form (LnExp). 
The insignificant coefficient suggests no relationship between enrolment probability and 
expenditure. In Model 3, even after allowing for non-linearity by including the quadratic term 
of the logarithm of monetary expenditure (LnExp2), both monetary expenditure coefficients 
are not significantly different from zero. 
The three models show similar results for the magnitude and significance of coefficients, as 
well as tests of goodness of fit. In all three models, five variables affect the MHI enrolment 
probability significantly compared to their reference categories: Byumba residence, 
household head attended school, households with pregnant women, households live within 30 
minutes of the health facility, and bike owners. These coefficients appear to be robust to the 
inclusion of a differently structured monetary expenditure variable. In Model 3, with a 
quadratic term of the expenditure function, larger household size is an additional significant 
enrolment factor. In all three models, monetary expenditures and some relevant asset 
variables (radio and cattle) are not significant, suggesting correlation with significant 
variables (bike and school), and raising concerns about multicollinearity between variables. 
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Table 4.11: Model 1-3: Logst regression results for enrolment probability 
Model 1 Model 2 M odel 3 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Reference 
Category 
Logit 
Coef. 
Std. 
Err. P 
Logit 
Coef. 
Std. 
Err. P 
Logit 
Coef. 
Std. 
Err. P 
ab ai 1 . 272 0.645 . 
063 1 . 285 0.654 . 
064 1 . 271 0.649 . 
064 
Byumba butare . 863 0.576 ). 001 . 
860 0.577 . 001 . 860 
0.577 ). 001 
Male hh head Female 0 . 295 
0.206 ). 168 . 316 0.203 ). 136 . 315 
0.202 ). 134 
head, 30+ 30 years ). 200 0.233) . 403 . 
191 0.229 ). 414 . 189 
0.229 . 418 
head with 
school Illiterate . 637 0.135 ). 001 . 
645 0.129 . 
001 ). 646 0.131 ). 001 
size 5+ size <5 0.372 0.182 ). 055 . 380 
0.19 . 059 . 393 
0.178 ). 039 
with 
re c 
No 
pregnancy . 505 0.205 
). 023 . 501 0.205 ). 024 . 501 
0.205 . 024 
with child 
5 
o small 
hild . 127 
0.217 . 566 . 
128 0.224 . 573 . 139 
0.213 . 521 
30 min to HC 0+ min 1.437 0.482 . 007 
1.443 0.479 ). 007 1.437 0) 007 
attle o cattle . 258 
0.406 ). 531 . 272 
0.411 ). 515 . 276 0.413 
). 512 
dio o radio . 314 0.196 ). 124 . 319 0.194 ). 116 . 311 
0.198 ). 132 
like No bike ). 617 0.2 . 006 . 611 
0.195 . 005 . 594 0.188 . 005 
X 0.084 (0.076 . 278 0.223 0.313 ). 485 
nEx 2 . 011 0.023 ). 634 
uartile 1 ). 267 0.232 . 263 
artile 2 ). 244 0.221 . 282 
artile 3 Quartile 4 ). 235 0.235 . 329 
cons 6.743 0.713 . 001 5.974 
(0.638) . 001 5.572 1.203 . 001 
robs 164 164 164 
Pop size weight 212.48 212.48 212.48 
(15,6) 55.93 13,8) 52.43 14,7) 61.28 
Prob >F . 0001 . 
0001 . 0001 
Log likelihood 654.969 654.96 654.71 
R chit 13.37 13.37 13.88 
Prob > Chi2 . 0001 . 0001 . 0001 
Pseudo R2 . 193 . 
193 
. 1934 
osmer-Lemeshow 
hit 10 10.33 . 79 7 
rob > Chi2 . 4119 . 
7448 
. 4663 
Note: Household Survey Data (10/2000) weighted estimates calculated in STATA7 svylogit. HH=Household, 
HC=Health Centre. Svylogit reports t-tests. P values show significance levels. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
The test statistics for the three models show significant results for the F test (or Chit test), the 
log likelihood and the LR Chi2. The Hosmer-Lemeshow Chi2 test examines the goodness of 
fit of the models. The data are ordered on the predicted probabilities and regrouped into ten 
equal size groups (StataCorp 2001). The three models report similarly insignificant Chi2, 
suggesting that the residuals are close to zero. Thus, the three models cannot be rejected and 
fit the data well. 
Despite similar results and no indication for an association between expenditure and the 
enrolment probability in Model 2, this comparison suggests that Model 3 fits the data best. It 
has six significant explanatory variables that correlate with enrolment, and smaller standard 
errors. 
The goodness of fit for Model 3 is depicted in Figure 4.12. The diagnostic plot is a scatter of 
the mean of the leverage of the covariant patterns (phat), against the mean value of the 
enrolment probability. The small circles on the graph are household groups that have the 
same characteristics or the same covariant pattern (Mukherjee et al. 1998). There is 
heteroskedasticity with increasing variance once the mean of the MHI variable goes beyond 
the cut-off point of about 0.125. Four circles fit the model particularly poorly. They are 
situated on the left-hand side far above the horizontal axis, where the dependent variable 
(MHI) equals zero, while the model predicts an enrolment probability of nearly 0.6. These are 
uninsured households who have characteristics like school attendance or Byumba residence, 
which according to the model predict MHI membership. 
Figure 4.12: Model 3: Covariant pattern analysis on enrolment probability 
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The correlation matrix for Model 3 is shown in Table A4.1. As expected, correlation is high 
between monetary expenditure variables, and relatively high between the pregnancy and child 
variable. However, it seems low between assets, gender and school variables. It suggests that 
more complex patterns of multicollinearity may affect parameters or standard error estimates, 
and could undermine correct inference (Deaton 1998). Although on a low level, the radio 
variable seems to be the variable that correlates most with other socio-economic indicators 
including gender, education and assets. Bivariate analysis suggested high correlation between 
gender, school, bike and radio. 
Due to concerns about multicollinearity and insignificant monetary expenditures and asset 
variables (radio and cattle), the socio-economic measures used in these models are checked. It 
leads to a test of Model 3 based on stepwise elimination of socio-economic variables that 
appear to have a non-significant effect on the enrolment probability, or seem to correlate with 
more relevant variables. These correlations have been described in Table 4.6 in section 4.3.4. 
The robustness test aims to reach a model with a reasonably well overall test statistic and 
significant relevant explanatory variables. Models 4 to 6 are shown in Table 4.13. 
Table 4.13: Model 4-6: Logst regression results for enrolment probability 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Reference 
Category 
Logit 
Coef. 
Std. 
Err. P 
Logit 
Coef. 
Std. 
Err. P 
Logit 
Coef. 
Std. 
Err. P 
ab a' 1.259 (0.640) . 063 1.296 0.652 . 061 1.288 0.651 . 062 
ba butare . 855 
0.578 . 001 . 851 0.570 . 001 . 863 0.577 . 001 
Male hh head Female . 279 (0.201) . 180 ). 330 (0.212) . 135 ). 341 (0.192) . 091 
head, 30+ 30 years . 205 0.234 . 393 ). 208 0.227 . 371 ). 180 0.232 ). 446 
head with 
school Illiterate . 614 0.132 . 001 . 640 0.132 ). 001 1 0.662 0.126 . 001 
size 5+ size <5 ). 401 (0.179) . 036 1 0.423 0.186 ). 034 . 425 0.174 ). 024 
with 
pregnancy 
No 
pregnancy . 491 0.207 . 028 . 489 0.203 . 
026 
. 547 0.203) . 014 
with child 
5 
No small 
child . 141 0.226 . 541 . 130 0.206) . 533 
30 min to HC 0+ min 1.421 0.471 . 007 1.434 0.461 . 005 1.448 (0.486) . 007 
Cattle No cattle . 254 0.415 . 546 ). 271 0.405 1512 
dio No radio ). 276 0.195 . 173 ). 346 0.229 . 147 ). 303 0.194 . 135 
ike No bike . 575 0.198 . 009 . 627 : 0.154) . 001 . 600 0.186 . 004 
LnExp 0.211 0.322 ). 519 0.212 0.321 ). 517 
nEx 2 . 0l1 0.023 . 657 . 010 0.024 . 677 )uartile 1 
uartile 2 
uartile 3 Quartile 4 
cons 6.520 0.633 . 001 5.620 1.222 . 001 5.571 1.195 . 001 
robs 3164 164 3164 
Pop size weight 3212.48 212.48 212.48 
12,9) 74.68 13,8) 69.78 13,8) 72.81 
Prob >F . 0001 . 0001 . 0001 Lojz likelihood 655.911 655.76 655.0139 
R chit 311.49 11.79 13.28 
rob > Chi2 . 0001 . 0001 . 0001 Pseudo R2 . 1919 . 1921 . 193 
osmer-Lemeshow 
hit 10 14.19 16.29 10.29 
Prob > Chi2 . 1643 . 0915 . 4156 Note: Household Survey Data (10/2000) weighted estimates calculated in STATA7 svylogit. HH=Household 
HC=Health Centre. Svylogit reports t-tests. P values show significance levels. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
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Model 4 regresses current MHI enrolment on the same explanatory variables as Model 3, 
though the two monetary variables LnExp and LnExp2 are excluded based on their non- 
significant26 and small coefficients. Coefficient results and test statistics are similar as in 
Model 3. Model 3 yields a lower Lemeshow Chi2 suggesting that it fits the data better than 
Model 4, which is abandoned. 
Model 5 excludes the cattle dummy, due to its non-significance in Model 3, and its eventual 
correlation with male gender and bike ownership. However, in a rural society, cattle may be a 
good asset indicator. Its exclusion does not affect other coefficients and their significance. 
Monetary expenditure remains insignificant. Model 5 has a high Lemeshow Chi2, significant 
at a 10 percent level, indicating that Model 3 fits the data better. 
Model 6 excludes the child variable due to its non-significance in Model 3 and correlation 
with pregnancy. The same coefficients are significant as in Model 3, including male gender at 
a 10 percent significance level. Expenditures remain insignificant. Model 6 has higher 
coefficients than Model 3, lower standard errors, and higher F-values and Log likelihood 
statistics. Although the Lemeshow Chi2 is slightly higher, the Chi2 value is insignificant. 
Based on a more pronounced gender variable and better test statistics, Model 6 is considered 
as fitting the data better than Model 3. The child variable seems to correlate with other 
variables (e. g. pregnancy), and excluding it leads to more distinct coefficients for other 
variables. Table A4.2 shows the correlation matrix for Model 6. Results are similar as in 
Model 3. 
Figure 4.14 shows the diagnostic plot describing the goodness of fit for Model 6. Comparing 
the pattern of Models 6 and 3 suggests that there is similar heteroskedasticity. The number of 
poorly fitting covariate patterns in the upper left-hand side is four. Based on the above test 
statistics and higher coefficients, Model 6 is judged to be the best (most parsimonious) 
model. 
26 Adjusted Wald test: joint hypothesis: LnY=0.0 and LnY2=0.0; F(2,19) = 1.04, Prob>F= 0.37. 
Figure 4.14: Model 6: Covariant pattern analysis on enrolment probability 
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Alternative model specifications were also tested using the backward elimination strategy. 
Model 7 continues with Model 3. It adds the room variable and excludes children, which 
results in a smaller sample size, and significant Kabgayi and room variables; expenditures 
remain insignificant. The test statistics suggests Models 3 and 6 fit the data better. Model 8 
includes rooms, but excludes cattle and child. The Hosmer-Lemeshow Chi2 is significant, 
suggesting a poor fit of this model. Similar poor fits occur when variations of this model are 
estimated. Model 9 excludes all asset variables (cattle, radio, bike, rooms), though 
expenditures remain insignificant. Excluding all assets variables would cause loss of relevant 
information. Based on the test statistics Model 9 is refuted. 
The above nine models share the same five explanatory variables that are significantly 
associated with the enrolment probability: Byumba residence, household head attended 
school, <30 minutes walking distance to the health facility, bike ownership and household 
with pregnancy. Large household size tends to become a significant indicator when the 
quadratic term of the logarithm of expenditure (LnExp2) is included, indicating non-linearity 
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in expenditure. The coefficients in all nine models are robust to the exclusion of asset and 
monetary expenditure variables. 
Model 6 is chosen as the model that fits the data best based on its low standard errors, test 
statistics, insignificant Lemeshow Chi2, and the covariant patterns shown in Table 4.1. It has 
six variables that significantly affect the enrolment probability, among them geographic, 
demographic and asset variables that are highly relevant in the Rwandan socio-economic 
context. The next section interprets these results in terms of their economic significance. 
4.4.3 Marginal effects 
This section uses the coefficients of Model 6 to quantify the marginal effect Sp/6Xk of a 
change in an explanatory variable on the probability of MHI enrolment (Dougherty 2002). 
Table 4.15 presents in the second column the marginal effect for each explanatory variable at 
the means of the variable. The marginal effect of a dummy variable measures the effect on 
the probability of moving from one level to the other. 
Table 4.15: Marginal effects for MHI enrolment probability, at mean value 
Explanatory Variable p/dx td. Err P>IzI 
Kabgayi . 084 . 063 1.330 . 185 . 263 
Byumba 0.161 . 045 3.600 . 001 . 520 
Male hh head . 015 . 008 1.890 . 059 . 684 
HH head, 30+ . 008 . 010 . 800 . 422 . 799 
HH head with school . 031 . 007 . 460 . 001 . 550 
HH size 5+ ). 021 . 009 . 300 . 021 . 477 
HH with pregnancy ). 029 . 012 . 510 . 012 . 287 
30 min to HC ). 090 . 039 . 300 ). 022 . 335 
Cattle ). 014 . 023 . 610 . 540 . 157 
Radio ). 015 ). 010 1.460 ). 144 . 342 
Bike ). 036 . 016 . 290 ). 022 . 092 
Ln(Exp) 0.010 . 015 0.650 . 514 . 198 
Ln(Exp)2 
Note: All exi)lanatorv varia 
. 000 . 001 . 420 . 675 bles and their referanra nntannriac nra Qhnun, in Tahie 
3.853 
A va 
Findings suggest that the effect on the enrolment probability is dominated by geographic 
variables. The MHI enrolment probability increases by 0.16 when living in Byumba. This 
effect is 0.08 higher in Kabgayi compared to Kabutare. The enrolment probability increases 
by 0.09 for households that live within 30 minutes of a health facility/MHI, at the sample 
means of all variables. The effect on the enrolment probability is not as pronounced for 
demographic and socio-economic variables. The enrolment probability increases by 0.03 after 
a household head attended school; by 0.015 for male-headed compared to female-headed 
households; and by 0.036 for households after they own a bike. A pregnancy increases 
households' enrolment probability significantly by 0.029, at the mean of all other variables. 
The marginal enrolment effect of monetary expenditure is tiny and not different from zero, 
implying no economically significant effect on the probability of enrolment. 
The following section draws from responses on households' enrolment or non-enrolment 
reasons to help interpreting the above results. 
4.4.4 Reasons to demand or decline MHI 
Survey participants were asked about their reasons to demand or decline MHI. Results are 
presented for insured and uninsured households according to their monetary expenditure 
group. 
MHI Members' Choice 
MHI member households were asked three questions: first, the reasons why they have 
enrolled in MIR; second, their perception of the premium level; and third, whether they 
intend to re-enrol. According to the literature, factors that induce consumers to insure are risk 
aversion, higher income levels, low insurance premiums and high user fees. 
Table 4.16 presents insured households' answers to the open question about their enrolment 
reasons across monetary expenditure quartiles. Responses do not differ significantly across 
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quartiles. Precaution is the main enrolment reason, pointing to members' risk aversion. Only 
about one-fifth among the poorest enrolled because MHI premium is not expensive. 
Table 4.16: Reasons to demand MHI, by quartile 
Why MHI member 01 02 03 04 Total 
Prudence 67% 55% 62% 44% 57% 
Not expensive 19% 33% 32% 33% 30% 
Other 14% 11% 6% 23% 13% 
Total % 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Total N 60 83 80 116 339 
Note: Wald (Pearson) Uncorrected Chi2(6) =11.12; Adjusted F(6,13) = 1.34; P<0.3 
Households were asked whether they fmd premium `easy to pay', `affordable' or `too 
expensive'. Insured households differ significantly across monetary expenditure quartiles in 
their perception of the MHI premium level (Table 4.17). More than half of households in the 
lowest quartile Ql said that premium is too expensive. 
Table 4.17: Perception of annual MHI premium level, by quartile 
MHI premium level 01 02 03 04 Total 
Easy to pay 3% 15% 22% 32% 19% 
Affordable 38% 53% 52% 41% 47% 
Too expensive 59% 32% 26% 27% 35% 
Total% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Total N 60 83 80 116 339 
Note: Wald (Pearson) Unadjusted Chi2(6) =36.4; Adjusted F(6,13) = 3.1; P<0.05 
Interviewees were given several options to respond to the question of how they have financed 
MHI premium (Table 4.18). Responses do not differ significantly across quartiles. Members 
are most likely to pay the premium by using their savings, followed by selling agricultural 
products, joining a tontine or borrowing money. One-third among the poorest quoted other 
means. It could be that among them are the 3,000 poor widows, children, indigents and 
orphans who had benefited from subsidised enrolment with premiums paid by local churches. 
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Table 4.18: How paid for MHI premium, by quartile 
How paid premium 01 02 03 04 Total 
Own savings 37% 38% 5% 58% 5% 
Family helped 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
Borrowed money % 9% 5% % % 
Tontine membership 5% % 13% % % 
Sold agricultural products 10% 7% 10% 16% 16% 
Sold fowl 8% 1% 1 %a 1% % 
Other (e. g. paid by churches) 32% 23% 4% 14% 23% 
Total % 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
[Total N 0 3 8 123 354 
Note: Uncorrected Chi2(18) = 44.4; Design-based F(4.75,80.73) = 1.8; P<0.11 
The endowment effect suggests that due to the `veil of experience' people would rather stay 
with what they have. While this would be a reason for non-members to remain uninsured, the 
insured would most probably re-enrol when their membership expires. Table 4.19 shows that 
almost all insured household intend to re-enrol. 
Table 4.19: Re-enrolment, by quartile 
Member will re-enrol in MHI all 02 03 04 Total 
No 5% 2% 4% 4% 3% 
Yes 95% 98% 96% 96% 97% 
Total % 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Total N 58 83 81 119 341 
Note: Pearson Uncorrected chi2 (3) =1.39; Design-based F(2.04,36) =0.4; P<0.7 
Members cited their main reason not to re-enrol in MHI (Table 4.20). Those who intend not 
to re-enrol are among the poorest. They are unsure whether they will be able to pay premium. 
Table 4.20: Main reason not to re-enrol In MHI, by quartile 
Why members will not re-enrol 01 02 03 04 Total 
Not sure to have money 83 % 50 % 0% 33 % 57 % 
Other 17% 50% 100% 67% 43% 
Total % 1100% 1100% 100 % 100% 100 % 
Total N 6. 4 1 3 14 
Note: Too few observations to conduct significance test 
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The above findings suggest that enrolment reflects members' risk aversion, which is equally 
prevalent across all monetary expenditure groups. However, the poor may have encountered 
additional economic hardship to pay the premium and enrol in MHI. 
Non-Members' Choice 
Non-members were asked about their current non-enrolment reasons and their future MHI 
enrolment intention. According to the literature on decision-making under uncertainty, factors 
that induce consumers to remain uninsured are: their risk aversion against something new; 
time preferences resulting in higher value for current than eventual future consumption; the 
veil of experience; or anticipation of eventual feelings of regret and disappointment in case 
MIR will not respond to their needs. 
Non-members responded to an open question about their main reasons for non-enrolment. 
Table 4.21 shows that poverty is mentioned most often across all quartiles. Poor households 
in Q1 and Q2 mention poverty significantly more often than the top group. Some of the richer 
households were not informed about MHI or provide other reasons, including the limited 
benefit package. 
Table 4.21: Non-members' current non-enrolment reasons, by quartile 
Why not MHI member 01 02 03 04 Total 
Poverty 91% 85% 80% 61% 80% 
Pro-rata payment not possible 0% 1% 1% 2% 1% 
HC quality of care 0% 1% 4% 3% 2% 
Not informed about MHI 4% 8% 8% 14% 8% 
Other 4% 5% 7% 20% 9% 
Total % 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Total N 691 668 667 633 2659 
Note: rearson uncorrectea cn>L (12) = 214.343; Design-based F (4.19,83.70) = 9.6036; P<0.001 
Non-members were asked about their future MHI enrolment intentions (Table 4.22). More 
than two-thirds of them plan to insure. However, responses differ significantly across 
quartiles. The intention to enrol tapers off significantly in the lowest monetary expenditure 
quartile. 
Table 4.22: Non-members' future enrolment plans, by quartile 
Non-member will enrol in MHI 01 Q2 03 04 Total 
No 47% 29% 23% 25% 31% 
Yes 53% 71% 77% 75% 69% 
Total % 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Total N 598 559 543 550 2250 
Note: Pearson Uncorrected chi2 (3) = 94.6845; Design-based F (1.58,31.69) = 11.5466; F<u. UU1 
Asked about their main reason not to insure (in an open question), poverty has been 
mentioned significantly more often by the bottom than the top groups (Table 4.23). 
Households in higher monetary expenditure quartiles mentioned high premiums as a reason 
for non-enrolment. Maybe they do not perceive themselves as poor but the price as too high 
pointing to eventual price or cross-price elasticity in MHI demand. Other reasons for non- 
enrolment were mostly cited by richer groups, and include reasons such as the limited benefit 
package, which should be expanded to cover hospital care. This argument points to state- 
dependent expected utility theory, suggesting that the expected insurance pay-off affects 
households' enrolment decision. 
Table 423: Non-members' future non-enrolment reasons, by quartile 
Why non-member will not enrol 01 02 03 04 Total 
Poverty 91% 89% 68% 41% 77% 
Premium too expensive 0% 0% 8% 8% 3% 
Other 9% 11% 24% 51% 20% 
Total % 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Total N 256 156 121 116 649 
Note: Uncorrected chi2 (6) = 138.869; Design-based F (3.29,65.80) = 30.0445; P <0.001 
The above findings suggest that across monetary expenditure groups, risk aversion or 
precaution is the main reasons for enrolment; and the poorest perceive the current premium as 
too expensive. Most households use their own savings to pay premium and they plan to re- 
enrol. Among non-members, poverty is the main reason for non-enrolment and mentioned 
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significantly more often by the poorest, who may have been forced to pay for other more 
pressing goods, such as food and clothing. 
These findings reassure through the clear separation of responses across quartiles that 
monetary expenditure is a robust socio-economic indicator. They suggest that although the 
MHI demand appears to be inelastic with respect to monetary expenditures, households in 
lowest monetary expenditure quartiles may have endured additional economic hardship to 
insure and mitigate their financial risk related to their health. It also suggests that monetary 
expenditure, despite its robustness as a socio-economic indicator, should be complemented in 
interpreting findings in the demand and equity analysis by a significant indicator that is 
related to income like education or gender of the household head or bike ownership. The 
former two are easier to measure27. As gender and school attendance are strongly correlated, 
one of the two variables would be sufficient for the analysis. 
4.5 Discussion 
This Chapter assessed the relationship between the MHI enrolment probability and 
households' socio-demographic and -economic characteristics based on household survey 
data collected in three Rwandan districts. The analysis of the determinants of the demand for 
health insurance in a low-income context was based on economic and social theories, and 
focused on the relationship between enrolment and household economic status. Expected 
utility theory suggests that the demand for insurance reflects individuals' risk aversion and 
demand for income certainty. Considering poor households' credit constraints, a positive 
relationship is expected between socio-economic status and insurance enrolment. However, 
in a low-income context, it might be that households who move closer to the poverty line 
become more risk averse and are therefore more likely to insure. 
27 Bikes are easy to hide, while gender and school attendance are more obvious characteristics. 
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This analysis expected a positive relationship between insurance enrolment and household 
socio-economic background. Findings from other studies suggested that although the poor 
may very likely be more risk averse, they are less likely to insure because they face credit 
constraints and have more pressing needs, like food, than worrying about securing eventual 
future medical care (Townsend 1995; Wagstaff 2001). In addition, the poor may rely on 
solidarity from family and friends to smooth out consumption over time and protect their 
socio-economic situation against financial shocks related to ill-health (Dercon 2000). 
The analysis in this Chapter found no relationship between MHI enrolment and household 
income proxied by monetary expenditures; and that about 90 percent of the target population 
of 1 million chose to remain uninsured during the first operational year of MHI. While 
poverty was the main non-enrolment reason, precaution was the main reason members gave 
for enrolling in MHI, and this fording was independent of their monetary expenditure 
classification. 
This suggests that households express similar risk aversion across socio-economic groups, 
but that the annual MIII premium is unaffordable for the large majority of the target 
population even though the data suggest that the demand for MHI is unrelated to monetary 
expenditure. 
Bivariate analysis revealed that the insured are from larger, male-headed households or from 
households with pregnant women or small children. In addition, insured household heads 
report higher probabilities of school attendance, and radio or bike ownership. Insured and 
uninsured households appear to be similar in terms of monetary expenditures and cattle 
ownership. 
Findings from multivariate analysis imply a positive relationship between MHI enrolment 
probability and households' geographical characteristics (residence in Byumba, within 30 
minutes of health facility/MHI bureau), demographic characteristics (large household size, 
households with pregnancy), and socio-economic characteristics (household head attended 
school, ownership of bike). Relevant asset variables (radio and cattle ownership) seem not to 
correlate with the probability of MHI enrolment, nor does monetary expenditure, which 
serves as an income proxy. Examination of marginal effects suggests that geographic 
variables have the largest effect on MIR enrolment probability (district of residence and 
distance to the health facility/MHI). Variables, including pregnancy, education of the 
household head, household size, and asset indicators have a substantially smaller effect. 
These results are not unambiguous in relation to the theories and findings from other studies. 
If the hypothesised positive relationship between enrolment and households' socio-economic 
background is correct, then it is of interest to identify why this has not been observed in these 
data. Reasons related to statistical methods, the data, and omitted variables may have 
contributed to the attenuation of the monetary expenditure effect. These are discussed by 
considering possible relationships between socio-economic status variables, not captured in 
the results, and by presenting arguments about why enrolment is equally likely across the 
socio-economic groups. It is also possible that the hypothesis is not correct. This discussion 
of findings should help identifying the most valid interpretation. 
Statistical issues, such as measurement errors, limited variation in the monetary expenditure 
variable, and correlation between variables may have contributed to the attenuation of the 
estimated coefficient on monetary expenditure. First, monetary expenditure is likely to have 
been measured with error, which decreases the precision with which parameters are estimated 
(Deaton 1998). However, clear gradients, though not always monotonic, in asset ownership 
across monetary expenditure groups were identified when comparing asset and monetary 
variables. In the logit model, monetary expenditures never appear to have a significant effect 
on the enrolment probability, and this is even the case when all assets variables are excluded. 
This suggests that there is not too much measurement error in expenditure, which would 
support the result of the analysis. 
Second, there may be limited variation in the monetary expenditure variable across the 
sample households, implying that the population is equally poor, which would support the 
empirical fording. Although some people may own a bike or have some more school years, 
this may not affect their monetary expenditure situation, simply because access to income 
generating resources is limited in areas with little economic development. Findings from the 
Household Living Condition Survey support this observation: about 66 percent of rural 
residents live below the consumption poverty line (Ministry of Economics and Finance 
2002). 
Third, there is no consistent relationship between enrolment and different socio-economic 
measures. This could be due to correlation among education, gender and assets variables that 
leads to insignificant results among relevant socio-economic variables and inconsistencies. 
This would be against the above finding. However, the correlation matrix, and the relatively 
low standard errors of coefficients do not necessarily identify a high correlation problem, nor 
does the stepwise dropping of asset variables affect the association between enrolment and 
monetary expenditures, which supports the above result. 
One possible explanation for the empirical findings could be that the relationship between 
MHI enrolment and monetary expenditures is better described by a threshold effect. The 
survey sample may not contain enough households who reach the required threshold for 
monetary expenditures to have a significant effect on enrolment. If the `true' relationship is a 
threshold, then it is possible for there to be no linear relationship over the estimated range. 
This would support the above finding. Identifying such a threshold would require a larger 
sample, together with more variation in income. 
Besides statistical and data issues, omitted variables may have contributed to the rejection of 
the hypothesis. Omitted variables include individual trust in MHI, the possibility to benefit 
from traditional solidarity mechanisms, subsidised enrolment of poor households, favourable 
premium for large households, non-monetary expenditures, individual health status, and user 
fees paid when uninsured. 
First, as described in the literature on trust in organisations, the poor have all interest to 
protect their income against financial risks and not to engage in risky investments (World 
Bank 2000). This is supported by focus group survey statements. Based on previous 
experience, some households have adopted a "wait and see" strategy, and will only insure 
once the MHI has built a reputation of trustworthiness (ONAPO 2000). This could also 
explain the wide range of enrolment in the 54 Mills (see Annex Table 2): MHIs with a 
reputation of trustworthy management may have attracted more members. Omitting mistrust 
as an explanatory variable will bias the monetary expenditure coefficient downwards, if the 
poor are more likely to mistrust MHL Additional data would be needed to conclude whether 
individual trust in MHI varies across socio-economic groups. Also, MIR enrolment has 
increased over time (see Table 3.3), suggesting that people increasingly perceive MHI as 
trustworthy organisations. 
Second, there may be an absence of traditional solidarity mechanisms, which has led to 
relatively higher uptake of insurance among the poor. In addition, as suggested by a study on 
social capital in Rwanda, traditional solidarity acts among family members and neighbours 
appear to have dwindled since the 1994 genocide, partly due to increased poverty (Colletta 
and Cullen 2000). The omission of a variable on traditional solidarity mechanisms may have 
contributed to the attenuation of the monetary expenditure effect if the poor are more likely to 
use these mechanisms to protect themselves against financial shocks. Though, whether these 
solidarity mechanisms contribute to equity in access and financing of health care, and are 
therefore an alternative to health insurance, would have to be further investigated, particularly 
in areas of high levels and intensity of poverty. 
Third, about 3,000 poor individuals, among them orphans, and poor female-headed 
households, have benefited from financial support by local churches that paid their MHI 
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premium. As these payments were made without identifying the insured as being 
"sponsored", it will be impossible to identify these MHI members. Such demand-side 
subsidies targeted to poor households might have contributed to the insignificant monetary 
expenditure variable. However, the number of female-headed households with subsidised 
enrolment was not large enough to cause female gender to become a significant enrolment 
determinant. Rather, without subsidies, female-headed households might be severely 
underrepresented among the insured. 
Fourth, the omission of non-monetary expenditures data results in a skewed distribution of 
monetary expenditure. Providing that the poor have a relatively larger share of non-monetary 
expenditures, using total monetary and non-monetary expenditure distribution in the analysis 
would result in an even smaller coefficient, and support the above result on income inelastic 
demand for MHI. 
Fifth, the data set lacks information on health status prior to enrolment. HIV prevalence is 
about 11 percent in rural and urban areas. Households with one and more sero-positive 
individuals may have become poor over time due to high total health expenditures for more 
frequent medical service use. Adverse selection by poor households with HIV-positive 
individuals may have led to higher MHI enrolment among the poor, as overall, paying 
premium is cheaper than paying user fees. In this case, the omission of HIV status may have 
biased the monetary expenditure variable downwards. 
Sixth, the data set does not account for any institutional factors such as providers' monopolist 
price-setting behaviour that may have influenced poor households' enrolment decision. 
Uninsured patients who seek care usually pay user fees and an "under the table" fee, which 
creates additional uncertainty for the uninsured patient about the total price to be paid for 
care. The prospect of knowing the out-of-pocket (OOP) amount (fixed co-payment) may have 
affected the enrolment decision. As the poor are more price-sensitive, a slight increase in user 
fee related payments might cause them to insure. If the poor are more likely to be asked to 
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pay "under the table" fees than the better-off, then the omission of information about such 
additional payments may have biased the monetary expenditure variable downwards. 
It could also be that the above inconsistent result on the hypothesised relationship between 
monetary expenditure and MIR enrolment is related to the choice of the underlying theory. If 
the data are in conflict with the theory, then the commitment to consumer theory and 
expected utility theory should be revisited (Greene 2000). This analysis assumed that 
consumers are risk averse and they maximize expected utility with objectively correct 
assessments of risk. But for example, if state-dependent expected utility theory applies, then 
the richer may have remained uninsured because their expected pay-off from MHI may not 
be `good enough' for them to enrol. They might prefer to insure with a health insurance that 
covers more expensive hospital care provided by physicians, instead of just basic medical 
care in health centres. 
The analysis in this Chapter used data on an insurance enrolment decision in a low-income 
context. However, theories of decision-making under uncertainty are not based on real market 
decisions of the type examined in this Chapter. If prospect theory or the status quo effect was 
to apply, or if there is some divergence between consumers' subjective and objective risk 
assessment, this could have contributed to inconsistent results. Though, other studies found 
that even if risk aversion is not the dominant motivation to insure and other theoretical 
concepts may play a role, their influence in the choice process will not affect results 
significantly (Manning and Marquis 1996). This argument would support the above result of 
income-inelastic demand for MHI. 
The discussion of the above results in relation to the hypothesis and the underlying theories 
highlight the limits of this analysis. First, weaknesses inherent to the data set have contributed 
to some extent to the attenuation of the monetary expenditure coefficient. Second, the 
theories based on which the analysis was conducted were developed and tested in Western 
contexts. They may not necessarily be appropriate in a low-income population group, and 
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may have contributed to inconsistent results. Though, the influence of other theoretical 
concepts might not necessarily change the above result significantly. 
These issues bring to light several points for further research in contexts of high levels of 
poverty. First, if expected utility theory is to be applied in low-income settings, then research 
on economic theories should be tested in the relevant real market situation. Second, a cross- 
section survey is limited in interpreting households' expenditures as some may be financing 
their current consumption by borrowing money, from their own savings, or from current 
income. Therefore, a household survey panel data set spanning over several years that 
includes data on income, savings and expenditure would allow assessing the long-run impact 
of insurance on households' socio-economic situation. Third, data that allow assessing the 
cross-price elasticity of demand between MHI and user fees could shed more light on 
households' enrolment behaviour. 
Based on the discussion of the results of this analysis, it can be concluded that although the 
data suggest an inelastic demand for MHI with respect to monetary expenditures, and risk 
aversion is equally prevalent across socio-economic groups, the current annual premium level 
is most likely unaffordable for the majority of poor households. To attain more certainty 
about their financial situation and to protect themselves against unforeseen financial shocks 
related to illness, the poor who have insured have most likely endured additional economic 
hardship. 
These poor households are often headed by a woman or an illiterate person, and they own 
significantly fewer assets than households in higher monetary expenditure groups. They may 
have chosen to enrol in MHI because they have already used all their potential income 
sources to make a daily living, including child and female labour, and because they rely less 
on spontaneous acts of solidarity among neighbours, as they are less able to reciprocate 
solidarity due to their poverty. It leads to the recommendation that some form of means 
testing should be used in setting the MHI premium. 
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The next Chapter will elaborate on the relationship between health expenditure and 
household economic status and provide additional information to support this 
recommendation. It examines equity implications of health financing and utilisation of care 
among insured and uninsured households by focusing on the degree of horizontal equity in 
utilisation, the share of household income going to finance health care, and eventual re- 
ranking in the move from the pre- to the post-health payment income distribution. The 
minimum standard approach serves to evaluate households' socio-economic situation before 
and after health spending. 
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Chapter 5: Equity in Utilisation and Financing 
and the Minimum Standard Approach 
5.1 Introduction 
Several researchers have investigated the equity impact of alternative systems of financing 
and delivery of care in OECD countries, USA and Canada. Although MIR has been 
suggested as an alternative to user fees to improve access to care, its impact on improving 
equity in health financing and service use has rarely been examined in low-income countries. 
Such an analysis is justified, particularly if MHI is criticised as having a small equity impact, 
due to the limited benefit package, leaving an important part to be paid by patients (Kutzin 
1998). 
According to egalitarian equity principles, a health system is equitable if financial 
contributions have some relationship with individuals' socio-economic situation, and if 
medical care is distributed based on patients' need to achieve better health, as judged by the 
health professional. The underlying rationale is based on four presumptions: health is seen as 
a precondition for people to flourish as human beings; health is subject to potentially large 
and unforeseen `shocks', which rarely happen due to the deliberate choice by the individual 
concerned; health care is seen as the appropriate way to restore health status after a shock like 
illness; and, medical care can be expensive and endanger households' ability to purchase 
other goods and services they need to flourish as human beings, among them food, shelter or 
clothing (Culyer and Wagstaff 1993). 
Health care utilisation may be sufficiently costly to endanger households' income situation. It 
may be considered as unfair if health expenditure causes household income to fall beyond a 
certain threshold such as the poverty line. Hence, in an environment characterized by high 
degrees of poverty, the egalitarian view may not be enough to examine whether MHI protects 
the income of the poor against expensive health care use. The minimum standard approach 
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examines the extent to which health insurance protects household income against falling 
below a threshold because of health care payments (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 2001). 
This Chapter introduces the literature on methods used to examine equity in utilisation and 
financing of health care, and the minimum standard approach. The related theories were 
presented in Chapter 2. By drawing from these methods, the purpose is to examine and 
compare (1) whether MIR has improved equity in utilisation and financing of health care for 
the insured compared to the uninsured; and (2) whether MHI is a means to protect the income 
of the poor against high health care expenditures. The contribution of MHI to equity in 
financing and delivery of health care and to income protection depends on the insured's 
medical service use, the MHI premium level and co-payments, and the benefit package 
covered by MIII. The analysis uses the same cross-sectional household survey as in the 
previous Chapter. 
The Chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 introduces the literature related to measuring 
equity in utilisation and financing of health care and on the minimum standard approach. 
Then, the analytical framework is derived. Section 5.3 shows how these methods are used 
empirically in this Chapter. Section 5.4 presents results and the last section discusses findings 
in combination with results from the previous Chapter on the demand for MM. 
5.2 Literature review 
Assessing health-related inequities poses methodological problems, mainly because measures 
of illness, health and need are hardly objective and tend to be biased given respondents 
cultural and socio-economic background. It requires defining `equal health' as well as the 
quantity and the nature of the goods and services to be distributed. 
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5.2.1 Defining key variables 
This section begins with defining four key variables: ability to pay (ATP), need for health 
care, health, and utilisation. 
In countries with established tax-systems, ability to pay is mostly proxied by households' pre- 
tax income, which can be adjusted by assets as well as capital income data. In developing 
countries, measures based on monetary and non-monetary consumption and not income, 
serve as ATP proxies (Deaton 1999). In the literature, the term pre-payment income is used to 
describe household income before any health care related payments have incurred; that is 
income gross of (or including) health care payments. Analogously, post-payment income 
reflects household income after health care payments have been made; also termed income 
net of health care payments (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 1998). 
Need for health care tends to be equated with ill-health, as the sicker need more care to 
recover (Culyer and Wagstaff 1993). Alternatively, need could be defined in terms of one's 
capacity to benefit from health care. This latter measures `need' in terms of the health status 
that will be affected rather than in terms of health care needed. A third definition describes 
need from a marginal perspective: "the amount of resources required to exhaust the capacity 
to benefit"; suggesting that if capacity to benefit is zero, so is need28 (Wagstaff and Van 
Doorslaer 1998). 
Assessing health status to define patient need requires morbidity data on an individual level, 
gathered in health interview surveys. Blaxter (1989) proposes a morbidity concept by 
classifying morbidity measures in three conceptual models: the medical model defines health 
as a deviation from physiological norms; the functional model defines health as a deviation 
from the ability to perform normal tasks; and the subjective model assesses individuals' self- 
assessed health (SAH) status. The various morbidity questions from a health survey are 
categorized according to the concept they are derived from. Questions about chronic illness 
28 p. 11 
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are derived from the medical model; questions about sufferings from a limiting chronic 
illness are derived from the functional model; and questions about individuals SAH (e. g. "Do 
you think your health is good, quite good, or not so good? ") are derived from the subjective 
model (Blaxter 1989). 
Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer (1993) measure cross-country health differences in Europe, by 
using the morbidity concept suggested by Blaxter. Illness concentration indices of inequality 
are examined for each of the three different morbidity measures in a cross-country 
comparison. Findings suggest that the degree of inequality depends on the morbidity measure 
chosen. Inequality in health tends to be strongest in the subjective model with SAH measures, 
and where differences in health across income groups are influenced by individuals' different 
risk attitudes (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 1993). This reflects critically on the validity of 
self-reported morbidity measures, and needs to be considered when analysing health status 
and inequalities, and comparing SAH across various countries and socio-economic groups. 
Other studies assess health inequalities based on comprehensive indices. The McMaster 
Health Utility Index (HUI) describes individuals' overall functional health, including eight 
attributes: vision, hearing, speech, ambulation, dexterity, emotion, cognition and pain. A 
single numerical value, between zero and one is assigned for all possible combinations of 
these self-reported health attributes, a score of one indicating perfect health (Wagstaff and 
Van Doorslaer 2002). 
In low-income contexts, need is often proxied by individuals' SAH status. For example, 
health measures, like self-reporting of medical conditions can be used where individuals have 
regular contacts with health personnel; however, this is rather rare in low-income settings. 
Also, some activity measures appear to be less valid in low-income settings as poor people 
don't have the luxury to let health compromise their daily work. These measures include 
whether one's health has affected activities of daily living; the number of bed days; and time 
spent away from work (Case and Deaton 2002). In addition, the SAH variable may cause 
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inconsistent estimates if it is correlated with unmeasured initial health endowments (Wagstaff 
and Van Doorslaer 1998). 
Despite these problems, SAH reported on an ordinal scale has been found as a valid measure 
to proxy ill-health or health status. Based on data from South Africa and the USA, Case and 
Deaton (2002) run ordered probit regressions. Findings suggest that health worsens with age; 
though women `age' less rapidly than men, and SAH deteriorates sharply with age among the 
poor. SAH is recommended as a health status proxy as long as there is no other method that 
allows identifying the `illness threshold' of individuals, and by recognizing that the cut-off 
points between `fair' and `poor' health varies across individuals (Case and Deaton 2002). 
Utilisation of health care (e. g. number of visits per capita per year) serves to proxy two 
concepts in the literature: "access to care" and "receipt of treatment". These two concepts are 
linked. Access reflects the opportunity to seek care, which is influenced by financial (price 
and income) and geographical conditions, while treatment depends on the availability of this 
opportunity and whether a person has chosen to use them. Access affects utilisation, which is 
expected to influence health status (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 1998). 
5.2.2 Measuring horizontal inequity in utilisation of health care 
The four key approaches in assessing equity in health service utilisation are: regression 
analysis, Le Grand's approach, and direct and indirect standardization. 
Regression analysis 
The degree of inequity in utilisation can be tested by regressing individuals' utilisation of 
medical care on a series of explanatory variables that may affect their service use, including 
health, socio-demographic and economic characteristics. Formally, this can be written as: 
(1) mk= aO+7t1 Yk'+7t2hk+? L3Xk+Ek 
r 
129 
where ink is medical utilisation of person k, yk reflects socio-economic variables, hk is a 
health variable, xk captures demographic factors, ek is an error term, and a are coefficients 
(Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 1993). 
The regression approach may serve to derive an inequity index. It has been applied in the 
RAND study (Manning et al. 1987); and in a study on the Egyptian School Health Insurance 
Program (SHIP) examining the SHIP's impact on equity in access to care (Yip and Berman 
2001). Also, previous analysis conducted by PHR used a regression approach to compare 
utilisation by insurance status and socio-economic groups (Schneider and Diop 2001). 
While the regression approach can be used to test for the presence of inequity, it does not 
allow quantifying the extent of inequity. For example, a comparison of treatment received by 
different socio-economic groups indicates nothing about inequity in delivery, given their 
different health status. Thus, regression analysis tends to be used in combination with other 
approaches (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 1993). 
Le Grand's Approach 
Le Grand suggests comparing equity in utilisation across groups with the groups' 
corresponding share of `need', which tends to be proxied by SAH status. In the absence of 
utilisation data by health and socio-economic status, studies have proxied utilisation by the 
relative share of public health expenditures that went to different groups. Horizontal equity 
means that the share of expenditures going to each group corresponds to the share of illness 
reported in this group (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 1993). A caveat needs to be made on the 
use of expenditures as a proxy for utilisation. This approach may be feasible in a centrally 
funded health system where the amount of health expenditures going to different socio- 
economic groups can be tracked, and the paying government source can be identified. But it 
may be difficult in health systems with mixed payment systems and where financial data are 
limited. 
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Inequity according to Le Grand can be quantified by measuring inequality in morbidity in the 
illness concentration curve (Lill), which serves as a benchmark to assess the expenditure 
concentration curve. The illness concentration curve plots the cumulative proportion of the 
population ranked according to their socio-economic status (R) against the cumulative 
proportions of illness proxied by SAH. The illness concentration curve coincides with the 45- 
degree line if illness is equally distributed across the socio-economic groups. It will he above 
the diagonal if the poor are sicker than the rich (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 1993). 
The illness concentration index C(ill) is a measure of relative inequality. C is defined 
analogously to the Gini coefficient, as minus twice the area between the concentration curve 
Lill and the diagonal (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 1993). 
(2) C(ill) =1- 2! LlI(R) dR 
C(ill) ranges from -1 (when only the most disadvantaged are ill) to +1 (when only the 
wealthiest are ill). The score is 0 when all socio-economic groups have the same probability 
of illness, independent of their economic status (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 1993) 
Where utilisation is proxied by health expenditure (T), the health expenditure concentration 
curve L(T) is formed by plotting the cumulative share of ('T) on the vertical axis against the 
cumulative proportion of households ranked by pre-payment income (x) on the horizontal 
axis. L(T) is above the 45-degree diagonal if the low-income groups are more extensive users 
of health care than the better-off. L(T) lies below Lin if the poor receive less of total health 
expenditures than the rich. The expenditure concentration index C(T) is defined like C(ill) 
(Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 1993). 
Using Le Grand's method, the degree of horizontal inequity (HIw) in utilisation reflects the 
difference between the expenditure concentration index C(T) and the illness concentration 
index C(ill). A positive HILL result suggests that the rich receive a larger medical expenditure 
share compared to their illness share; whereas a negative result implies the poor receive a 
131 
larger medical expenditure share compared to the their illness share (Wagstaff et al. 1989; 
Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 1993). 
Studies have used Le Grand's equity measure as a point of departure, mainly because of its 
implicit assumption that the non-sick as identified by SAH will not use care. If individuals 
across socio-economic groups perceive their health differently, this may result in a bias 
towards detecting inequity favouring the rich (who might seek care although not sick). Also, 
measures based on the simple association between health and income may be contaminated 
by the systematic variation of other factors with income, such as demographic and geographic 
characteristics, which could vary across socio-economic groups and affect the allocation of 
medical care (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 1993). Two standardized methods have been 
proposed as alternatives to quantify inequity: the direct and the indirect standardization-based 
index. 
Direct standardization 
The direct standardization based approach is based on grouped data. It divides a population 
sample into income groups and computes need-standardized medical care for each group to 
identify the amount of care people in each group would have received if they had the same 
need (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 1998). 
The distribution of medical care by income is captured by the medical care concentration 
curve LM(R), which graphs the cumulative proportion of medical care (m) against the 
cumulative proportion of the sample population (R), ranked by income. The medical care 
concentration index CM, defined analogously as the Gini and corresponding to LM(R) 
indicates the degree of inequality in the distribution of medical care. The extent of inequity is 
assessed by computing standardized health care utilisation by income groups in a regression 
and based on standardizing variables such as age and gender. The degree of horizontal 
inequity results from comparing the standardized concentration curve L+M(R) with the 
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diagonal. It can be measured as twice the area between L+M(R) and the diagonal, or as 
(Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 1993): 
(3) HI (dir) =1- 2J L'M(R) dR = Cm 
where C+M is the concentration index for directly standardized medical care. It is defined as 
twice the area between L+M(R) and the diagonal. HI(dir) ranges from -1 (inequity favours the 
poor if <0) to +1 (inequity favours the rich if >0), and is 0 when standardized utilisation is 
distributed equally; or if L+M(R) crosses the diagonal, which may arrive if the top and bottom 
groups have higher L+M(R) than the middle group. Inequity favouring one group could then 
eventually offset another group (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 1993). 
This approach has been applied in a comparative study on eight OECD countries, though 
with limited results (Van Doorslaer et al. 1999). The direct standardization based inequity 
approach has disadvantages: the value of Cm depends on the number of income groups; and 
the degree of horizontal inequity can only be used as an equity measure if need for medical 
care does not vary with income. If need does vary with income, it has to be compared to the 
degree of inequality in need, which is done in the indirect standardization method (Wagstaff 
and Van Doorslaer 1998). 
Indirect standardization 
The indirect standardization-based approach aims to compare the actual distribution of use 
with the distribution that would be expected given the distribution of need. This is estimated 
as the need-expected distribution of medical care. Based on individual-level data, the 
approach predicts the amount of medical care m*k a person k would have received if she had 
been treated as others with the same `need' characteristics. The figure m*k is computed in a 
regression model as the predicted values saved from an equation where utilisation is 
regressed on a vector of need indicators (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 1998). It reflects the 
need (N) for medical care (m), or need-expected utilisation. The concentration index of need 
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CN (i. e. indirectly standardized care) is defined based on the concentration curve for need, 
LN(R): 
(4) CN =1- 21 LN(R) dR 
The extent of horizontal inequity HI(indir) is assessed by comparing the concentration curve 
of need-expected utilisation LN(R) with the curve for actual utilisation of medical care LM(R). 
If LN(R) lies above LM(R), horizontal inequity favours the rich, and vice versa. HI(indir) is 
twice the area between the need and the medical care concentration curves, computed by the 
difference between the concentration index for actual care CM and CN (Wagstaff and Van 
Doorslaer 1998): 
(5) HI(111dir) =21 (LN(R) - LM(R)) CSR = CM - CN r 
A positive (negative) value suggests horizontal inequity favouring the better-off (worse-off). 
A zero value for HI(indir) suggests medical care and need are proportionately distributed 
across income distributions. The method requires graphing the curves to see whether a zero 
result is due to crossing curves or due to their coinciding with the diagonal (Van Doorslaer et 
al. 2002). 
This indirect standardization approach has been applied in studies based on data from OECD 
countries (Van Doorslaer et al. 1998) and from the Netherlands (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 
1998) to compare the relative degree of horizontal inequity in utilisation across different 
health care systems. In the OECD study, the degree of horizontal equity in the use of 
physician visits is examined in a two-part model by testing for the extent of any systematic 
deviations from horizontal equity by income level. First, a logit model predicts the possibility 
of any service use with general practitioner (GP) and medical specialist services; and second, 
a truncated negative binomial count predicts the conditional expected value of positive 
utilisation (Greene 2000; Van Doorslaer et al. 2002). Factors, like insurance status are 
included in the `need' standardization process to examine to what extent the association 
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between an individual's utilisation and her relative rank in the income distribution is 
confounded by variables other than need proxies. Need is proxied by a vector of nine age 
dummies (defined by nine age groups) and four dummy variables for self-assessed health. 
Results suggest significant inequity favouring the rich in the utilisation of specialist care, 
irrespective of insurance coverage and of specific delivery system characteristics of the 
countries studied (Van Doorslaer et al. 2002). 
This methodological review shows that there is a trend of measuring inequity in utilisation by 
combining multivariate analysis with equality measures to predict utilisation, need and health 
expenditures and compute the corresponding concentration indices and curves based on the 
predicted values. Horizontal inequities in utilisation are then computed by comparing the 
differences between the respective indices for actual use and need, or need-adjusted 
utilisation, across different socio-economic groups. 
5.2.3 Measuring inequity in health financing 
An analysis on equity in utilisation includes equity in health financing, as an equitable 
distribution of utilisation should not have an adverse effect on the distribution of disposable 
income (Culyer and Wagstaff 1993). In this thesis, equitable financing of health care is based 
on vertical equity concepts, which recognizes that the initial income and wealth distribution is 
inequitable (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 1993). Equity in health financing is examined based 
on the degree of progressivity, that is the extent to which the better-off pay a larger 
proportion of their total monetary expenditures on health care than the poor (Kakwani 1977; 
Aronson et al. 1994); and on the redistributive effect of health care payments, by computing 
the difference between pre- and post-health income (Van Doorslaer et al. 1999). 
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Progressivity effect: The Kakwani index 
Progressivity in health financing is defined in terms of departure from proportionality. The 
Kakwani's index K(T) of progressivity of health payment (T) on pre-payment income29 (x) 
reflects twice the area between the Lorenz curve for pre-payment income, L(x), and the 
concentration curve for health care payments L(T). The Lorenz curve for pre-payment 
income L(x) graphs the cumulative percentages of total income received against the 
cumulative percentages of individuals ranked by their income level, starting with the poorest. 
The Gini reflects twice the area between the Lorenz curve and the 45-degree line. It ranges 
between 0 (total equality) and 1 (perfect inequality) (Kakwani 1977; Wagstaff and Van 
Doorslaer 1998). 
The Kakwani index is the difference between the concentration index for health care 
payments C(T) and the Gini for pre-payment income (x): 
(6) Kakwani (T) = C(T) - Gini(x) 
The Kakwani ranges from -2 to 1. A positive K(T) suggests that L(T) is below the Lorenz 
curve (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 2001), indicating progressivity in health financing; while 
a negative value indicates regressivity in financing (Van Doorslaer et al. 1999). 
29 Following the literature, the term pre-payment income will be used, describing income gross of (or including) health care payments. That is income before any health care related payments have been 
made. 
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Redistributive effect: The Reynolds-Smolensky index 
The redistributive effect is measured by the Reynolds-Smolensky (RS) index. It shows the 
change in income inequality associated with the move from the pre-payment to post-payment 
income30 distribution. The RS(T) is defined as twice the area between the Lorenz curve for 
pre-payment income L(x) and the concentration curve for post-payment income L(x-T) 
(Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 2001): 
(7) RS(T) = Gini(x) - C(x - T), 
where C(x-T) is the concentration index for post-health payment income. RS(T) is positive if 
the Lorenz curve is below L(x-T), suggesting that health care payments reduce income 
inequality. A negative RS(T) value indicates regressivity and pro-rich distribution. The RS(T) 
and the Kakwani index are associated: 
(8) RS(T) _ {1 / (1-t)} * Kakwani index, 
where (t) is the health payment share of pre-payment income (t=T/x). The redistributive 
effect increases with the degree of progressivity on pre-payment income (Wagstaff and Van 
Doorslaer 2001). RS(T) shows that the amount of redistributive effect caused by health 
expenditures depends on its progressivity and by the proportion (t) of income taken up for 
health care. 
The above methods are based on the assumption that health care expenditures does not lead to 
re-ranking of individuals when moving from pre- to post-health-payment income, and that the 
redistributive effect is due to progressivity. An alternative measure of the redistributive effect 
of health care payments on income is derived from the tax and public finance literature (Van 
Doorslaer et al. 1999). 
30 Post-payment income is income after health care payments have been made. 
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Redistributive effect: Aronson/Johnson/Lambert 
The consequences of variation in health expenditures at each income level are examined by 
the redistributive effect developed by Aronson/Johnson/Lambert (AJL). It allows treating 
equity in health financing as an income redistribution problem (Wagstaff 2001). 
The AJL redistributive effect depends on four factors: first, the progressivity of health 
financing; second, the proportion of income used for health care; third, horizontal inequity in 
raising health care revenues; and fourth, the extent of re-ranking among households in the 
distribution from before to after health care payment income (Van Doorslaer et al. 1999). 
Formally, the redistributive effect (RE) consists of three components: vertical equity V, 
horizontal equity H, and re-ranking R. Where income inequality is measured by the Gini, the 
RE reflects the difference between the Gini for pre- and the Gini for post-payment income: 
(9) RE =V-H-R= Gini(x) - Gini(x-T), 
where: V= {t / (1-t)} * Kakwani(T); H=Za Gini F(x); R= Gini(x-T) - C(x-T). 
The redistributive effect (RE) is positive if the Lorenz curve of post-payment income lies 
above the pre-payment income curve, indicating that health payments reduce income 
inequality. V reflects verticality in the income redistribution: the extent at which people with 
different pre-payment income end up paying similar shares of their income for health care. 
H describes the extent to which people with similar pre-payment income pay similar 
proportions of their income to health care. Households are divided into groups of prepayment 
expenditure equals. H is defined by the Gini F(x) for post-payment income of households 
with income x, weighted by a(x), which is the product of the population share and post- 
payment income share for these households. 
R captures the degree of re-ranking in the move from pre-health to the post-health income 
distribution, by comparing the post-health Gini with the post-health concentration coefficient. 
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R is zero if there is no re-ranking (Wagstaff 2001). This method was used to measure 
inequity in health care finances in OECD countries (Aronson et al. 1994; Wagstaff and Van 
Doorslaer 1997). 
The AJL redistributive effect is applied in a study based on Vietnam household survey data 
from 1993 to 1998. Households are divided into groups of pre-payment equals by expressing 
pre-payment income as a multiple of the overall poverty line (PL). Inequality measures are 
computed to estimate the redistributive effect of health expenditures on income. Results 
suggest that since the introduction of social health insurance, the redistributive effect has 
decreased by about 50 percent from 1993 to 1998, which is mostly attributable to a reduced 
degree of regressivity in health financing (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 2001). 
This review of methodologies used to study equity in financing shows that the relevant 
inequities can be quantified by the Kakwani index and two different redistributive effects. 
Progressivity describes how unequal the share of health expenditures is across income 
groups, while the redistributive effect examines whether health expenditures are equally 
distributed by quantifying vertical and horizontal inequity, and the extent of re-ranking 
(Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 2001). 
However, even if health care is financed according to egalitarian equity principles, the total 
amount spent on health may still be "too large" for the poor, and considered as unfair. This is 
addressed by the minimum standard approach. It examines to what extent poor households' 
socio-economic situation is protected against financial shocks under a health financing 
system. 
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5.2.4 Minimum standard approach 
The minimum standard approach (MSA) is concerned with health payments falling short or 
exceeding a threshold, which is either defined in proportional or absolute terms of income. A 
threshold proportional to income aims to ensure that households' health care expenditures as 
a fraction of income do not exceed this threshold. Otherwise, they are considered as 
"catastrophic" (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 2001). However, this does not show to what 
extent catastrophic payments cause hardship. 
A minimum threshold in terms of absolute levels of income, i. e. the poverty line (PL), aims to 
ensure that in the long-run, health care payments do not push households into poverty, or 
further into poverty; l (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 2001). Two quantitative poverty 
measures serve as benchmarks: the headcount and the poverty gap. The headcount ratio 
shows the proportion of the population below the PL. The poverty gap reflects the average 
shortfall from the PL. It allows examining the effect of transfers among the poor, such as 
from the poorest to the less-poor (Deaton 1998). 
The Pen's parades32 visualize the impoverishment effect of health payments. The Pen's 
parades plot household incomes before and after health payment along the y-axis against 
households ranked by pre-payment income against the x-axis. Reading off the parades at the 
poverty line gives the number of households living below poverty: the poverty headcount 
(Litchfield 1999). It allows assessing the variations of health payments within the same 
income groups by comparing their socio-economic status before and after they had medical 
expenditure (Aronson et al. 1994). 
" In other socio-economic contexts another appropriate minimum level may be chosen. 32 Named after the Dutch economist Jan Pen who invented it: "Parade of dwarfs and a few giants". The 
original Pen's Parades were conceptualized by comparing the incomes of every individual in a 
population. In practice comparing incomes at every income level is too laborious; hence some degree 
of aggregation is usually employed to compare quantiles. Note, the Pen's parades are different than the 
Lorenz curve, which plots on the x-axis the cumulative fraction of individuals ranked by their 
increasing income against the cumulative proportion of income on the y-axis. 
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Figure 5.1 shows the Pen's parades, by plotting income before and after health payments 
along the y-axis against households ranked by pre-payment income along the x-axis 
(Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 2001). 
Figure 5.1: Pen's parade, income before and after health expenditures 
Income 
lent 
f 
by 
income 
Ho HI 
Note: adapted from Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2001). PL=poverty line, hh=households. 
The poverty impact of health financing depends on the degree of progressivity as well as on 
the share of income absorbed by health payments. A higher share of income absorbed by 
health payments will increase the poverty impact of health and push the post-payment Pen 
parade down (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 2001). 
The poverty impact of health payments can be measured by the changes in the poverty head 
count and in the poverty gap. At the intersection between the respective parades and the 
poverty line, the headcount ratio is shown, before health payments (Ho) and after health 
payments (Hl). The area between the PL and the pre- and post-payment parade reveals the 
poverty gap before (A) and after (A+B+C) health spending. Area B reflects the deepening 
poverty with the already poorer falling further into poverty; whereas area C corresponds to 
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the additional poverty including the non-poor falling below the PL (Wagstaff and Van 
Doorslaer 2001). 
Formally, the poverty impact of health care payment can be expressed as follows. If an 
individual's pre-payment income is defined by x, then P(pre) is the number of households 
below the PL. It takes the value of 1 if a household's pre-payment income xis below PL, 
which defines a household as poor; and zero otherwise. It leads to the pre payment poverty 
headcount, which is (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 2001): 
(10) H =1/N Z P(pre) = µ(p pre), where N is the sample size. 
The pre-payment poverty gap is denoted by g(pre), and equal to x-z(pre) if x<z(pre), and zero 
otherwise. The average prepayment poverty gap is derived: 
(11) G(pre) =1/N g(pre) = µ(g pre). 
The normalized pre payment poverty gap is: 
(12) NG(pre) = G(pre) / PL(pre), 
and the mean positive pre payment poverty gap is: 
(13) MPG(pre) _ J: g(pre) / P(pre) = µ(g pre) / µ(p pre), 
this results in the average poverty gap: 
(14) g(g pre) = µ(p pre) * MPG(pre). 
The measures for post-payment are derived analogously. It leads to the definition of the 
poverty impact (PI) measures of health expenditures (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 2001): 
(15) PI (H) = H(post) - H(pre); PI(G) = G(post) - G(pre); PI(NG) = NG(post) - 
NG(pre). 
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This method has been applied to examine how health expenditures have added to poverty in 
Vietnam. Findings suggest that some households are clearly pushed further into extreme 
poverty by OOP payments, while others are pushed below the extreme PL. The more 
frequently occurring outpatient payments had a larger poverty impact than hospital payments 
(Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 2001). 
This last finding is particular interesting. Many MIR in low-income countries cover hospital 
care only, aiming to protect the poor against "catastrophically expensive" hospital payments. 
Though, these are less likely to occur than outpatient care provided in basic health facilities. 
It creates doubts about whether MHI with hospital-coverage will protect households' income. 
Thus, before introducing MHI into a user fee financing system, a comparative analysis of the 
poverty impact of hospital and of outpatient expenditures may help defining an MIR benefit 
package to protect the poor against financial shocks related to their health. 
5.2.5 Analytical framework 
The analytical framework uses inequality and PI measures to examine the extent to which 
MHI compared to user fee payments responds (1) to egalitarian equity criterion in utilisation 
and financing of health care, and (2) to the minimum standard principle with respect to 
households' financial impact of health spending. 
The characteristics of a health care system influence the distribution of health care among 
people, which type of service they use and the distribution of health care payments (Wagstaff 
and Van Doorslaer 2001). Table 5.2 describes the relevant health system characteristics for 
insured and uninsured patients, which may affect to what extent systematic deviations from 
an equitable distribution of utilisation and financing of health care may occur. The first 
column lists the provider characteristics in the three districts: payment in public and church. 
owned HC, their gatekeeper function, ambulance transfers, the care provided at the hospital, 
and supply-side subsidies. The second column describes insured patients' conditions with 
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respect to these characteristics. For example, MHI pays HC a monthly capitation payment 
and insured patients pay a RWF 100 (USD 0.30) co-payment per episode of illness. HC play 
a gatekeeper function for insured patients, whose hospital treatment is only covered by MHI 
with health centre referral. The third column describes these conditions for the uninsured. 
Table 5.2: Equity relevant health system characteristics and provider incentives 
Characteristics MHI Patients Uninsured Patients 
Payment for care in Members pay MHI annual Patients pay user fees based on 
public and church- enrolment fees based on which, FFS for each consultation 
owned health centre MHI pays capitation payment to (RWF200), each service and 
(HC) HC. drug at the point of delivery. An 
All services and drugs on average of 2-5 percent of 
essential drug list free for insured patients is exempt from payment. 
patients at the point of delivery, 
except of co-payment of RWF1 00 
per episode of illness 
HC gatekeeper Yes No 
Ambulance transfer Paid by MHI if referred by HC, User fee paid by patient (about 
through capitation amount paid to RWF2500 per transport to 
the HC hospital) 
Payment for care in MHI covers consultation, Patients pay user fees based on 
district hospital (DH) overnight stay and full episode FFS for all services and drugs at 
(incl. drugs) of C-section in 2 point of service delivery. 
districts; while full episodes of C- 
section, malaria and children 
below 5 are covered. 
Patients pay OOP for care not 
covered by MHI (like uninsured). 
Supply-side All facilities receive subsidies from donors and government in form of 
subsidies salaries for public employees, salary mark-ups, and drug donations. 
Given these characteristics, the first part of the analysis examines the degree to which MHI 
contributes to horizontal equity in utilisation, compared to user fees. The second part 
evaluates the progressivity and redistributive effects of MHI and user fees, to see which 
system better meets egalitarian equity criteria. The third part uses the minimum standard 
approach to compare the impact of MHI and of user fees on household income. The data set 
does not dispose of a longitudinal data. Therefore, the poverty impact of health care payments 
cannot be examined. The PL will serve as a threshold income for purely comparative reasons. 
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5.3 Model, data and variable definitions 
5.3.1 Data set 
The analysis uses the same cross-sectional household survey data as in Chapter 4. The survey 
consists of three modules: a household, a curative care and a preventive care module. The 
curative module includes questions on individuals' health care utilisation and expenditures, 
health status, demographic and socio-economic information and on MIR status. In order to 
qualify to be interviewed in the curative module of the household survey, one of the 
following two questions had to be responded positively: (1) "Were you sick, did you have an 
accident or an injury in the past two weeks? " (2) "Did you have a headache, diarrhoea, fever, 
or any coughing in the past two weeks? "33 A significantly higher share of the uninsured 
(27%) than the insured (21 % 34 ) qualified for the curative part. 
The equity in utilisation analysis uses data collected from 376 insured and 3,459 uninsured 
sick individuals (total 3,835 persons) interviewed in the curative module. This information is 
linked with the household module to examine socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics. The analysis of equity in financing and the minimum standard approach uses 
all 3,139 households interviewed in the household survey, among them 354 insured and 2,785 
uninsured households. The household is taken as the sharing unit for monetary expenditure. 
Table 5.3 presents the variables used in the analysis. Variables have been visually examined 
in histograms to identify skewness. 
33 These symptoms reflect the infectious diseases patients are usually suffering from. Rural people tend 
to describe their ill-health by "fever", independent of the medical diagnosis. 34 Pearson uncorrected Chi2(1) = 20.44; p<0.001. 
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Table 5.3: Variable definition and descriptives 
Variable Definition Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Curative module of hh-survey: 
Patient MHI member MHlpat 3835 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Patient gender (1=male) genPat 3835 0.44 0.50 0 1 
Patient age agePat 3835 24.18 20.70 0 98 
Patient age 0-5 years d_agepat 3835 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Patient (age 6+) with school d_schpat 2912 0.60 0.49 0 1 
Pregnant (female 15-49 age) pregnant 1022 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Ave household size rhhsize 3835 5.32 2.33 1 15 
SAH before care (1 =not serious; 
2=serious; 3=very serious) SAH 3835 1.84 0.67 1 3 
SAH dummy (0=not serious) d_SAH 3835 0.68 0.47 0 1 
4 and more days in bed due to 
illness before seeking care Beddays4+ 3835 0.78 0.42 0 1 
1+ professional care visit visitl 3835 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Hospitalized of those with care. d_HDcare 857 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Radio in HH d_radio 3835 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Bike in HH d_bike 3814 0.10 0.31 0 1 
Cattle in HH d_cattle 3835 0.18 0.39 0 1 
Monetary expenditure per capita 
per month (+1) rexpc_1 3835 2740.6 4970.5 1 148251 
Monetary expend quartiles Yquartile 3835 2.52 1.09 1 4 
Total OOP per episode of illness RWFepill 3835 459.6 1,311.6 0 20,000 
Health expenditures per visit rdep_visit 689 1638.9 2429.7 0 20,000 
Household module of household survey: 
OOP+ Premium p/cap p/month OOP_Ppc 3139 194.7 978.7 0 26000 
MHI premium per insured HH p/m MHlpremhh 354 208.3 0.0 208.3 208.3 
MHI premium per cap p/month MHlpremPC 354 50.0 34.1 17.4 208.3 
HH monthly health expenditure-all rexp8 3139 765.8 3634.1 0 121900 
Health expenditure plc plm- all rexp8pc 3139 189.0 978.4 0 26000 
Pre-payment monetary 
expenditures gross OOP+ 
Premium per cap per month PreYpc 3139 3173.6 7500.6 0 192950 
Post- payment monetary 
expenditures net OOP+ Premium 
per cap per month PostYpc 3139 2978.9 7161.2 0 192950 
Monetary expenditure share of 
OOP+ Premium plcap p/month sh_OOPYpc 3112 0.060 0.144 0 1 
Note: vata source: nousenoia survey, and curative care module (9/2000). Non-weighted data. 
OOP=Out-of-pocket health payments. Exchange Rate: USD 1=RWF390 in June 2000; 
USD 1=RWF460 in June 2002. 
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5.3.2 Limits related to data and variables 
It is worth highlighting upfront several issues related to the data and variables used: (1) 
monetary expenditures; (2) health expenditures; (3) utilisation; (4) health status; (5) 
measurement errors, (6) omitted variable bias and heterogeneity. 
First, household monetary expenditures are recorded over a period of one month. Household 
monetary expenditure includes payments made at the local village market (for food and non- 
food items), and other household expenditures like rent, transport, tobacco; school fees, and 
OOP payments for health care. It excludes premium paid for MHI, as this was not an item 
asked in the one-month window of the questionnaire. The per capita amount (rexpc 1) is 
calculated by dividing total monetary expenditure of a household by the respective household 
size (rhhsize). This monthly per capita amount is used as proxy for pre-health payment 
income and a socio-economic status (SES) ranking variable for individuals. Households are 
grouped into quartiles (Yquartile) based on this variable. Two main limits exist: annualising a 
monthly amount and the inclusion of health spending. 
Annualising these monthly amounts by multiplying times twelve will lead to overestimates 
for households who had payments during the reporting period and to underestimates of all 
households who reported zero expenditure during this time (Van Doorslaer et al. 1999). For 
example, 15 households, reported zero-value observations for all monetary expenditure 
components, indicating that they had no cash flow during the month prior to the interview. 
The National Population Office suggested that this might truly reflect households' socio- 
economic situation, as much rural trade still takes place in non-monetary terms. To 
circumvent the zero-value problem for monetary expenditure without losing observations, 
each observation of monetary expenditure variable is increased by one, which will not affect 
the shape of the distribution (Deaton 1998). While this is inappropriate for conducting 
individual household level estimates, the method is acceptable for estimating and comparing 
group averages and assessing progressivity (Van Doorslaer et al. 1999). 
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Total monetary expenditures represent a welfare measure prior to payment for health care. 
This requires the assumption that health payments does not affect saving decisions. In a low- 
income context, this assumption may be unrealistic and would have to be examined in a 
longitudinal data set. However, as the focus is on assessing the degree of proportionality 
between health payments and monetary expenditures, total monetary expenditures gross or 
net of health care spending can be used (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 2001). 
Second, four different measures of health expenditures are used: 
(a) Total health expenditures per episode of illness in the two-week recall period prior to 
interview (RWFepill) (see Tables 7.1 and 7.2 in (Schneider and Diop 2001)). It includes any 
payments made by the household for care received before visiting a provider (i. e. home care, 
drugs at pharmacy and local drug vendors, traditional medicines), at the first visit, and for 
other providers, transport costs, and insured patients co-payment of RWF 100 per health 
centre visit. 
(b) Total health expenditures per visit to a health centre (rdep visit), including patients' 
payment made for consultation, drugs, lab-test, and insured patients' co-payment; but 
excludes MHI premium. 
(c) Monthly health expenditures per household (rexp8) is a component of total monthly 
monetary expenditure. It includes health expenditures made by the household during one 
month associated with treatment and diagnosis of illness and injury, drugs and services 
purchased at providers and pharmacy, inpatient services, values paid to traditional healers, 
transport costs, and co-payments made by the insured. MIR members were not explicitly 
asked to include eventual premium payments in this monthly amount. As MHI premium is 
paid annually, they most likely have not remembered this amount as a monthly expenditure. 
To make members' and non-members total monthly health expenditures comparable, a fourth 
variable is generated. 
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(d) Total health expenditures per capita per month (OOP Ppc) includes total health 
expenditures paid by a household per month, (rexp8) plus one-twelfth (RWF 208) of 
households annual MIR premium (MHlpremhh) for insured households. The annual MHI 
premium is divided by 12 to make health expenditures comparable for the two groups, though 
it does not reflect reality. Payment by monthly instalment is not an option for paying the MHI 
premium. Also, it is erroneous to attribute one-twelfth of premium to the health expenditures 
of the 3,000 non-identifiable poor individuals who did not pay premium but were sponsored 
by churches and other community members (see Section 4.5). Hence, health financing results 
for total health expenditures should be interpreted with caution. Per capita values are 
computed by dividing total household amounts by the household size (rhhsize), resulting in 
monthly premium per MHI member (MHlpremPC) and in per capita monthly health 
expenditures (rexp8pc). 
Studies conducted in OECD countries encountered severe data limits when estimating the 
health financing burden across income groups. It has led researchers to use data from other 
surveys conducted in a different year (e. g. UK), or to impute household expenditures for 
insurance premiums based on econometric estimates of the income-elasticity of demand for 
insurance derived from a different data set (e. g. Switzerland) (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 
1992). 
Third, utilisation is proxied by the professional provider visit dummy (visitl), which was 
assessed based on the question "Did you visit a professional provider (doctor, nurse, health 
centre, hospital, private clinic, or dispensary) outside of the house to treat your illness in the 
last two weeks? " A hospitalisation dummy (d Hdcare) describes whether the patient with 
provider contact had been hospitalised at the district hospital. Visit has a skewed distribution 
with the majority of sick reporting zero visits in the 2-week interview period. Due to the 
seasonality of infectious diseases (e. g. malaria, respiratory infections during raining season), 
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this visit probability reflects the time, when the survey was conducted, and does not lend 
itself for annual interpretation 35 
A potential problem with the curative questionnaire is that it is addressed to household 
members who were sick in the two weeks prior to the interview. There are no questions 
regarding hospitalisation during the last year before the interview took place or on any long- 
term illness or disability individuals may suffer. This may have affected the analysis of the 
actual level of utilisation of insured services: if there is adverse selection of more seriously 
sick individuals into MHI, then without this adverse selection, utilisation levels might be 
lower. 
Fourth, health is proxied by individuals' self-assessed severity (SAID) of an episode of illness 
during the two weeks prior to the interview. This question was only addressed to sick 
individuals interviewed in the curative module. It reflects the categorical response to the 
health survey question: "Before receiving care, did you think the sickness was `not serious', 
was `serious', was `very serious' or you did not know? ". Based on the responses, a SAH 
dummy variable is computed (1=serious/very serious sick; and 0= not seriously sick). 
Compared to other studies, this SAH measure is very limited, and should not be used for 
comparison with results reported in other studies. It mainly reflects sick individuals' self- 
perception of their severity of illness during a two-week time period. This is a weak indicator. 
Self-reporting of health conditions in areas where individuals have few contacts with health 
personnel has limited validity (Case and Deaton 2002). 
Fifth, zero-value observations and missing data point to measurement errors of an unknown 
magnitude. Some genuine data variation across households may not be picked up in the 
estimation process. In some cases the reported value may be close to the true value, and in 
other cases the degree of data reliability could be low (Van Doorslaer et al. 1999). When 
35 Annual visit rates have been analysed based on monthly utilisation data collected by insurance 
status, in all health facilities and for totally 2 years. Results are presented in the PHR Technical Report 
No. 61. 
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inequality is measured, as in this analysis, genuine dispersion needs to be separated from 
measurement errors. Measurement errors will result in less precise estimates of inequality 
levels (Deaton 1998). However, there is no reason to expect that the occurrence of 
measurement errors could be different among the insured or uninsured, implying that it 
should not affect the comparative results between the two groups. 
Finally, problems of omitted variable bias and heterogeneity exist. Omitted variable bias 
occurs when relevant explanatory variables that could affect the dependent variable are 
excluded from the regression. Heterogeneity bias arises, for example, from the unobservable 
health endowment, which induces correlation between observable and unobservable 
arguments when health is regressed on utilisation. Estimates of health expenditures from 
household surveys are potentially subject to both recall bias and small sample bias due to the 
infrequency with which some payments are made. Whether estimates in the distribution of 
health payments are biased depends upon whether reporting health expenditures is 
systematically related to income, which is the case in this analysis. Once more, insured and 
uninsured households should be equally exposed to these problems, which should limit the 
effect on comparative results. 
5.3.3 Variables and estimation procedures 
Bivariate and multivariate analysis has been conducted with this data set and presented in a 
PHR report. Results indicate markedly higher utilisation rates for medical care among the 
insured compared to the uninsured. While utilisation is not linked to socio-demographic and 
economic indicators among the insured, the probability of service use increases with higher 
socio-economic status among the uninsured. A logit regression conducted with all insured 
and uninsured individuals served to test for the presence of inequity in the probability of 
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using health services. The regression for the full sample indicates a significant effect of MHI 
membership on the visit probability36. 
Previous analysis tabulated mean values for health expenditures by socio-economic and 
insurance status. Uninsured patients report markedly higher OOP payments per episode of 
illness than MHI members. However, insured households - and especially those in the two 
lower quartiles - spend a significantly larger share of their total monetary expenditures on 
health including premium than the uninsured. This is related to two reasons: members' annual 
MHI premium and the uninsured not using health care37 (Schneider and Diop 2001). 
Comparing mean values is not enough to inform on the progressivity in health financing 
(Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 1992). 
This Chapter expands on previous findings and examines the extent of inequity in utilisation 
and financing of health services, and the protection of income through MIR. This time, the 
analysis is conducted by insured and uninsured groups to assess inequities within each group. 
Analysis is performed in STATA7 with weighted data. The robustness of findings is tested by 
comparing the consistency of results estimated by different inequality measures. 
The analysis begins with the description of the sample group to identify who among the 
insured and uninsured reported sickness and as a consequence sought medical care. The 
bivariate relationship is examined between sick individuals' insurance status and measures of 
socio-demographic, health and economic status. Then ordinary least square (OLS) serves to 
describe in a single regression how the mean number of visits for insured and uninsured sick 
individuals varies with their demographic, health or geographic situation. 
36 See Table 5.10 in PHRplus Technical Report No. TE002. 
37 See Table 7.3 in PHRplus Technical Report No. TE002. 
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Equity in Utilisation: 
Measuring equity in utilisation requires morbidity and socio-demographic data on an 
individual level. The unit of the utilisation analysis is the sick individual interviewed in the 
curative module of the household survey. 
The analysis examines the degree to which horizontal equity in utilisation is attained, with 
those in equal need reporting equal utilisation. It aims to ascertain to what extent the actual 
distribution of visits among the insured and the uninsured reflects their corresponding 
distribution of need for such care. The extent of any systematic deviations from this equity 
principle is tested. 
The analytical strategy employed is based on state-dependent EU theory, which has been 
introduced in the previous Chapter. It is assumed that the insurance status of a sick individual 
is linked with the utilisation probability; implying that insurance ought to be treated as an 
endogenous variables. As the focus is on horizontal inequity, this is not further investigated 
(Van Doorslaer et al. 2002). 
The robustness of the following three measures will be compared. 
First, the association between inequality in monetary expenditure and utilisation is examined 
by evaluating mean expenditure values and two inequality measures (the Gini and Atkinson 
measures) by subgroups of sick insured and uninsured individuals, who use or do not use 
care, by using the STATA7 ineqdeco command (StataCorp 2001). 
Second, following Le Grand (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 1993), horizontal inequity in the 
distribution of (a) the SAH dummy (as a proxy for need) reflecting the fraction of 
seriously/very sick individuals; and (b) actual utilisation is examined, by insurance status and 
monetary expenditure quartile. Monetary expenditures serve as the income proxy. Estimates 
include mean visit numbers and the fraction of individuals who are seriously/very seriously 
sick; and concentration indices for the SAH dummy C(d SAH and for actual visits CM to 
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quantify the degree of inequality related to monetary expenditures in the SAH and visit 
variable, for insured and uninsured individuals. Concentration indices are computed in 
STATA7 based on covariance results between the relevant variable, and the individual's 
fractional rank in the per capita household monetary expenditure distribution in 2000. 
Standard errors will not be computed as there is no appropriate way to compute them for 
concentration indices with weighted data38. The degree of horizontal inequity (HIm) in 
utilisation reflects the difference between the visit concentration index CM (used instead of 
expenditure concentration index C(T)) and the SAH concentration index C(d SAH). 
Third, the indirect standardization-based method serves to derive a measure of need for 
medical care. Several variables indicating a greater need for health care are used as 
standardizing variables in two separate logit regressions. First, the need-standardized 
probability of service use is proxied by the SAH dummy (0=not seriously sick; 1=serious and 
very seriously sick) only; and second, the visit dummy is regressed on additional need 
variables that might affect the visit probability. 
A binary choice model serves to estimate individuals adjusted visit probability based on 
weighted data and by insurance status. In a logit regression, the dependent variable takes the 
value of 1 if individuals report a visit during the two weeks prior to the interview, or zero 
otherwise: 
(16) P; (visit) =1 / (1 + 1/e LI 
(17) L; =b1 +b2 X2i + .... + bk Xki 
where, Xkj represents a set of variables that are assumed to reflect the expected need for care 
and influence a sick person's (k) visit probability P(visit). 
38 See Quantitative Techniques for Health Equity Analysis - Technical Note #7. 
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In the first logit model, the visit probability is regressed on the SAH dummy: 
(18) P; (visit) = F(L) =a+ ß1(d SAH) +a 
The predicted values are saved and concentration indices for actual visit CM and for SAH- 
standardized visits CM(d SAH) are derived. SAH as the only need proxy may cause biased 
results if individuals across socio-economic groups perceive their health differently, or if 
other factors affect their care-seeking behaviour, independent of their health status (Wagstaff 
and Van Doorslaer 1993). 
Therefore, the second standardization approach includes additional need indicators among the 
explanatory variables. In Rwanda, it is expected that the visit probability could be higher if 
the patient is male, a small child, pregnant, has already spent 4 or more days in bed, and 
being seriously/very seriously sick. The visit probability adjusted by need characteristics is 
estimated in a logit model for insured and then, uninsured sick individuals: 
(19) P; (visit) = F(L) =a+ 7t 1 (genPat) +t2 (d agepat) + 7t3 (pregnant) + 714 (bedday4+) + 
a5 (d_SAH) +£ 
where gender (genPat) equals 1 if male; the age dummy (d agepat) takes the value of 1 if the 
sick individual is 0-5 years old; a pregnancy dummy (pregnant) is 1 if the sick was pregnant 
during the interview or the year prior to the interview; a (bedday4+) dummy that equals 1 if 
the sick individual had spent four and more days in bed due to illness before seeking care; 
and the SAH dummy. 
Having obtained the predictions, need-standardized concentration indices CN are derived for 
MIR members and the uninsured (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 1993). The extent of 
horizontal inequity in utilisation HI(indir) is assessed by comparing each group's 
concentration index on the share of actual utilisation CM with its share of need-expected 
utilisation, as expressed by CN: 
(20) HI(indir) = CM - CN 
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A positive (negative) value suggests horizontal inequity favouring the better-off (worse-off); 
while a zero value suggests medical care and need are proportionately distributed across 
income distributions. Concentration curves are not shown, as these indices yield clear 
results39. 
Equity in Financing: 
The unit of the health financing analysis is the household, which is the sharing unit for total 
monetary and health expenditures. The Kakwani index serves to assess progressivity through 
departures from proportionality in the relation between health care payments and total 
monetary expenditures. Based on the Reynolds-Smolensky and the AJL index the 
redistributive effect of MHI and user fees is compared (Van Doorslaer et al. 1999). 
First, the progressivity of health financing is assessed for insured and uninsured groups, 
based on the Kakwani index presented in equation (6). It reflects the difference between the 
health expenditure concentration index C(T) and the Gini for pre-payment income Gini(x). 
Pre-health payment monetary expenditure per capita per month (PreYpc) reflects total 
household monthly monetary expenditures before health care spending plus the monthly MHI 
premium for insured households. Total health expenditures per capita per month (OOP Ppc) 
include total monthly household health expenditures (rexp8) plus one-twelfth of annual 
household MIR premium (MHIpremhh) for insured households. Equity implications are 
discussed. 
Second, the redistributive effect of health financing between pre- and post-payment income is 
estimated with the Reynolds-Smolensky (RS) index, as shown in equation (8). The monthly 
share of total monetary expenditures spent on health (s1.0OPYpc) is computed by dividing 
total health expenditures per capita per month (OOP_Ppc) by pre-payment monetary 
expenditures per capita per month (PreYpc). 
39 Comparing the two groups would require manipulating the household survey micro-data into groups 
and then construct concentration curves in Excel; though, aggregating micro-data causes less precise 
results. 
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Third, the redistributive effect in health financing following the AJL approach is computed 
by insurance status (equation 9) and by comparing the two Ginis of income before and after 
health expenditures. 
Estimating the horizontal inequity component of the AJL effect would require sub-dividing 
the sample into different socio-economic groups, which will not be computed, mainly due to 
three reasons. First, it is difficult to disentangle re-ranking from horizontal inequity as the 
latter causes re-ranking; second, measuring horizontal inequity would require dividing the 
sample into groups of prepayment equals, which is limited by the small sample size of MHI 
(Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 2001); and third, the focus is on vertical health financing in 
terms of progressivity defined as departure of proportionality. Therefore, only the aggregated 
value is presented for the AJL redistributive effect and the re-ranking component R as 
defined in equation 9. 
Minimum Standard Approach: 
The household is the unit of the analysis. The minimum standard approach serves to examine 
the extent to which health spending pushes insured and uninsured household income below or 
further below the poverty line. Longitudinal data would be needed in order to assess the 
poverty impact of health care payment. However, this analysis uses a cross-sectional data set, 
which leads to the assumption that all costs are borne in the same period, and there is no 
consumption smoothing by borrowing or lending (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 2001). 
Therefore, the PL is used as a minimum standard for purely comparative reasons. The 
analysis compares the mean levels of households' monetary expenditures before and after 
health spending for the two groups. As the purpose is to compare two different financing 
systems against this PL, it will not affect the result of estimating the relative change in the 
head count nor the poverty gap among the different groups. However, the data do not allow 
results to be interpreted in a poverty context. 
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The minimum level is defined by the broad-based consumption poverty line (PL) of RWF 
4,920 per month per adult in the year 2000 as defined in the HLCS (see Section 4.3.4) 
(Ministry of Economics and Finance 2002). Comparing the PL "per adult" from the HLCS 
with monetary consumption "per capita" will cause a larger proportion of households of the 
latter group to be poor. Hence, the result should not be interpreted in this sense. Rather, the 
purpose is to compare insured and uninsured monetary expenditures before and after health 
expenditures with respect to the PL. Therefore, the HLCS "per adult" total consumption 
measure is retained for comparison with the "per capita" monetary expenditures used in this 
household survey. 
Two key variables serve to estimate the income impact of health financing with respect to the 
PL: the monetary expenditure variable captures the households' living standard and serves as 
a proxy for income; and the health care payment variable. Monthly per capita income before 
(PreYpc) and after health spending (PreYpc - rexp8pc) are normalized by the monthly PL per 
adult of RWF 4,920. Pre-payment monetary expenditure normalized by PL is: 
(21) X(pre)PL = (PreYpc) / PL, 
Post-payment expenditure normalized by the PL equals: 
(22) X(post)PL = X(pre)PL - (rexp8pc/PL), 
where (rexp8pc) reflects total household health expenditures per capita per month. Equations 
(21) and (22) are computed for insured and uninsured households. The same PL is used in 
both equations. The post-payment PL can be lower if the PL includes health spending; 
however, empirically this is difficult to disentangle. Applying a post-payment PL after health 
spending would reveal the number of households drawn out of poverty because they did not 
incur any health expenditures; though this is less relevant in this analysis. 
The Pen's parades (see Figure 5.1) provide a framework for examining and comparing 
monetary expenditures before and after health payments for user fees and for MHL The 
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parades are plotted in two separate graphs for the full sample of 354 insured and a random 
sample of 354 uninsured households. The large number of uninsured households makes it 
difficult and too laborious to visualize and compare the impact among the uninsured based on 
the full sample. 
The Pen's parades in Figure 5.1 provide the impression that households keep the same rank in 
their pre- and post-payment income distribution. But in reality this is not the case and re- 
ranking occurs after health expenditures. The analysis aims to visualize re-ranking by first 
computing the relevant measures in STATA7, sorting the households by pre-payment income 
and copying both the pre- and post-payment income variables into Excel. Then "paintdrop" 
charts are drawn. It allows a visual inspection of which households are drawn below the PL 
and where they are located in the pre-payment income distribution. 
The poverty head count ratio and the poverty gap are computed and examined for insured and 
uninsured households following equations (10) - (15). 
5.4 Results 
First bivariate analysis examines the stability of significant variables. Second, equity in the 
distribution of utilisation and of health financing is compared. Then, the minimum standard 
approach evaluates the income impact of health financing by insurances status. The 
robustness of findings is tested by comparing the results across different measures. 
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5.4.1 Description of the sample group 
The socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the households included in this 
analysis have been presented in Section 4.4.2 of this thesis. This section presents findings 
derived from bivariate analysis for insured, uninsured and all sick individuals interviewed in 
the curative care module. Table 5.4 suggests that among the individuals who experienced 
illness, the insured differ from the uninsured in several respects. A markedly higher 
proportion among sick insured than uninsured has some schooling, is pregnant, reports a 
provider visit, or owns a radio or a bike. 
Before seeking care, the sick insured stay a significantly shorter period in bed than the 
uninsured, although both report similar SAH status. A markedly lower proportion of the sick 
insured has been hospitalised; and they report considerably shorter hospital stays than the 
uninsured. This could be related to their smaller sample size, the health centre gatekeeper 
function, or a less severe case-mix due to faster access to care for people who are insured. 
The insured in third monetary expenditure quartile report a significantly lower per capita 
amount than the uninsured, suggesting that the latter are better-off. These characteristics of 
sick individuals reflect to some extent the overall distribution of insured and uninsured 
households (see Tables 4.8 and 4.9). 
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Table 5.4: Socto-demographics and -economics, proportions and means 
Sick Individuals 
Characteristics of Sick 
Individuals 
Insured 
(n 376) 
Uninsured 
(n 3,459) 
All Sick (n 
3,835) t-test or F-test 
Demographics 
Male Gender 43.3% 42.2% 42.3% n. s. 
With School (age >5) 76.2%*** 60.3% 61.2% F(1,20) = 25.37 
n (individuals age >5) 280 2,632 2,912 
HH within 30min of HC 18.4%*** 5.8% 6.6% F(1,20) = 9.6 
In Age group 0-5 years 24% 23% 23% n. s. 
Mean Age, years 24.8 24.5 24.5 n. s. 
Health 
Pregnant (age 15-49) 49.6%*** 22.8% 24.3% F(1,20) =16.36 
n (pregnant) 95 927 1,022 
Health (SAH) before care 
- not seriously sick 42.3% 30.4% 31.1% 7) _ 79 35 F(1 
- seriously sick 41.7% 52.5% 51.9% 
. . , 6.1; p<0.01 
- very seriously sick 16.1% 17.1% 17.1% 
Had 1+ visit in past 2 weeks 45.3%*** 14.6% 16.5% 
F(1,20) = 
38.11 
Hospitalised (of individuals 
who sought care) 3.5%*** 16.1% 14.3% F(1,20) =1 5.79 
n(hospitalised) 185 672 857 
Mean nbr days in bed before 
care 4.6** 5.6 5.5 t=2.44 
Mean nbr days hospitalised 4.1 *** 11.5 11.24 t=2.98 
Ownership of assets, propor tion of households 
Radio 50.1%** 35.30% 36.20% F(1,20) = 5.03 
Bike 17.7%** 10.5% 11% F(1,20) = 5.01 
Cattle 28.6% 20.1% 20.6% n. s 
Monetary expenditures, per capita per month, mean values RWF 
All Sick, RWF 2,750 2,706 2,709 n. s. 
Quartile 1 (lowest), RWF 398 342 344 n. s. 
Quartile 2 1,011 1,072 1,069 n. s. 
Quartile 3 1,997** 2,273 2,252 t=2.68 
Quartile 4 7,077 7,214 7,206 n. s. 
Source: Curative module oT household survey. Weighted data, estimates conducted in STATA7 with 
svytab and svymean commands. Pearson and Wald t-tests were performed. *** Sign at 1 percent level 
(P<0.01). ** Significant at 5 percent (P<0.05). * Significant at 10 percent level (P<0.10). 
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Table 5.5 describes the mean number of visits by sick individuals' socio-demographics and 
health characteristics and by insurance status. The last column presents t-values on 
significance of the difference between insured and uninsured. Significance levels are also 
tested within groups. Sick MM members report significantly higher visit rates than the 
uninsured across all sub-groups. 
Table 5.5: Number of visits, by socio-demographics, means 
Characteristics Insured (n 376) Uninsured (n 3,459) t-values 
All sick individuals 0.45*** 0.15 5.13 
Demographics 
Female 0.42*** 0.14 3.83 
Male 0.50*** 0.16 6.1 
6 years and older 0.45*** 0.13 5.08 
0-5 years 0.46*** 0.19 3.04 
With School 0.45*** 0.15 4.76 
No School 0.45*** 0.11 4.5 
Health Status 
Not very sick 0.22*** 0.05 4.29 
Sick 0.64*** 0.15 7.71 
Very sick 0.61*** 0.3 3.02 
t-value (diff not sick - sick) (t=8.02; p<0.01) (t=5.9; p<0.01) 
t-value (dill sick - very sick) n. s. (t=7.4; p<0.01) 
Source: Curative module of household survey. Weighted data, estimates conducted in STATA7 with 
svymean commands. Wald t-tests compare difference within insurance status group, t values in 
brackets. *** Significant at 1 percent level; **significant at 5 percent level of significance. 
Table 5.6 presents mean and inequality measures of monetary expenditures for sick 
individuals, and by insurance status. All sick individuals report similar mean monetary 
expenditure per capita. However, total monetary expenditure appears to be more equally 
distributed among MHI members, as shown by the lower Gini and Atkinson measures, 
indicating higher inequalities in monetary expenditures among the sick uninsured. 
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Table 5.6: Inequality measures all sick Individuals 
Monetar Atkinson measures 
Sick Individuals 
y 
Expenditure RWF Gin[ = 0.5 = 1.0 E=2.0 
MHI (n 376) , 751 . 538 . 244 . 417 . 683 
Uninsured (n 3,459) E, 708 . 567 . 275 . 495 . 950 
II (n 3,835) , 730 0.566 . 273 . 491 . 948 
Note: Data source: Curative module household survey weighted data from 9/2000. Mean monetary 
expenditure per capita per month in RWF. Exchange Rate: USDI=RWF 390 in 6/2000. c is Atkinson 
inequality aversion parameter. 
This comparison of sick individuals based on bivariate analysis indicates that the sick insured 
and uninsured groups differ significantly in regard of socio-demographic (patient attended 
school), health characteristics (pregnancy, less bed-days before care, less severe SAH, more 
visits, fewer hospital care), and economic characteristics (own radio, bike, cattle, lower 
monetary expenditure when in third quartile). 
The two groups are similar with regard to the gender and age distribution and overall 
monetary expenditures. The Gini and Atkinson measures suggest a slightly more equal 
distribution of monetary expenditure among insured sick individuals. 
5.4.2 Equity in utilisation of health care 
Horizontal inequity in utilisation of medical care is examined by insurance status. The focus 
is on the distribution of three key variables: (1) monetary expenditure per capita per month; 
(2) utilisation of medical care, and (3) sick individuals' self-assessed health (SAH) status. 
Three different HI measures are estimated. The section begins by comparing monetary 
expenditures for users and non-users of care, depending on their insurance status. It is of 
interest to identify differences in income inequality in the four groups. 
Table 5.7 presents mean values and the Gini and Atkinson measures for monetary 
expenditures of sick individuals. Results are first shown for MHI members with and without 
a provider visit, and then for the uninsured. Among MHI members, users and non-users of 
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health care report similar mean monetary expenditure levels (t 4.17; p=0.3), Gini (3% lower 
for users) and Atkinson indices. This suggests no link between the level and distribution of 
monetary expenditure and utilisation in the insured group. 
The uninsured with visit report markedly higher per capita expenditures than those without 
visit (t=4.32; p<0.001). Uninsured users show a more equal distribution of monetary 
expenditure than uninsured non-users, as expressed by lower Gini and Atkinson measures. 
Table 5.7: Income mean and Inequality, by visit, by MHI status 
MHI member Uninsured Individual 
Mean and Inequality 
measures 
With visit 
(n 171) 
No visit 
(n 205) 
With visit 
(n 518) 
No visit 
(n 2,941) 
Monetary expenditure per 
cap per month (mean) RWF 3,085 2,542 3,674 2,474 
Gini of monetary expend 0.523 0.540 0.471 0.580 
Atkinson E=0.5 0.228 0.254 0.185 0.289 
Atkinson e=1.0 0.406 0.420 0.355 0.511 
Atkinson E=2.0 0.696 0.667 0.831 0.953 
Note: Data source: Sick individuals interviewed in curative module. Weighted data from 9/2000. 
Estimates conducted in STATA7 with svymean and ineqdeco by subgroup commands. Exchange Rate: 
USDI=RWF 390 in June 2000. c is Atkinson inequality aversion parameter. 
This comparison indicates that the worse-off among the uninsured are excluded from care. 
Irrespective of their insurance status, users report higher average monetary expenditures per 
capita and a more equal monetary expenditure distribution than non-users of care. Comparing 
the four different mean monetary expenditures in Table 5.7 (for insured an uninsured with 
and without visits) with their corresponding deciles' asset and education variables as shown 
in Table 4.6 in Section 4.3.4, suggests that these households fare similarly with respect to 
assets and education level of the household head. 
Figure 5.8 shows the generalized Lorenz curves based on monetary expenditures for sick 
insured and uninsured individuals with visits (second and fourth column in Table 5.7). 
Generalized curves are used as an alternative to Lorenz curves due to the different means and 
aggregates of the distribution. The generalized curve shows the cumulative share of the 
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monetary expenditure variable multiplied by its mean, which affects the scale but not the 
shape of the curve. 
The Lorenz curve for sick uninsured with visit is above the MIR curve: the pre-payment 
income distribution of uninsured users dominates the insured users distribution. This finding 
is in line with the above lower Gini for the uninsured. It implies that uninsured users have 
more monetary expenditure resources in total, or are better-off than insured users of care 
(Deaton 1998). 
Figure 5.8: Generalized Lorenz curves: Sick with visit 
3674.05 
. 000824 
Cum. Pop. Prop. 
Note: curative module household survey (9/2000). Cumulative monthly monetary expenditure per 
capita is computed in STATA7, with weighted data, and glcurve command. Sample population is sick 
individuals with at least 1 provider visit. Ranked by monetary expenditure per capita. Uninsured above 
MHI curve. 
Figure 5.9 shows the "other side", that is the generalized Lorenz curves for sick individuals 
without visit, by insurance status (third and fifth column in Table 5.7). The insured curve lies 
above (or dominates) the uninsured curve for the lower 80 percent of the population. Then the 
curves intersect, and the inverse is the case. It suggests that the poorer 80 percent of insured 
individuals without visit are slightly better off in terms of monetary expenditures compared to 
the uninsured without visit. 
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Uninsured MHI members 
Figure 5.9: Generalized Lorenz curves: Sick without visit 
2542.14 
. 000141 
Cum. Pop. Prop. 
Note: Curative module household survey (9/2000). Cumulative monetary expenditure per capita Is 
computed in STATA7, with weighted data, and glcurve command. Sample population Is sick Individuals 
without visit. Ranked by monetary expenditure per capita. MHI curve above uninsured curve until 
crossing. 
These comparisons imply that the insured and uninsured individuals, independent of their use 
of medical care, differ in their distribution of monetary expenditures while they report similar 
mean levels of monetary expenditures. Among the uninsured, users have a more equal socio- 
economic distribution, mainly because the poorest are excluded from care. This supports 
above findings from bivariate analysis on monetary expenditures by MHI status and visit 
(Section 5.4.1). 
Actual utilisation of medical care 
The second key variable is actual utilisation of medical care, proxied by the visit dummy 
(visit1). The concentration index is computed for MIR and for user fees with corresponding 
mean numbers of actual visits. The purpose is to examine whether MHI increases utilisation 
of care, or if it just leads to an equal distribution of utilisation among the insured, but at a 
similarly low mean level to that in the uninsured group. 
Table 5.10 presents mean visit values by insurance status and across monetary expenditure 
quartiles. The insured in all four quartiles report significantly higher values than the 
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Uninsured - MHI members 
uninsured. The difference between insured visits across quartiles (Q1 vs. Q4) is insignificant; 
but highly significant for the uninsured. 
The corresponding medical care concentration indices CM are zero for the insured, suggesting 
no inequality in utilisation related to monetary expenditures. However, the 0.27 value for the 
uninsured points to visit inequality, implying that the better-off report more visits than the 
poor uninsured. 
Table 5.10: Actual visits, mean and inequality measures 
Mean Visit by Monet Expend Quartiles 
Actual Visits Low 01 02 03 04 All sick CM 
MHI (n 376) 0.40 0.35 0.49 0.54 0.453 0.079 
Uninsured (n 3459) 0.06 0.13 0.14 0.26 0.146 0.270 
All sick (n 3835) 0.07 0.14 0.17 0.27 0.165 0.243 
t (diff MHI - NM) 3.41 2.44 4.22 4.22 5.13 
p-value 0.003 0.024 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Note: Curative module household survey weighted data from 9/2000. Estimates conducted in STATA7 
with svymean, glcurve and cor commands. T-test between insured and uninsured tests the significance 
in difference within quartile. Difference between Q1 and Q4 are insignificant for MHI (t = 1.22, p<0.2) 
but significant for uninsured (t= 8.22, p<0.001). 
Need for health care, proxied by SAH 
The third key variable `need for care' is proxied by the SAH dummy as defined by sick 
individuals interviewed in the curative module. It provides the information to compare 
whether MHI yields equal utilisation for equal need and irrespective of individuals' monetary 
expenditures. 
Table 5.11 presents SAH values by insurance status and across monetary expenditure 
quartiles; as well as respective concentration indices for the insured and uninsured 
C(d_SAH). The fraction of sick individuals with serious/very sick SAH status is similar for 
insured and uninsured within each quartile; but overall, a significantly larger proportion of 
the uninsured consider themselves as seriously/very seriously sick (p<0.014). 
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The corresponding concentration index for illness C(d SAH) is zero in both groups, 
suggesting no inequalities in SAH with regard to monetary expenditures. Though, the slightly 
negative concentration index for the uninsured indicates some pro-rich inequalities in self- 
assessed health in this group. 
Table 5.11: SAH, fraction and inequality measures 
Fraction SAH by Quart iles 
Need proxied by SAH dummy 01 02 03 04 All sick C(d_SAH) 
MHI (n 376) 0.537 0.522 0.585 0.682 0.586 0.045 
Uninsured (n 3459) 0.710 0.691 0.701 0.688 0.697 -0.009 
All sick (n 3835) 0.703 0.681 0.692 0.688 0.691 -0.006 
t (diff MHI - NM) 1.53 1.92 1.97 0.14 2.69 
p-value 0.141 0.07 0.063 0.891 0.014 
Note: Data source: Curative module household survey weighted data from 9/2000. Estimates 
conducted in STATA7 with svymean and cor commands. Proxy for need is SAH dummy, where 
sickness was: `0=not serious', and `1=serious/very serious'. T-test between insured and uninsured tests 
the significance in difference within quartile. Difference between Q1 and Q4 are insignificant for MHI 
(t =1.23; p<0.2) and for uninsured (t= -1.37, p<O. 19). 
Le Grand's Approach 
Using Le Grand's method, the degree of horizontal inequity (HIw) in utilisation reflects the 
difference between the visit concentration index CM and the SAH concentration index 
C(d_SAH) shown in Tables 5.10 and 5.11 (Van Doorslaer et al. 2002). The resulting HILG in 
utilisation is 0.034 for insured sick individuals; 0.278 for the uninsured; and 0.249 for the 
entire sample. 
The positive HIw result for the uninsured suggests that the rich uninsured receive a larger 
medical visit share compared to their illness or SAH share. The zero HILG result for MIR 
member individuals implies horizontal equity in utilisation among the insured: medical care 
is distributed based on their needs and independent of their socio-economic background. 
This approach is based on the assumption that only persons who are sick will receive health 
care. In reality, care-seeking behaviour may be affected by additional factors. If they correlate 
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with monetary expenditures, then the simple association between health and monetary 
expenditures could be contaminated by the systematic variation of other factors (Wagstaff 
and Van Doorslaer 1993). The indirect standardized method serves as an alternative to 
quantify inequity and check the consistency of the above results. 
Indirect Standardization of Need 
Indirectly standardized horizontal inequality measures are derived based on actual and need- 
standardized probability of visits estimated in logit regression models as defined in equations 
(18) and (19). Three concentration indices are computed, and corresponding mean values are 
shown. 
First, CM, based on actual visits (m); 
Second, a simple SAH-adjusted visit probability is estimated in a logit regression following 
equation (18). The SAH-adjusted visit probability m(SAH), the concentration index 
CM(SAH), and the horizontal inequity index is computed HI(SAI-1). Logit regression results 
are presented in the Annex Table A5.1. 
Third, a logit model serves to estimate a need-adjusted visit probability m(need+) following 
equation (19). Need is proxied by male gender, age to identify children 0-5 years; pregnancy; 
four and more days in bed due to illness; and the SAH dummy. CM(need+) is the 
concentration index for need standardized visits, and HI(need+) the corresponding horizontal 
inequity index (see equation 20). Logit regression results are presented in Annex Table A5.2. 
Table 5.12 presents results for insured and uninsured sick individuals. MM members report 
significantly higher visit rates compared to the uninsured, independent of the adjustment 
method. Standardization does not affect the values for actual visit (m), SAH standardized 
mean visits m(SAH), and need standardized visit probability m(need+). This finding indicates 
that the variables used to indirectly standardize the visit probability do not yield any relevant 
differences in the insured and uninsured groups. 
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For insured individuals, SAH and need-adjusted concentration and horizontal inequity indices 
are zero, suggesting equal utilisation for equal need and SAH. 
For the uninsured, substantial inequity in utilisation remain, independent of their need and 
SAH status. Their SAH- and need-adjusted concentration indices (CM(SAH) and CM(need+)) 
show that an equal visit distribution would have been expected given their distribution of 
SAH and need. The resulting considerably higher HI indices HI(SAH) and HI(need+) suggest 
that the distribution of visits favours the rich uninsured, even when controlling for health 
status using SAH and predicted need. 
Table 5.12: Horizontal inequity in utilisation, by MHI status 
HI Indices MHI Uninsured p-values 
Actual visits 
Actual mean visit (m) 0.453 0.146 p<0.001 
CM: Concentration index for actual visits 0.079 0.270 
SAH-adjusted visit probability 
m(SAH): SAH standardized mean visit 0.458 0.147 p<0.001 
CM(SAH): SAH adjusted concentration index 0.018 -0.001 
(1) HI (SAH) = CM - CM(SAH) 0.061 0.271 
Need-adjusted visit probability 
m(need+): Need adjusted mean visit 0.453 0.146 p<0.001 
CM(need+): Need adjusted concentration index 0.042 0.008 
(2) HI (need+) = CM - CM(need+) 0.037 0.261 
N (sick individuals) 376 3459 
Source: Curative module of household survey. Weighted data, estimates conducted in STATA7 with 
svymean, svylogit, cor commands. SAH enters both equations as a dummy (not so sick vs. sick and 
very sick). Need standardized for age, gender, pregnancy, bed days, and SAH dummy. 
Overall, the different methods used in this section confirm the robustness of findings: Even if 
the visit probability is adjusted by variables that would indicate a greater need for health care, 
there are strong financial barriers among the uninsured caused by user fees that lead to 
horizontal inequity in utilisation. This is not the case among MHI members. Their actual 
distribution of visits matches the distribution of their health status and their need for care. 
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5.4.3 Equity in health financing 
This section presents results on equity in health financing, by insurance status, and on a 
household level. The progressivity of health financing is assessed in terms of departure from 
proportionality based on the Kakwani index as defined in equation (6). The redistributive 
effect is estimated first by the Reynolds-Smolensky (RS) index as shown in equation (8), and 
by the AJL effect (equation 9). 
Table 5.13 shows summary measures for insured and uninsured households. For the insured, 
total health expenditures include MHI premium and OOP (col 3); for uninsured, this is only 
OOP payments (rexp8pc) (col 4). For the insured, total health expenditures per capita per 
month (column 3) is divided into monthly MIII premium per capita (column 1), and OOP 
health expenditures per capita per month (column 2). Monthly MHI premium is imputed and 
does not reflect the actual situation of an annual premium. For MI-II members, the amounts in 
columns 1 and 2 are reported separately to identify eventual inequities related to the premium 
or OOP level. The fifth column shows the values for the full sample population. 
The previous section identified significant differences between the insured and uninsured in 
terms of mean visit levels and equity in utilisation. Results in Table 5.13 suggest that insured 
and uninsured households report no significant differences in their pre-payment income, 
proxied by their total monetary expenditures, including MHI premium. Per episode of illness, 
MHI members report significantly lower OOP expenditures (including visit) than the 
uninsured (p<0.01). 
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Table 5.13: Inequity effect of health financing, by MHI status 
Column number: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
MHI MHI MHI NM % 
Variable Name prem OOP total total All t dill 
Monet exp plc p/m 
incl health + MHI 
x= (PreYpc) premium 40 3418.1 2884.2 2922.5 1.01 
OOP(ill) OOP per illness 497 497 1987 1745 5.41 
T(month) = Health exp pc per 
(OOP_Ppc) month (RWF) 48.1 144.7 192.8 202.6 201.9 0.14 
Monetary exp 
t =Tlx (%) share of T 5.77% 3.3% 9.05% 6.1% 6.3% 1.85 
Gini for pre- 
payment monet 
Gini(x) exp (x) 0.621 0.621 0.605 0.611 3% 
Concentration 
C(T) index for T 0.645 0.497 0.652 0.641 
Kakwani index of 
progressivity of T 0.024 
Kakwani (T) on x: C(T) - Gini(x) -0.124 0.046 0.030 
Post-health 
payment monet 
expend net T plc 3273.4 
x-T p/m (RWF) 3225.3 2681.6 2720.6 1.05 
Concentration 
index for post- 
payment monet 0.581 
C(x-T) expendit vis-ä-vis x 0.589 0.609 0.609 
Reynolds- 
Smolensky index 
of redistributive 
RS(T) effect for OOP 0.025 -0.137 0.049 0.032 
Gini post-payment 
Gini(x-T) monet exp (x-T) 0.620 0.629 0.615 0.616 2% 
Re-ranking degree: 
R Gini(x-T) - C(x-T) 0.039 0.040 0.006 0.008 
Redistributive 
effect: 0.0008 -3% 
AJL effect Gini(x) - Gini(x-T) -0.0078 -0.0092 -0.0053 
N Nbr of HH 354 2785 3139 
Nbr of sick individ. 
N(s, v) with visit 171 518 689 
Nnte: Data source: Household survey and cur ative mod ule househ old survey Weicht PA tiara frn,. 
9/2000. MHI total = MHI premium + MHI OOP. NM total = NM OOP. Estimates conducted with 
svymean, inequal, glcurve and cor commands. Mean monetary expenditure in RWF. Exchange Rate: 
USDI=RWF 390 in 6/2000. T-test significance level in difference of mean values between totals for 
MHI and NM (non-members): % change shows the difference between MHI insured and the 
uninsured. 
40 Note: this per capita monetary expenditure amount includes all health related expenditures including 
M HI premium for the insured. It serves as a proxy for pre-payment income. 
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The difference in total monthly health expenditures per capita (OOP_Ppc) between the two 
groups is insignificant. The average income share t of total health expenditures is lower for 
uninsured than for MHI households. This is mainly because of members' MIR premium 
payment, which reflects almost 6 percent of their total monetary expenditures (col 1). Once 
premium is paid, MIR members report a lower share of total income that goes to monthly 
OOP payments (3.3%) than the uninsured (6.3%). The Gini(x) of pre-payment income is 
equally positive for insured and uninsured households, indicating a distribution of monetary 
expenditure favouring the rich in both groups. 
The Kakwani index measures the progressivity of health care payments on pre-payment 
income. The Kakwani is zero for insured (col 2) and uninsured OOP (col 4), but slightly 
negative for total MHI health expenditures, including MHI premium (col 3). While the zero 
values suggest proportionality in health financing for OOP paid by user fees and MHI, the 
negative value for total MHI indicates regressivity in total health expenditures. 
This Kakwani result needs to be interpreted cautiously. The uninsured result does not reflect 
equity but is rather caused by the large proportion of them with zero health expenditures due 
to their exclusion from care when sick. All insured households, on the other hand, have some 
health expenditures consisting of their flat-rate annual MHI premium, which causes 
regressivity in health financing. Hence, this regressive result for total MHI indicates that the 
annual MHI premium level is too high for poor households and should be lowered for the 
poor to reach a positive Kakwani index and progressivity in health financing. 
This result is also potentially problematic due to two reasons: first, the data limits and second, 
the appropriateness of the Kakwani index. As described in Section 5.3, the proportionality of 
health financing is analysed based on household monetary expenditures for consumption. 
This information was collected for one month and has been annualized to reflect annual 
monetary expenditures. It results in imputing annual expenditures of zero for those 
households who had no expenditures during the interview month. This could provide an 
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erroneous impression. While it is very well possible that some households never have cash 
and only live from trading goods and services, most people do have at least some cash 
expenditures during the year. Since the MIR premium can be paid at any time of the year, 
whenever the household has cash available, attributing one-twelfth of MHI premium to these 
zero-expenditure households may provide a regressivity result that is mainly due to the data 
limits. It highlights the importance of using longitudinal data sets with regular follow-up 
interviews to conduct health financing analysis. Similarly, the Kakwani index reflects the 
difference between two measures generally assessed based on longitudinal data: the 
concentration index for health care payments C(T) and the Gini for pre-payment income (x). 
Future research could focus on whether the Kakwani index is an appropriate measure of 
equity when using one month of cross-sectional data, and thereby contribute knowledge on 
when these indices are appropriate. 
The redistributive effect as expressed by the Reynolds-Smolensky RS(T) index shows the 
change in income inequality associated with the move from the pre-payment to post-payment 
income4' distribution due to health care payments. The degree of the redistributive effect 
RS(T) is zero for insured and uninsured OOP (columns 2 and 4), suggesting that OOP 
spending und MHI and user fee have no impact on the income distribution after health 
spending. However, the negative value for total MHI including premium (col 3) indicates a 
pro-rich income redistribution among MHI members, which, again, is caused by the annual 
MHI premium. 
This RS(T) gives the impression that MHI contributes to a more unequal post-payment 
distribution than user fees, which is misleading. The poor sick uninsured are not having any 
health expenditures because they are excluded from care. While MHI contributes to 
horizontal equality in utilisation, the MHI premium level yields regressivity in health 
financing and a pro-rich redistribution in the post-payment income. This cautiousness in the 
interpretation highlights the limits of the methodology. 
41 Post-payment income is income after health care payments have been made. 
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The Kakwani and Reynolds-Smolensky indices assume that there is no re-ranking when 
moving from pre- to the post-payment expenditures and that the redistributive effect is caused 
by progressivity only. However, in reality, re-ranking most likely occurs. Some households' 
rank in the pre- and post-payment distribution may be different, because at given income 
level, they pay different amounts for health care. 
Therefore, the Aronson (AJL) effect is computed, following equation 9. For both groups the 
magnitude of redistribution for total health spending (col 3 and 4) is miniscule and negative, 
suggesting that the Lorenz curve for post-payment income would lie below the Lorenz curve 
for pre-payment income. Total health expenditures (including premium) contribute to income 
inequality for insured and uninsured households (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 2001), 
although the insured used care about four times more often when sick. The zero AJL value 
for MHI OOP expenditures nearly coincides with the Reynolds-Smolensky index. This means 
that OOP health expenditures for insured households are not related to re-ranking in the move 
from the pre-payment to post-payment income distribution, which is confirmed by the zero 
result for the re-ranking degree. Hence, among the insured, any pro-rich redistribution after 
health payments is due to the MIII premium level. 
Combining results on equity in utilisation and health financing leads to three key findings. 
First, MHI members pay about four times less for an episode of illness than the uninsured. 
Thus, it is not surprising that MHI members receive significantly more visits for equal need 
for care. MHI contributes to horizontal equity in utilisation among insured, who report 
similar utilisation for similar need, irrespective of their monetary expenditure situation. 
However, user fees create inequity in utilisation as need-adjusted utilisation is positively 
related to monetary expenditure. 
Second, as a result of their exclusion from care, total health financing represents a lower 
share of total monetary expenditures among the uninsured. Consequently, the different health 
financing equity indicators suggest that user fees would cause proportionality in health 
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financing and no redistributive effect on pre-payment income. This is due to the poor sick 
uninsured not seeking care. 
Third, total health expenditures for the insured are slightly regressive and represent a higher 
share of total pre-payment income than for uninsured households. The annual Mffi premium 
caused this result. However, the Aronson effect suggests that the redistributive effect of 
health expenditures is miniscule for both groups, which is impressive given that the insured 
use care considerably more often. 
It can be concluded that MHI with utilisation at a significant higher and equitable level has 
decreased horizontal inequity in utilisation, resulted in a lower share of income being paid 
OOP, and caused a similar negligible redistributive effect as user fees, which create 
horizontal inequities in utilisation. This OOP result is comparable to findings from the 
Vietnam study, where based on estimates of the redistributive effect of health expenditures on 
income, it was suggested that since the introduction of social health insurance, the 
redistributive effect has decreased over time, which was mostly attributable to a reduced 
degree of regressivity in health financing (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 2001). On the other 
hand, annual MHI premium reflect an important proportion of poor households income, and 
causes regressivity in total health financing among insured households. This finding confirms 
results from previous analysis, as well as concerns raised in Chapter 4 about the high MHI 
premium level. 
5.4.4 Minimum standard approach 
In a low-income context, analysing the distribution of health expenditures is not enough to 
reach a conclusion about fairness in financing. Instead of equity principles, the poverty 
relevance of health care payments may be more important. In the long run, health 
expenditures may have an impoverishing effect, and threaten households' ability to purchase 
food and other important goods. This analytical approach applies a short-term concept. It uses 
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a cross-sectional dataset and assumes that all costs are borne in the same period. It thus 
ignores options of consumption smoothing over time, by borrowing and lending. 
Fairness in payments for health care suggests that in the short run, OOP health expenditures 
should not push household income below or further below the PL. Rather, health policy 
should protect household income against dropping below a minimum standard level. This 
section aims to identify to what extent this objective is reached by user fees and by MHI. The 
minimum is defined by the year 2000 HLCS consumption PL of RWF 4,920 per month per 
adult and set in terms of the absolute level of household pre-payment expenditure (Ministry 
of Economics and Finance 2002). Mean levels of monetary expenditures are compared for 
insured and uninsured households for before and after health care spending, and against the 
PL. Due to these survey-specific differences in the two income proxy variables, this result 
should not be used to compare poverty in the household survey against poverty in the HLCS. 
The Pen's parades plot household pre-payment monetary expenditures before health 
expenditures along the y-axis against households ranked by pre-payment expenditures along 
the x-axis (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 2001). Figure 5.14 shows the Pen's parade for a 
random sample of uninsured households, and Figure 5.15 for all MHI households. The 
random sample of uninsured households equals the sample size of MHI households, to make 
the graphs comparable. 
The Pen's parades are drawn as in "paintdrop" charts to identify eventual re-ranking in 
household pre- and post-payment income distribution after health expenditures. Households' 
pre- and post-payment monetary expenditures are normalized by the PL. Overlaid on the 
chart are "paintdrops": households' OOP health expenditures (rexp8pc), resulting in their 
post-payment position. It allows a visual inspection of which households are drawn below the 
PL and where they are located in the pre-payment income distribution. 
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Figure 5.14: Pen's parade, random sample of uninsured households 
Poverty, monetary expenditure before and after health payments, 
random sample of non-Insured households 
-Poverty line   4920 RWF p. aduh -Pre-OOP HH expenditure -Post-OOP NH expenditure 
5 
a ýa 
Note: Data source: household survey (9/2000). 
Figure 5.15: Pen's parade, full sample of MHI households 
Poverty, monetary expenditures before and after health payments, 
MHI households 
5 
4 
a 
ýz 
1 16 31 46 61 76 91 106 121 136 161 166 161 196 211 226 241 256 271 266 301 316 331 446 MM "He ranked In seconding order of monetary expenditures (RYYF) 
Note: Data source: household survey (9/2000). 
The charts *show that independent of their insurance status, the majority of households are 
already below PL. In some cases, their total monetary expenditures are clearly pushed further 
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Hits ranked in ascending order of monetary expenditure po (RWF) 
into poverty by OOP payments. In other cases, household income drops below the PL having 
started out above it "before" OOP health payments. Comparing the random uninsured sample 
with the insured group suggests that MHI is more effective than user fees in protecting 
household income against falling below the PL. 
However, insured households who seek care still have to pay a co-payment per visit, fees for 
hospital care not covered by MHI, and transport costs to facilities. Figure 5.15 shows that 
these expenditures cause some of the insured monetary expenditures to drop below or further 
below the PL. Hence, in the long run the current MHI coverage may not be enough to protect 
household income against poverty. This result is compatible with findings from Vietnam, 
where the more frequently occurring outpatient payments, not covered by insurance, had 
clearly pushed some households further into or below the extreme poverty by OOP payments 
(Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 2001). 
Table 5.16 shows additional poverty measures that help interpreting these graphical findings. 
The headcount ratio identifies the proportion of the population below the PL. The poverty 
gap reflects the average shortfall from the PL. First, outpatient and inpatient utilisation rates 
are shown for individuals stemming from households who are below poverty line. The 
insured classified below the poverty line report significantly higher utilisation rates for 
outpatient and inpatient care than the uninsured. 
The poverty headcount ratio shows that before OOP expenditures, 81 percent of insured 
households and 86.6 percent of uninsured households are below the poverty line. OOP health 
expenditures increase the headcount ratio by 0.6 percentage points for MHI and by 1.3 
percentage points for uninsured households. Comparing monetary expenditure per capita with 
a PL defined by monetary and non-monetary consumption expenditure per adult provides the 
erroneous result that a larger proportion of households interviewed in this household survey 
live below the PL compared to the national rural average of 66 percent. 
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Table 5.16: OOP spending in terms of the PL, by MHI status 
MHI Uninsured 
Consumption PL per adult per month (RWF) 4920 4920 
N (households) 354 2785 
P(pre): Nbr of households < PL before health 287 2412 
P(post): Nbr of households < PL after health 289 2447 
Utilisation rates of sick below PL 
Outpatient utilisation rate in health centres, per capita 0.43*** 0.13 
Inpatient utilisation rate in hospitals, per capita 0.37*** 0.1 
Poverty headcounts 
H(pre-payment): P(pre) /N 81.1% 86.6% 
H(post-payment): P(post) /N 81.6% 87.9% 
PI(H): Increase of headcount ratio, %-points 0.6 1.3 
Poverty gap 
G(pre-payment) (RWF) 2628 2856 
G(post-payment) (RWF) 2687 2953 
PI(G) (RWF) 59 97 
Normalized poverty gap 
NG(pre): G(pre)/PL 53.4% 58% 
NG(post): G(post)/PL 54.6% 60% 
PI(NG): Increase of normalized poverty gap 1.2% 2% 
Note: Data source: household survey (9/2000). Estimates computed in STATA7. Weighted data. See equations 
(10) - (15) in section 5.2.3 for definition of poverty measures. *** Significant at 1 percent level of significance 
(P<0.001). 
The normalized poverty gap increases due to OOP health expenditures by 1.2 percentage 
points for insured and 2 percentage points for uninsured households. For the insured, OOP 
health payments (due to the use of care not covered by MHI) increased the number of poor 
Rwandan households by 0.7 percent (=0.6/81.1); and for the uninsured by 1.5 percent. The 
relative impact is slightly greater on the normalized poverty gap, with relative impact shares 
of 2.2 percent for the insured and 3.4 percent for the uninsured. 
The above findings suggest that for insured households health expenditures have a smaller 
impact on the headcount and the normalized poverty gap than for uninsured households. 
However, the latter report significantly fewer in- and outpatient visits and inequity in 
utilisation. 
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If there is adverse selection in the current MHI, then without adverse selection the paintdrops 
in Figure 5.10 would be smaller, suggesting that MHI protects the insured even better against 
unexpected health expenditures. 
Longitudinal data would be needed to examine over time, the relative importance of health 
payments in the poverty context. Nonetheless, these findings suggest that the uninsured avoid 
seeking care in order to prevent that health payments endanger their ability to purchase food 
and other important goods. 
Table 5.13 has shown that on average, MIR members pay RWF 497 per episode of illness, 
which includes co-payment, transport cost to the facility, and health expenditures for home 
care, drugs bought at pharmacy, and care not covered by the MIII benefit package (see Table 
7.1 in (Schneider and Diop, 2001) for detailed break-down of expenditures by socio- 
economic group and insurance status). Richer Mill members pay more than those in lower 
monetary quartiles (RWF 966 vs. less than RWF 200). This could be because the richer 
insured are willing to pay additional amount for care not covered by MHI, including hospital 
care and drugs excluded from the MOH essential drug list. This leads to equity concerns, 
suggesting that current MHI coverage may not be great enough to ensure horizontal equity in 
utilisation of not-covered care. 
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5.5 Discussion 
The aim of this Chapter was first, to review the literature on methods of measuring equity in 
utilisation and financing of medical care and of the minimum standard approach; and second, 
to employ these methods to compare utilisation and financing of health care for insured and 
uninsured groups. This is done using data from households and sick individuals interviewed 
in the 2000 household survey conducted by PHR in three Rwandan districts. 
The egalitarian equity principle and the minimum standard approach serve as the standards 
against which equity is measured in this analysis. The egalitarian equity principle says that a 
system is equitable if it is financed according to individuals' socio-economic situation, and if 
medical care is distributed based on patients' need to achieve better health, as judged by the 
health professional and unrestricted by patients' income and wealth (Wagstaff and Van 
Doorslaer 1993). 
Many low-income countries do not aspire egalitarian equity principles, and the minimum 
standard definition may be more important. The focus is then on the extent to which health 
care payments force household income below a minimum threshold, such as the poverty line 
(Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 2001), in which case household income and their ability to 
purchase other goods and services including food, shelter or clothing would be endangered 
(Culyer and Wagstaff 1993). 
The main findings presented in this Chapter on equity in utilisation and health financing and 
the minimum standard approach can be summarized as follows: 
First, the analysis has used different measures to examine equity in utilisation and health 
financing among insured and uninsured households. The results suggest that sick insured 
individuals report a markedly higher visit rate than the uninsured. The Le Grand horizontal 
inequity index HIw is positive for the uninsured suggesting that the rich uninsured receive a 
larger medical visit share compared to their illness share. The zero HIS result for MHI 
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members implies horizontal equity in utilisation: medical care is distributed independent of 
their socio-economic background. This finding is supported by indirect standardization 
methods. Even when controlling in the estimation of the visit probability for other factors that 
would indicate a greater need for health care, user fees create horizontal inequity in 
utilisation: visits strongly correlate with individuals' socio-economic background. For the 
insured, the distribution of visit probability matches their distribution of their health status 
and the need for care. Hence, MHI contributes to equity in utilisation. 
Second, analysis of equity in health financing implies that at a markedly higher visit rate, 
MIR members pay on average considerably less per episode of illness than the uninsured. 
The Kakwani index is zero for OOP for the insured and uninsured implying proportionality in 
OOP financing in both systems; but slightly negative for total MM health expenditures, when 
MHI premiums are included. This negative result points to regressivity in total MHI health 
expenditures due to MM premium; but is to some extent also caused by the one-month 
income proxy with some households reporting cero expenditures, and should be interpreted 
with caution. Similarly, the RS index is negative for total MHI including premium, 
suggesting a pro-rich income redistribution among MHI members. Again, this is due to the 
annual MHI premium level. Insured and uninsured OOP payments seem to create no 
redistributive effect, as the RS(T) degree is zero. The Aronson (AJL) redistributive effect is 
miniscule and negative for both groups: total health payments slightly contribute to income 
inequality among the insured and uninsured; which is related to premium levels among MHI 
members. Although the insured use care about four times more often when sick, the AJL and 
re-ranking indices are zero for MHI OOP payments. Thus, MHI OOP does not appear to 
contribute to any re-ranking or income inequality. 
The equity findings lead to the conclusion that Mill with utilisation at a significantly higher 
level leads to horizontal equity in utilisation. However, MHI premium levels appear to be too 
high for the poor and lead to regressivity in health financing and some re-ranking. On the 
other hand, user fees cause strong horizontal inequities in utilisation at a lower mean level. 
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The poor uninsured are excluded from medical care, which gives the misleading impression 
that user fees cause proportionality in health financing and no redistributive effect on pre- 
payment income. Hence, it is important to combine analysis on equity in utilisation and 
financing of health care. 
Finally, the minimum standard approach compares the two health financing mechanisms. 
The analysis examines households' socio-economic situation in terms of the poverty line. The 
focus is on whether MHI and user fee health financing systems protect household income 
against dropping below the PL. Findings suggest that OOP spending has a similar small 
impact on the headcount and the normalized poverty gap for insured and uninsured 
households, although the latter report significantly fewer provider visits. It could be that the 
poor uninsured chose not to use care because they fear that paying for care might endanger 
their ability to purchase other goods and services. Thus, compared to user fees, MHI better 
protects poor households' monetary expenditures against financial shocks caused by OOP 
payments; and this is despite a considerably higher utilisation level by MIR members. 
This analysis has limits related to the data set, measurement errors, and methods that have not 
been used. Although the analysis follows the methods used by other researchers, the findings 
presented in this Chapter do not lend themselves to comparison with results from studies that 
use differently defined data and variables, and are conducted in a different socio-economic 
context. In particular, the analysis relied on two simply defined key variables, which are 
rather limited compared to measures used in other studies. These two variables include 
individuals' SAH health status before they sought care, which serves as a proxy for health 
status, and monetary expenditures as a proxy for household income. 
Measuring inequality requires that genuine dispersion be separated from measurement errors 
But measurement errors are inherent in every data set. They lead to the situation that some 
genuine data variation across households is not picked up in the estimation process (Van 
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Doorslaer et al. 1999). However, it would be expected that less precision would equally affect 
insured and uninsured groups, and thus not impact the comparative results. 
Several analytical methods have not been applied in this analysis. For example, the health 
financing section only looked at vertical equity, whereas horizontal inequity issues have not 
been investigated. Estimating the horizontal component of the Aronson index could have 
done this. However, this method requires sub-dividing the sample into different socio- 
economic groups to estimate inequality measures with decomposition by subgroups. Due to 
the small number of insured patients this detailed analysis is not conducted, and only the 
aggregated value for the AJL is presented. 
The section on the minimum standard definition evaluates health financing in the context of 
poverty. However, the analysis uses a cross-sectional data set, which does not allow 
concluding on the poverty impact of health payment. Longitudinal data would be needed to 
examine the poverty impact of health payments and households' income smoothing over 
time. 
Findings from this and the previous Chapter on the enrolment probability can be combined. 
First, MHI responds to overall equity principles in utilisation and OOP health financing 
related to the episode of illness. However, total MHI health expenditures including premium 
causes regressivity in health financing, while MHI OOP health expenditures cause 
proportionality. This is due to the high share of monetary expenditures going to MHI 
premium payments, and the limited MM benefit package, which excludes most hospital care. 
In addition, the "paintdrop" charts indicate that some insured households' pre-payment 
income drops below and further below the poverty line due to their OOP spending. These 
results lead to several suggestions for scaling up an equitable MHI design in Rwanda. 
First, to reach progressivity in health financing, the MHI premium could be subsidised for 
households in the two lowest monetary expenditure quartiles, and/or the current flat-rate 
premiums could be replaced by an income-dependent premium. 
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Second, to protect monetary expenditures of poor households against OOP payments for care 
not covered under MHI, the current limited MHI benefit package should be expanded to a 
benefit package that covers all services and drugs offered by public and church-owned 
hospitals and health centres within a health district. This would imply a premium increase, 
which could negatively affect enrolment. Therefore, additional finances are required and 
eventual cross-subsidies from the better-off to the worse-off within a society. 
Before incorporating these suggestions into an MHI scale up design, the following Chapter 
examines the financial sustainability implications of MHI in health facilities. 
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5.6 Annex 
Table A5.1: SAH-adjusted visit probability, for members and non-members 
Explanatory Reference Sick M HI Members Uninsured Sick Individuals 
variable category Logit coef. Std. Err. P>jtj Logit coef. Std. Err. P>jtj 
d_SAH Not very sick 1.727 0.225 0.001 1.385 0.143 0.001 
_cons -1.253 
0.213 0.001 -2.858 0.223 0.001 
Nbr obs 376 3,459 
Pop size weig hted 185.2197 2,945.03 
F (1,18) 58.78 (1,20) 93.54 
Prop >F 0.0001 0.0001 
Note: Curative module household survey. Weighted estimates computed in STATA7, 
svylogit 
Table A5.2: Need-adjusted visit probability, for members and non-members 
Explanatory Reference Sick MHI Members Uninsured Sick Individuals 
variable category Logit coef. Std. Err. P>jtI Logit coef. Std. Err. P>ItI 
Male patient Female 0.684 0.354 0.069 0.219 0.165 0.200 
d_agepat 0.220 0.282 0.447 0.459 0.175 0.016 
pregnant 1.302 0.512 0.020 0.312 0.247 0.221 
d_bed 4+day <4 days -0.594 0.395 0.150 0.210 0.291 0.479 
d_SAH Not very sick 1.884 0.207 0.001 1.423 0.159 0.001 
_cons -1.417 0.412 0.003 -3.287 0.405 0.001 
Nbr obs 376 3,459 
Pop size weig ht 185.2197 2,945.03 
F (5,14) 14.28 (5,16) 20.44 
Prop >F 0.0001 0.0001 
Note: -urative mouuie nousenoiu survey. weigntea estimates computed in STATA7, 
svylogit 
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Part III: Sustainability 
Chapter 6: The Financial Impact of MHI with 
Capitation and of User Fees in HC 
6.1 Introduction 
Many governments in low- and middle-income countries have promoted MHI, with the aim 
to raise additional resources for a financially depleted public health sector. Most of these 
insurance schemes reimburse providers by fee-for-service payment (Bennett et al. 1998). Few 
attempts exist to understand the contribution of M! to financial sustainability in a health 
sector (Barnum and Kutzin 1993). Such an analysis is justified on the grounds of efficiency 
arguments, related to the consumption and production of medical care. MIR has been 
criticised for creating perverse financial incentives to providers and the insured; and for 
drawing resources from other sources (Bennett et al. 1998). Eventual cost increases due to 
inefficient production or consumption may lead providers and insurers to shift costs to other 
sources and select risks (Barr 1998). This tradeoff between efficiency and risk selection can 
be balanced by the provider payment mechanism (Newhouse 1996). 
The MHI in Rwanda is unique in the sense that the chosen provider payment is capitation per 
member per month in health centres instead of fee-for-service (see Table 3.2). As a result, 
health centres receive both a capitation amount per member from MHI and user fees from 
uninsured patients. In addition, donors and the government subsidize the supply of care. 
Hence, the focus in this Chapter is on the financial implications of user fees and of MHI with 
capitation payment in health centres. The financial situation in hospitals is not examined due 
to the limited benefit package (see Table 3.2) in hospitals and the lack of comprehensive 
hospital data. 
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The theory about the responsiveness of public providers to financial incentives is weak. There 
is little evidence on public provider behaviour in general, and there is even less evidence 
about the impact of different provider financing systems on behaviour, costs and efficiency of 
public providers in developing countries (Barnum and Kutzin 1993). 
The principle-agent problem that characterizes the provider-insurer relationship suggests that 
providers respond to financial incentives, and treat patients according to their payment status. 
Under capitation, provider revenue per patient is unrelated to the resources expended in 
treatment. This encourages providers to manage their financial risk by maintaining costs low 
and becoming more efficient; by shifting costs to other payers; and by `dumping' and 
`skimping' potentially high-cost patients (Ellis and McGuire 1993). Capitation payment for 
insured patients implies that these patients would receive care such that related costs remain 
on average below the capitation payment. On the other hand, user fees implies user-fee 
paying patients, who can afford it, to receive better quality and more resource intensive care, 
leading to higher marginal costs (Dor and Farley 1996). 
If payment-specific treatment is technically feasible for providers, then this would leave room 
for cost savings in the treatment of insured patients. But, differentiated treatment by payment 
type may simply not be practicable for providers and considered as medically unsound. It 
may be easier for providers to follow standard treatment protocols for all patients (Dor and 
Farley 1996). 
Also, payment-specific treatment would suggest that a range of treatment is medically 
acceptable and within standards of quality of care. `Medical appropriateness' tends to be 
subject to debate, and leads to `appropriate treatment' within a quality range that is assumed 
to be constant across providers (Dor and Farley 1996). Thus, these are vague concepts and 
difficult to assess making interpretation of cost differences difficult. While more intense 
treatment could signify either quality care for a more severe case-mix that is accurately 
11 
treated, or oversupply of care to patients; less intense treatment leading to low marginal Costs 
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could mean undersupplying care to patients, greater efficiency, or a less severe case-mix of 
patients. Concerns arise if treatment results in care that is beyond the medical acceptable 
range. 
Using data from Europe and the USA, studies have estimated cost functions for private 
providers to assess their technical and economic efficiency, including average and marginal 
costs, as well as the extent of economies of scale and scope (Scott and Parkin 1995). Findings 
from the few payer-specific studies conducted in the USA suggest that providers behave as 
economic agents and adjust treatment intensity according to the expected payer-specific 
revenue from different sources (Dor and Farley 1996). 
In the absence of detailed provider data to assess the impact of insurance, analysis on MHI 
tends to report descriptive information on finances and membership (Bennett et al. 1998; ELO 
2002). As most insurance schemes reimburse providers on a FFS basis, a comparative 
analysis on the impact of prospective payment mechanisms on provider cost and efficiency 
has not been conducted yet in low-income countries. 
This analysis aims to add to empirical evidence on payer-specific cost analysis. It examines 
the impact of alternative payment mechanisms on provider recurrent cost in public and 
church-owned health centres in Rwanda, by comparing the cost and efficiency implications of 
(1) MIII with capitation payment versus (2) user fee payment by the uninsured. It aims to 
determine whether HC shift costs of treating insured patients to other payers, instead of 
adjusting costs and improving the intensity of treatment. 
The hypothesis is that HC respond to incentives set by capitation payment, leading to less 
resource-intense treatment within a given range of quality of care, which - ceteris paribus - 
results in lower marginal costs for treating insured patients. Providers' less intense treatment 
of insured patients may not necessarily result in worse quality from a patient and medical 
standard point of view, but rather increase economic efficiency. This hypothesis implies that 
providers can adjust payer-specific treatment intensity within the medically acceptable 
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quality of care range, such that marginal revenue equates marginal cost. It suggests that HC 
do not necessarily shift treatment costs of insured patients; but rather, providers adjust costs 
in response to incentives set by the payment system (Dor and Farley 1996). 
In addition, as the financial risk of insurance caused by members' adverse selection decreases 
with growing MHI pool size, a negative relationship is hypothesised between total recurrent 
cost in health centres and MHI pool size. 
The analysis uses monthly data collected from August 1999 until July 2000 from 52 health 
centres, where insured and uninsured patients receive treatment. The focus is on the HC cost 
structure, and the cost impact in HC of the two payment systems. The robustness of the 
results is tested by using two different functional forms of a cost function: a translog and a 
log-linear cost model. Average and marginal costs and returns to the variable factor are 
estimated to examine HC capacity to accommodate an eventual higher demand for care, with 
an increasing proportion of the population insured. In anticipation of a MHI scale up, findings 
may help identify the degree to which capitation payment enhances efficiency in the 
provision of care. 
The following section introduces the literature on provider behaviour, provider cost functions 
and structure, and empirical evidence from other studies. Then, the study area is presented. 
Section 4 describes the methods and data used. Section 5 presents results and checks their 
robustness. Findings are interpreted by drawing from additional data sources from households 
and focus groups collected in Rwanda. 
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6.2 Literature review 
6.2.1 Behaviour and cost functions in health care 
This section begins with an introduction to the provider behaviour in the context of different 
payment systems. Then, it discusses issues related to accounting-based and econometric cost 
functions and the cost minimization assumption made. Thereafter, empirical evidence is 
presented on cost implications of efficiency, quality of care, and risk-selection behaviour by 
providers. 
Provider Behaviour 
The goals and decision-making process of non-profit health care providers are not well 
described by the conventional profit maximization model of the competitive market. Various 
alternative models have tried to explain the incentives of non-profit providers (Barnum and 
Kutzin 1993). Generally, it is hypothesised that providers select a resource-mix for treatment 
within the technically feasible set and subject to budget constraints, which depend on the 
provider payment system (Weisbrod 1991). 
While it is expected that FFS payment lead to higher quality and quantities of care (Dor and 
Farley 1996), prospective payment encourages providers at the margin to use production 
processes that reduce cost rather than improve quality of care (Weisbrod 1991; Ellis and 
McGuire 1996). The institutional framework may constrain providers from reducing costs by 
reducing quality, for example through law liability for medical malpractice, and professional 
ethics and codes (Weisbrod 1991). But this is less likely in developing countries. Rather, in a 
resource constrained context, it is to be expected that given the imperfection of the agency 
relationship between providers and patients, providers might reduce dimensions of quality 
that are difficult for insurers and patients to monitor (Ellis and McGuire 1996). 
In the absence of a clear model of provider behaviour, it is rather difficult to interpret the link 
between cost and output in health care markets. 
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Cost Functions 
Most cost studies apply short-run variable cost functions. They provide a better picture of 
costs for a specific point of time than long-run functions (Wouters 1993), and assume costs to 
be minimized with respect to specific inputs (Scott and Parkin 1995). 
Cost studies use financial and production data to analyse costs, which are either generated in 
a step-down or an aggregated data approach. The latter uses average costs data based on 
aggregated central records. The step-down approach uses providers as the unit of analysis to 
estimate average cost of outputs (e. g. unit cost per visit) based on detailed cost and 
production process data. Fixed costs are allocated to the specific production functions and 
final service categories according to explicit allocation criteria; while treatment costs are 
attributed to the service category where they occur (Barnum and Kutzin 1993). 
In econometric analysis, total costs tend to be assessed in two common cost function 
specifications: `ad hoc' cost functions and production theoretic cost functions. `Ad hoc', 
accounting-based cost or `unit' cost studies are based on a linear function of possible cost 
determinants. Accounting studies generate a point in time estimate of total costs at a given 
output level, assuming that marginal costs are constant, and resulting in a direct and simple 
relation between an increase in an input component and a rise in total costs (Barnum and 
Kutzin 1993). 
Econometric cost functions are based on production-theoretic models and rely on the duality 
principle between production and cost functions. They serve to examine how total costs 
change in response to changes in service mix, inputs, factor prices, and scale of operations 
(Barnum and Kutzin 1993). The assumption is that firms minimize costs given their input 
factors and prices (Scott and Parkin 1995). 
Models such as the Cobb-Douglas or transcendental logarithmic (translog) form assume that 
variables. enter the equation multiplicatively rather than additively (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 
,j 99 1). Non-linear cost functions allow marginal costs to vary with the level of production 
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(Breyer 1987), yielding information on economic and technical efficiency (Barnum and 
Kutzin 1993). Due to the inherent restriction of unit elasticities of factor substitution in log- 
linear cost function, the translog function is mainly used in models with multi-product funs. 
The translog function allows unrestrictive modelling of elasticities of substitution. The 
model's flexible form causes them to differ at every data point (Greene 2000). 
Cost Minimization Behaviour 
In the context of studying public or private non-profit providers, the behavioural restriction of 
cost minimization imposed on models by the econometric cost function has weaknesses 
(Barnum and Kutzin 1993). Under certain institutional regimes, providers cannot or do not 
have the necessary incentives to minimize costs, particularly in the public sector or under 
FFS reimbursement. Cost-minimizing behaviour may be affected by the separation of 
ownership and management, as well as the lack of a competitive benchmark for performance 
comparison (Somanathan et al. 2000). 
According to Hansen and Zwanziger (1996), cost minimization is not in conflict with non- 
profit behaviour theories and the not-for-profit nature of public hospitals. It requires that 
providers are interested in using their resources efficiently to maximize the size of the output, 
consisting of quantity, quality, provider satisfaction, etc. (Hansen and Zwanziger 1996). 
Wouters (1993) recommends testing the cost minimization assumption when identifying 
inefficiencies in production. In a cost analysis of Nigerian health faculties, she selects 24 
facilities that appear to be technically efficient based on the criterion of at least 600 visits per 
health worker per year. An efficiency index comparing facilities' marginal productivity of 
high- and low-paid staff with their respective salary levels is computed to estimate eventual 
deviations from cost-minimizing behaviour. Findings indicate that overstaffing and 
underutilization of facilities contribute to inefficiency. The insignificant efficiency variable 
implies that deviations from cost minimization leave total cost unaffected (Wouters 1993). 
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A study of the Sri Lanka public health sector finds significant levels of variation in efficiency 
across facilities. Cost-minimization appears to be limited due to labour market conditions, 
such as an excess of physicians, and government rules affecting the choice of input factors. 
Low levels of public funding leads to input constraints resulting in low salaries and 
demotivation (Somanathan et al. 2000). 
Eakin and Kniesner (1988) find that the cost minimization assumption may yield misleading 
results when analysing the demand for hospital input factors in the USA. However, output 
factors are less sensitive to this assumption. Hence, cost-minimizing cost functions may be 
employed, even without necessarily assuming cost-minimizing behaviour (Eakin and 
Kniesner 1988). 
6.2.2 Empirical evidence 
The empirical application of translog models is limited by (i) small sample size, (ii) the 
absence of good data on factor prices, and (iii) zero-value observations. First, the increased 
flexibility through adding explanatory variables in their quadratic and interaction forms is 
gained at the cost of losing degrees of freedom, which is problematic at a small sample size. 
Explanatory variables could be aggregated into summary variables; though, this might result 
in aggregation of potentially heterogeneous variables. Second, the absence of reliable data on 
input prices leads to estimating the translog function under the restriction of linear 
homogeneity of factor prices, which may cause multicollinearity. Studies tend to ignore input 
prices if these are similar for all providers or if factor substitution is not calculated. Third, 
zero-value observations result in undefined explanatory variables. The zero-value problem 
can be circumvented in three possible ways: first, excluding zero-value observations; second, 
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substituting zero-values by a small number, generally by one's; or third, a Box-Cox 
transformation of all zero-values variable (Scott and Parkin 1995; Greene 2000)42 
The usefulness of the translog cost function has been tested in a cost study based on data 
from 76 Scottish NHS hospitals. The small sample size limits the number of explanatory 
variables. Zero-output values are substituted by one's; and explanatory variables are 
normalized before logarithmic transformation. Parameter results suggest that inpatient and 
outpatient discharges affect total costs significantly. Total cost is an increasing function of 
interventions and bed. The interaction term between outpatient visit and beds is negative and 
significant, implying that the outpatient impact on total costs depends negatively on the 
number of inpatient beds (Scott and Parkin 1995). 
Despite satisfactory results of a number of specification tests, the authors assume that their 
translog cost model is misspecified due to several insignificant explanatory variables, a 
highly significant intercept, and an unusually high R2, implying a model close to identity. The 
sensitivity of the results is tested by first running the same model on a different year data set; 
then, different cost function specifications are used, and insignificant explanatory variables 
are dropped, using backward stepwise regression. Finally, the model is run with interaction 
and squared variables excluded. All these different regressions produce the same test results 
(Scott and Parkin 1995). 
These findings suggest that the multicollinear and deterministic nature of the model could be 
due to limited variation in the way NHS hospitals produce their output, reflecting the 
similarity in how NHS hospitals are managed and financed. Hence, stochastic analysis might 
be inappropriate when deterministic behaviour is implicit and the authors recommend 
exploring the use of a nonparametric technique (Scott and Parkin 1995), which does not 
assume a specific distributional form of the error term nor of the structural relationship 
42 The Box-Cox transformation uses maximum-likelihood estimation to find the non-specified 
parameters in a regression model. It results in a cost model with a generalized translog functional form. 
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between the dependent and the explanatory variables. However, nonparametric procedures 
require a large sample size (Kennedy 1997; Greene 2000). 
Few cost studies have been conducted in low-income contexts. Most employ an accounting- 
based approach to estimate average costs per service unit and compare provider performance 
and relative efficiency, as well as cost-effectiveness of alternative interventions and 
economically efficient cost-recovery policies. The number of econometric cost studies is 
limited due to reasons such as provider data deficiencies that are too large to be absorbed in 
error terms; the unrealistic assumption of cost minimization; and the lack of a clear model of 
hospital behaviour to interpret the relation between cost and output (Barnum and Kutzin 
1993). 
Wouters (1993) applies the translog form of the generalized Cobb-Douglas bi-product cost 
function to estimate average, and marginal costs, economies of scale and scope in 24 
Nigerian health facilities that appear to be technically efficient. Results suggest that most 
providers operate below technically efficient activity levels; and staff is not used in a cost- 
minimizing way. In addition, facilities are operating below inpatient capacity, and reach a 
higher productivity level for outpatient than for inpatient care (Wouters 1993). 
Somanathan et al (2000) use a Cobb-Douglas function to examine efficiency based on data 
collected in 85 public sector facilities in Sri Lanka. Findings reveal a wide range of average 
costs per bed-day among facilities, which appears to be attributable to different occupancy 
rates, low output levels and an excess of physicians. Marginal costs are below average costs, 
indicating increasing returns to the variable factor and production levels on the downward 
slope of facilities' average cost curve. Thus, raising output would decrease average costs 
(Somanathan et al. 2000). 
Other studies conducted in low-income contexts suggest that providers rarely have 
diseconomies of scale, which could threaten their sustainability. Rather, their technical 
inefficiencies tend to be related to poor drug storage, inadequate drug prescriptions and staff 
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inflexibility, leading to waste of limited resources and production below capacity. It has been 
recommended to reduce inefficiencies by introducing institutional changes that address 
behavioural incentives set by financing mechanisms (Barnum and Kutzin 1993). This has led 
to concerns about whether efficiency-enhancing incentives could negatively affect the quality 
of care and cause patients to be excluded from care. 
Presumably, higher levels of quality care affect provider cost. Studies have evaluated the 
structural quality dimension in health care by describing the resources needed to provide care 
(Wouters 1991). The Nigerian analysis proxies quality of care by drug availability in 
facilities, assuming that better drug availability increases quality and total costs. Findings 
reveal that structural quality affects cost negatively, which is interpreted as a result of more 
efficient drug supply management (Wouters 1993). In Sri Lanka, physical quality is assessed 
by the facility's cleanliness, and structural quality encompasses the availability of equipment 
and drugs needed to provide services. The insignificant quality coefficient in the production 
function suggests that higher structural quality is not linked to lower production output level. 
Similar results from the cost function indicate that the level of structural quality does not 
seem to affect health facility cost (Somanathan et al. 2000). 
Researchers have evaluated the cost impact of different provider payment systems. The 
RAND study examines whether HMO providers' lower service use and lower treatment costs 
is caused by more efficient treatment or by providers' risk-selection of healthier members 
under prospective provider payment. Findings suggest that due to the financial incentives 
related to the payment system, HMOs provide a less intensive style of inpatient care than 
other plans; indicating a range of technically feasible treatment styles which could be used to 
increase efficiency in the production of care (Manning et al. 1987). 
Dor and Farley (1996) employ a generalized translog model and data from 331 US hospitals, 
to estimate a multi-product cost function in which case-mix adjusted outputs by provider 
payment source are treated as distinct outputs, in order to identify whether providers vary the 
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intensity of interventions in response to patients' payment sources. Findings suggest that 
patient treatment costs vary widely, and that these differences are systematically related to 
expected payment source. More generous insurance payment tends to be related to higher 
marginal costs compared with less generous payers such as Medicaid. The study concludes 
that providers behave as economic agents and are able to respond to financial incentives, 
thereby allocating resources accordingly on a case-by-case basis and within the range of what 
is clinically acceptable. Increasing insurance coverage will lead to increases in payer-specific 
resource-intensity, and will not necessarily be used to pick-up cost-shifting from other 
payment sources (Dor and Farley 1996). 
6.2.3 Cost and revenue structure 
Cost studies generally examine the cost structure, including marginal and average costs, as 
well as the extent to which scale and scope economies are generated (Barnum and Kutzin 
1993). These concepts are introduced and their purpose in this analysis is explained. 
Marginal Costs 
Marginal costs (MC) reflect the change in total costs (TC) at each output level (Q) as output 
increases by one more unit (Begg et al. 2000). MC are estimated at the mean value of an 
output level holding other outputs constant: 
(1) MC; = STC/SQ; 
where MC; is the marginal cost of producing an additional unit of the it' output (Barnum and 
Kutzin 1993). 
Dor and Farley (1996) estimate payer-specific MC based on generalized translog model 
results and at different output levels. In a translog function, MC is the elasticity of total cost 
with respect to payer-specific output (S1nTC/S1nQ; ) multiplied by the average cost for each 
output, or the payer-specific total costs C; divided by the total number of payer-specific 
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services Q; provided (Scott and Parkin 1995). The null hypothesis is that marginal costs are 
equal for the different payment sources. Findings suggest that significant differences between 
payer-specific MC depend on the point of output at which MC are evaluated, leading to the 
suggestion that providers discriminate patients' treatment intensity by payment source 
depending on their output level (Dor and Farley 1996). 
Average Costs 
In a single-product firm, average costs (AC) are simply defined as C(y)/yi, which is the total 
cost to produce output yj divided by the quantity of yj produced. In multi-product firms, there 
is no single meaningful definition of AC per output, mainly because there is no meaningful 
way to aggregate different types of services into a single output measure, and because total 
costs are influenced by the composition of the output-mix as well as the scale effect (Kass 
1987). 
Average incremental costs (AIC) is the multi-product firm analogue of average costs and is 
defined as the difference between the cost of producing all outputs (at some specified levels) 
and the cost of producing all of these outputs except the one being examined, e. g., C(yl, ...., 
yk) - C(O, y2,..., yk). The incremental cost of yj is divided by the quantity of the output yj in 
order to compute the AIC of this selected output (Grannemann et al. 1986), which is: 
(2) AIC1= TC(Y1, Y2,..., Yk) - TC(O, Y2, ..., Yk) /Yl 
This equation shows that total costs (TC) are allocated to one selected output Y1, which 
becomes problematic, when various outputs represent different shares of the total workload. 
Dor and Farley (1996) evaluate AIC for payer-specific outputs. The analysis yields 
implausible results, which leads them to examine economies of scale by comparing payer- 
specific MC at different production levels. Dranove (1998) uses AC calculated in a step- 
down approach, which was done by the Office of Health Planning and applied consistently 
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across providers. Kaas (1987) uses unit costs to describe AC per visit for each service 
category in home health care. 
Somanathan et al (2000) estimate AC to analyse operating efficiency in health facilities in Sri 
Lanka. The direct accounting-based allocation method serves to attribute total recurrent costs 
to inpatient and outpatient departments. Physicians' salary costs are allocated to inpatient and 
outpatient departments in proportion to their relative total hours worked in the two 
departments, respectively. The same time-based allocation method is used to distribute 
overhead costs. Drug costs are attributed to inpatient and outpatient based on a sample of 50 
drugs issued in the two departments. The AC estimations are calculated by dividing total 
department cost by the number of total services provided in this department. Comparable 
estimates occur, although not consistently, when calculating AIC based on Cobb-Douglas 
parameters (Somanathan et al. 2000). 
Economies of Scale and Returns to the Variable Factor 
Along the AC curve, scale measures refer to the output level of a firm. They identify whether 
output levels should be changed to reach economic efficiency. In the long run, a firm can 
adjust all inputs when changes occur, whereas in the short run, only partial adjustments are 
possible (Begg et al. 2000). Economies of scale (EOS) is a long-run cost concept, while in the 
short-run, returns to the variable input factor (RVF) are estimated (Barnum and Kutzin 1993). 
EOS measures the effect on cost C when output Y(i) increases generally, while the output 
mix remains unchanged and all inputs are allowed to vary (Barnum et al. 1995): 
(3) EOS=(1 -cc)/Eac, y( 
where ßA, B reflect the elasticity of A with respect to B (Barnum et al. 1995). 
Short-run RVF measures the effect on costs of a general increase in output when the output 
mix and bed size - as a proxy for scale - remain fixed. 
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Short-run product-specific returns to the variable factor (SPRVF) measures the effect on costs 
of a proportional increase in all inputs on the output of the it product while the level of 
output of all other products remains constant (Barnum and Kutzin 1993). There is no 
unambiguous definition of SPRVF, as there is no simple definition of the concept of AC in 
multi-product firms (Scott and Parkin 1995). SPRVF are calculated by dividing AICI of the 
specific variable by its MCI (Barnum and Kutzin 1993): 
(4) SPRVFI = AIC1/MC1= C(yt) / yj (dC/dyl) 
SPRVF exist if the result is greater than one (Barnum and Kutzin 1993). 
Scale measures are estimated along the average cost curve. Increasing AC with larger output 
size indicate decreasing return to scale, which is often related to more complex management 
or additional investment in larger firms (Begg et al. 2000). Increasing return to scale along 
the average curve's downward slope indicate that average costs fall with increasing output, 
leading to more efficient use of idle capacity (Dranove 1998). At the optimal short-run point, 
firms yield constant returns to the variable factor when MC equal AC (Barnum and Kutzin 
1993). 
Several studies analyse EOS. Dranove (1998) uses semi-parametric methods to estimate EOS 
in hospital cost centres when hospitals with different discharge volumes create mergers. EOS 
are estimated by varying costs parametrically with predictors such as wages, and non- 
parametrically with the output variable, such as discharges. The relative costs per discharge 
are expressed by unit costs and compared across hospitals' different cost centres at different 
discharge volumes. The relative percentage comparison of unit costs across discharge levels 
point to important scale economies. Hospitals with 7500 discharges have about 6% lower 
costs per discharge than hospitals with 5000 discharges (Dranove 1998). 
Dor and Farley (1996) examine scale effects by comparing product-specific MC values by 
payment source at different levels of patient discharges (at 75,90,110 and 125 percent of the 
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mean values of total discharges). They find payer-specific differences in MC caused by 
payer-specific differences in treatment intensity. Medicaid MC are substantially lower but 
rise with facility size while other payer-specific MC (Medicare and private insurance) 
decrease, implying that providers modify treatment intensity to adjust MC to the expected 
reimbursement level (Dor and Farley 1996). 
This overview of the literature related to production costs in health shows that studies have 
tested the validity of different structural cost functions to estimate how explanatory variables 
affect total provider cost. Although it may be difficult for providers to minimize cost, 
deviations from the cost-minimizing assumption made in econometric cost functions should 
not significantly affect cost results. Findings on efficiency concepts suggest that output 
levels, quality of care, and payer-specific financial incentives affect costs. The absence of a 
meaningful definition of AC in a multi-product firm has led others to estimate scale 
economies based on the accounting based step-down direct allocation method and by varying 
MC and AC across different output levels. 
6.3 Providers in study area 
The study area covers three Rwandan health districts (Byumba, Kabgayi and Kabutare) with 
54 heath centres, of which each contracts with one MM. The analysis is limited to 52 HC, of 
which 58 % are publicly owned, and 42 % are church-owned. Two HC are excluded due to 
incomplete data. 
Rwandan health centres are multi-product firms. Nurses provide basic care to insured and 
uninsured patients. Service delivery is influenced by the availability of medical infrastructure 
and input factors, by the population's overall health and socio-economic conditions, and by 
the incentives set by the health financing system. HC total costs consist of personnel (52%) 
and drug costs (32%). 
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Expressing each intervention's relative share of total activities is an imperfect aggregation 
(Kass 1987). However, it shows that HC total workload includes curative consultations43 to 
insured patients (10%), and to uninsured patients (35%), child vaccination (42%), which is 
provided at no charge to patients independent of their insurance status, and prenatal care 
consultations (8%). Inpatient care is relatively less important, and provided by 47 of 52 HC. 
On average, HC have 5 beds. Inpatient services constitute about 5% of total interventions 
(insured admissions (0.4%), uninsured admissions (3.7%), insured deliveries (0.1%), and 
uninsured deliveries (0.9%)). 
Assuming that HC are staffed and geographically located to provide 0.5 consultations per 
inhabitant per year, then the average HC should provide 10,437 consultations per year. This 
is almost twice as much as the reported annual average of 5,946 consultations. In 2000, only 
8 of the 52 HC surpassed the assumed norm, implying that 44 operated below capacity. 
HC revenue stems from government, donors and the population. Donor and government 
subsidies contribute about 30% of total HC revenue in form of salaries of government-posted 
nurses44 and drugs. Providers depend on revenue from the population (70% of total revenue 
in church and 62% in public facilities) to pay for their operating costs. 
Revenue from the population includes user fees paid by uninsured patients for services and 
drugs received; and monthly MHI capitation payment depending on the number of MITI 
members in the partner MHI pool, and insured patients' co-payments. The financial 
dependency on revenue from patients sets HC an incentive to behave like private sector 
providers. The incentive to oversupply care to user fee paying patients is limited by patients' 
ability to pay. Capitation payment by MIII sets the incentive to HC to produce efficiently, as 
well as to avoid high cost patients and to under-service poorly informed patients (Newhouse 
1996). 
43 In this chapter, consultation is used as a synonym for visit to health centre. 44 On average, 2 nurses are paid by government sources leaving the remaining staff costs to be 
financed by population revenue. Donors do not pay salaries but tend to pay mark-ups in the amount of 20% of net salary. 
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HC retain and manage all their revenue sources, and no financial auditing exists. They 
reinvest part of their surplus in covering recurrent costs, infrastructure costs, and hiring of 
personnel. All 52 HC have accumulated bank savings, which they keep in anticipation of 
"worse times", that is when the government and donors stop paying salary and salary 
bonuses. The attitude prevails that these subsidies are not to be taken as a guaranteed revenue 
sources. It leads HC to select input factors, such as staff and drugs, based on anticipated 
population revenue and in order to minimize eventual losses. 
6.4 Model specification, methods and data 
6.4.1 Specification of cost function 
The health centre is the unit of analysis. The analytical framework employs an econometric 
cost function allowing identification of payer-specific outputs. In a payer-specific analysis, 
total costs rise with total volume of services provided on a payer-specific basis (Dor and 
Farley 1996), which is: 
(1) TC = c(X1 Mi Q1 , X2 M2 Q2) ... ), 
where TC reflects total costs, Xl is the number of services provided to patients by payment 
source, MI represents the case-mix adjustment index for patients severity of illness, and Q1 is 
a quality index, reflecting the payer-specific treatment intensity of patients. Factor prices are 
excluded from the cost function. They are fixed by the Ministry of Health for staff and drugs, 
and do not vary across health facilities45. 
Patients' demand for medical care X (P, Q) is a function of prices P charged by providers, the 
quality of care Q provided and other variables. 
as Donors follow the MOH salary scale when paying bonuses to health centre employees. However, it 
is unknown to what extent salary levels vary in reality due to eventual 'under-the-table' payments 
made to staff by user fee-paying patients. 
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Quality is defined by the term `service intensity' which is provided within a range of 
treatment options that are consistent with `appropriate' medical practice. The underlying 
rationale is that clinical criteria about medical appropriateness vary (Dor and Farley 1996). 
In equation (2), quality of care Q directly affects MC of care provided. Assuming that output 
X has been risk-adjusted by M, then the first order condition for expected cost minimization 
with respect to output X implies providers to select a quality of care level Q, where MC of 
producing quality equals the marginal revenue (MR) from additional quality by payer-source. 
Payer-specific marginal costs MC; at a given quality level are defined as the derivative of TC 
with respect to X; adjusted by case-mix M;, which formally is (Dor and Farley 1996): 
(2) MC; = STC / 6(M; X) = c'(. ) Q;. 
Payer-specific quality Q; suggests that quality differences exist on the basis of different 
resource intensities. If providers do not discriminate on this basis, then QMHI = Q.,, f..  and 
differences in treatment costs would reflect differences in case mix. 
If HC are able to differentiate treatment across payment source, then they will select payer- 
specific levels of resource intensity that equate MC and MR in each payer segment (Dor and 
Farley 1996). As a result, richer and generously user-fee paying patients might receive more 
quality, and resource intensive treatment resulting in higher MC. 
Capitation payment without case-mix adjustment could lead to less intensive care, lower 
quality and MC. If this less intensive treatment of insured patients is within medical quality 
standards, then related cost reduction is expected to cause productivity gains, triggered by the 
financial incentives set by the prospective payment system (Dor and Farley 1996). It could 
also be that providers' quality discrimination in response to capitation causes dumping and 
skimping of insured patients, resulting in lower MC and medically inappropriate treatment 
(Ellis and McGuire 1996). 
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The data set available does not provide any criteria to judge whether eventual lower MC for 
insured patients are a result of providers' less intense treatment within or beyond the range of 
quality standards in health centres. Therefore, findings from additional data sources will be 
used to interpret results. Assumptions made on quality of care are presented below. 
6.4.2 Model assumptions 
The analysis is based on five assumptions: cost minimization, similar patient case-mix among 
HC, exogenous demand for care, similar structural quality, and HC are informed about their 
cost and revenue. 
First, cost-minimizing behaviour implies that HC can choose all input factors at their cost- 
minimizing levels to produce a certain output level at the minimum possible cost (Begg et al. 
2000). The analysis assumes that providers have an incentive to minimize cost when 
reimbursed under capitation payment (Kass 1987), and deviations from cost-minimizing 
behaviour may not influence total cost in a significant way (Wouters 1993). 
Second, it is assumed that HC face the same overall health and socio-economic factors, 
resulting in similar case-mix with patients reporting similar severities of illness across HC 
and independent of their insurance status. No adverse selection among the insured is 
assumed. This assumption is based on the 1998 annual report of the MOH, which identified 
that the majority (88 percent) of health encounters in HC suffered of one of the five most 
frequent diagnoses. 
Household survey findings suggest that a significantly larger proportion among the uninsured 
reported illness during the two weeks preceding the interview (27%) than among the insured 
(21 %). But, the uninsured are five times less likely to visit a HC when sick, and they wait 
significantly longer than the insured until they seek care. Hence, uninsured patients might be 
more severely ill than the insured who receive treatment more regularly and at the onset of 
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illness. Thus, caution should be applied when assuming similar severity of illness among the 
insured and uninsured. The analysis could control for patients' severity if payer-specific case- 
mix data were available on a HC level. 
Third, based on the production theory model, it is assumed that the level of care provided is 
determined exogenously by patients' demand for care, and providers behave as perfect agents 
for patients (Scott and Parkin 1995). Two arguments justify this assumption: first, uninsured 
patients' limited financial ability reduces the incentive set by user fees to oversupply care; 
and second, capitation payment sets an incentive for providers to be efficient. 
Fourth, structural quality including equipment and supplies in HC and qualification of 
medical staff is assumed to be similar across HC, independent of payer-status. This 
assumption is based on findings from the household survey where the same proportion (68%) 
among insured and uninsured patients said that the HC always had drugs available. Outcome 
quality describes the effect from treatment on health status; it is a multi-dimensional concept 
(Wouters 1991) and is excluded from this analysis. 
Fifth, a major assumption is that providers are aware of the cost implications of different 
treatment styles, know their revenue situation, and that differentiated treatment is technically 
feasible, allowing providers to allocate resources in response to the financial incentives set by 
expected payment sources. This assumption is based on observations made during field visits 
and workshops with HC nurses. Due to providers' dependence on revenue from insured and 
uninsured patients, HC keep detailed treatment notes to estimate the amount they would have 
received if the insured patient were uninsured. Though, payer-specific patient treatment 
behaviour may be too costly to apply, and nurses might instead follow standard treatment 
protocols, for all patients. 
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6.4.3 Data and variables 
The analysis uses data on service use, costs and finances collected monthly from 52 HC 
during the first year in which MHI has been in effect (8/99 - 7/00). For each HC, data were 
collected on the number of services (curative consultations, prenatal care visits, vaccinations, 
deliveries, inpatient admissions, lab tests) provided to insured and uninsured patients and the 
total amount of drugs sold to insured and to uninsured patients; the monthly total amount of 
HC expenses for drugs bought at the district pharmacy; the total amount of HC expenses for 
fixed costs, such as personnel and other recurrent costs (electricity, water, fuel, etc); and the 
total amount of monthly HC revenue from each payment source: government, donors, user 
fees payments, MHI capitation revenue and co-payments from insured patients. 
Based on detailed HC data, an accounting-based step-down approach was used to conduct a 
disaggregated data analysis by insured and uninsured line of business in each HC. First, the 
total number of detailed service use, including preventive and curative care, lab tests, 
inpatient admissions and deliveries, was identified for each line of business. Second, insured 
and uninsured patients' drug consumption was registered and summarized based on detailed 
patient drug prescription records. Accordingly, the total value of drugs sold to insured and to 
uninsured patients, was summarized for each line of business. Third, overhead, including 
personnel and other recurrent costs were allocated to each line of business in proportion to 
their respective total number of services used. It results in payer-specific total costs by 
insured and uninsured patients. 
Table 6.1 contains definitions and descriptive statistics for the variables used 
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Table 6.1: Variable definition and descriptives (N = 52), (8/1999 - 7/2000) 
Variable Definition Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total HC recurrent costs (RWF) C , 170,393 3,047,893 1,846,899 14,100,000 
Total number insured curative 
consultations M 1294.25 1272.09 126 6434 
Total number uninsured curative 
onsultation CNM 652.42 3068.96 1067 14107 
Total number preventive care 
visits (vaccination and prenatal) PREY 559.73 590.85 1942 18570 
otal number inpatient services 
deliveries and admissions) INPAT 77.81 75.05 1 3739 
otal number MHI members end 
of 1st MHI year (30/06/00) MHI 1668.12 1619.8 04 711 
HI curative visits per member 
er year (MHI visit rate) Mpcap 1.531 . 582 . 626 3.095 
Uninsured curative visits per 
uninsured per year (Uninsured 
visit rate) NMpcap 0.285 . 262 . 056 1.189 
/o of total revenue from MHI PrMrev . 120 . 080 10.019 . 332 
/o of total revenue from user fees PrNMrev . 533 . 121 . 253 . 773 
caner dummy (1 =public, 
)=church) . 577 . 499 1 
og of TC InTC 15.310 . 541 14.429 16.463 
-og of 
CM InCM . 847 . 792 . 836 . 769 
-og of 
CNM InCNM . 256 ). 620 . 973 . 554 
-og of PREV 
InPREV . 662 ). 502 . 571 . 829 
og of INPAT InINPAT . 727 1.984 . 000 . 227 
og of MHI InMHI . 079 . 836 . 318 . 072 Note: Exchange Rate: USD 1=RWF390 in June 2000 
Total recurrent cost (TC) in HC is the dependent variable, calculated as the sum of the two 
payer-specific total costs. The logarithmic transformation of variables reduces problems 
related to heteroskedasticity in error terms and multicollinear variables, which yields 
inefficient least square estimators when OLS is applied (Breyer 1987). Therefore, TC enters 
the equation in its logarithmic form. 
Output is measured by the number of curative and preventive care consultations in their 
logarithmic form: insured consultations (InCM), uninsured consultations (InCNM), and 
preventive care visits (InPREV), which includes total child vaccination and prenatal care 
consultations. The inpatient variable (INPAT) is computed by aggregating HC admissions 
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and deliveries into one inpatient variable. Four HC report zero-output values for (INPAT). 
One version replaces these zero-output values by l's before logarithmic transformation. In 
another version, these 4 health centres are excluded. 
The MIR pool size is a proxy to identify whether smaller Mill pools suffer from adverse 
selection leading to higher HC costs. A larger MHI pool could also reflect a better performing 
HC: people may choose to enrol in MHI or not, based on the reputation of the partnering HC. 
Under capitation payment, the size of the MHI revenue proportion in HC corresponds to the 
MHI pool size. Therefore, and following Dranove (1998), Model 3 includes measures of the 
percentage of total HC revenue from insured (PrMrev) and uninsured patients (PrNMrev). 
PrMrev includes monthly capitation payments and insured patients' co-payments of RWF 
100 per new visit46. PrNMrev contains user-fee revenue. The sum of PrMrev and PrNMres is 
<1 as total HC revenue also includes donor and government funding. The different payment 
sources as a proportion of total revenue are expected to reveal the cost impact of large or 
small MHI pools as well as large or small numbers of user-fee paying patients. It is expected 
that the financial risk caused by adverse selection becomes less of an issue with growing 
MI-11 pool size. Hence, the association between TC and MHI revenue proportion (PrMrev) is 
expected to be negative. The variable on the user fee revenue proportion (PrNMrev) tests the 
hypothesis that with increasing user fee revenue, HC have fewer incentives to minimize 
costs, and a positive coefficient would be anticipated (Kass 1987). 
The ownership dummy (0) (church-owned or public HC) helps to inform why observed costs 
eventually deviate from the theoretical minimum The economic interpretation is that the 
dummy represents the overhead costs in multiplicative form of a public HC. The null 
hypothesis is that there is no difference in the overhead costs between church and public HC. 
In the sensitivity test, the ownership dummy is interacted with payer-specific output variables 
to examine whether church and public facilities have different slopes expressed by different 
46 RWF 100 = USD 0.30 in 1999. 
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payer-specific MC of consultations in church and in public HC. MC in HC are expected to be 
equal because of similar consultation-staff ratios. 
Too many explanatory variables will decrease the degrees of freedom, which is problematic 
in this analysis given the already small sample size of 52 facilities. Therefore, the number of 
explanatory variables is limited. Annex Table A6.6 presents variables for the restricted model 
based on 47 HC. 
6.4.4 Model definition 
The analytical strategy employed is based on equations (1) and (2). First, on a HC level, the 
factors that affect HC total recurrent cost are evaluated. Second, it examines the extent to 
which payer-specific utilisation of services will affect HC cost structures. 
A general-to-specific modelling approach is used, beginning with a translog model and 
testing linear restrictions to arrive at a log-linear functional form and the most parsimonious 
model. While the translog functional form permits flexibility to represent any relationship 
between costs and outputs, other functional forms, such as the Cobb-Douglas, restrict the 
shape of the cost curves and may distort estimates of marginal costs. However, the increased 
flexibility through a translog given by the higher order terms is gained at the cost of the 
number of parameters to be estimated, which is one of the main limitations of the translog 
and particularly important with small sample sizes. In order for the model to retain sufficient 
degrees of freedom, output variables tend to be aggregated; though this has been debated 
(Scott and Parkin 1995). Usually, a translog model is estimated by imposing the restriction of 
homogeneity in factor prices, since labour input prices tend to be similar in the public sector. 
The equation can then be estimated by OLS; but multicollinearity remains an issue. However, 
excluding the input price variable as well as aggregating variables improves the degrees of 
freedom (Scott and Parkin 1995). In this analysis, due to the small number of observations of 
52 health centres, adding too many independent variables was problematic. . 
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The analysis regresses in a multi-product cost function total recurrent health centre cost on 
curative consultations defined by payment source and a series of other independent variables 
that may relate with cost. Considering the relative small sample size, the function is 
simplified by evaluating the relevance of individual variables through statistical tests on 
restrictions (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1991). This is shown in the following model-building 
approach. 
Model 1 estimates equation (3) in a translog functional form 
(3) Ln(TC) =a+ (illn(CM) + ß2ln(CNM) + (331n(MHI) + (i41n(CM)ln(CNM) + 
ß51n(CM)111(MW+ ß61n(CNM)1n( 
". 
ý ß7(I11CM)2 + ß8(lri"N". "J2 + F'9(l'ý"'I"JZ + F'10o +e 
Due to the small sample size of 52 HC, only most relevant output variables are included. The 
logarithm of total HC costs (TC) is regressed on the logarithm of curative consultation by 
payment source (CM) and (CNM), on the logarithm of MHI size (NW, on their interactive 
and square terms and on the HC ownership dummy (0). c is a random disturbance term. 
Interaction terms reveal the effect on TC, conditioned on the relationship between the two 
outputs. The squared output terms show whether TC is an increasing function of outputs 
(Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1991). MC are estimated as linear combinations of the parameter 
values and the related mean values of explanatory variables (Scott and Parkin 1995). 
To avoid losing too many degrees of freedom and due to zero value observations, preventive 
care visits (PREV) and inpatient services (INPAT) were excluded from the translog model. If 
they affect TC, then their omission can produce a bias as well as larger standard errors 
(Mukherjee et al. 1998). Results show that based on this data set, the translog model yields 
unsatisfactory explanatory power, and the model was abandoned. 
Model 2 employs a log-linear cost function, which allows using an unlimited variety of 
functions (Greene 2000). This function does not require higher order terms, which gives 
place to include other parameters that can be estimated. Therefore, in addition to the 
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explanatory variables used in Model 1, preventive care (PREV) is included. In analogy with 
Model 1, the logarithm of TC is regressed on the logarithmic form of insured (CM) and 
uninsured curative consultations (CNM), preventive care (PREV), the number of MHI 
members (MHI), and on the ownership dummy (0). Strong correlation between MHI and CM 
leads to the formulation of Model 3. 
Model 3 contains a log-linear cost function. Following Dranove (1998), the MIR variable is 
replaced by measures of the percentage of total provider charges accounted for by user fees 
(PrNMrev) and by insured patients (PrMrev). The logarithm of total HC costs (TC) is 
regressed on the logarithm of insured curative consultations (CM), of uninsured curative 
consultations (CNM), of preventive care services (PREV), on the proportion of MHI revenue 
(PrMrev) and on the proportion of user fee revenue (PrNMrev), and on the HC ownership 
dummy (0). c is a random disturbance term. The functional form can be written as: 
(4) Ln(TC) = a+ (illn(CM)+ (321n(CNM)+ (331n(PREV)+ (34(prMrev) + 05(prNMrev) + 
ß6o+ E 
Modifications of Model 3 are estimated. 
6.4.5 Estimation procedures 
The analysis is performed in STATA7. All variables have been visually examined in 
histograms to identify skewness before logarithmic transformation. Parameter estimates are 
obtained using ordinary least square (OLS) regression. 
Heteroskedasticity in an OLS regression results in inefficient least square estimators and 
inappropriate covariance matrix, although the estimator will remain unbiased and consistent. 
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Therefore, Goldfeld-Quandt tests47 are performed on each explanatory variable to identify 
eventual heteroskedasticity in the disturbance term and to test whether OLS is valid (Pindyck 
and Rubinfeld 1991). The null hypothesis of homoskedasticity cannot be rejected for the 
included variables. Each model is further tested by the Breusch-Pagan or Cook and Weisberg 
test for heteroskedasticity48. The Ramsay RESET test identifies model misspecification and 
non-linearity (Kennedy 1997), which would cause biased least square estimates. 
For the cost structure analysis, the 52 HC are ranked according to their total consultations and 
divided into three groups with low, medium and high output levels. For each group, the 
following variables are calculated at their respective mean value: insured consultations, 
uninsured consultations, MHI pool size, payer-specific marginal and unit costs, as well as 
total number of curative consultations per staff per year. Results describe the "average HC" 
within its respective group and do not characterize providers that deviate unusually from the 
average (Dor and Farley 1996). 
Based on the log-linear model, payer-specific MC are estimated to examine payer-specific 
treatment intensity49. Following Dor and Farley (1996), payer-specific marginal costs MC(i) 
for consultations are estimated as a linear combination of payer-specific elasticity estimates 
from the log-linear regression and their respective AC for consultations. Formally, this is: 
(5) MC(i) = 3(i) (C(i)/y(i)); 
where (i) = insured or uninsured patients; ß(i) = elasticities of cost with respect to insured or 
uninsured consultations; C(i) = payer-specific costs calculated based on a step-down 
The sample is divided into three ranges containing the 3/8 of the observations with the smallest values of the X variable (lower part of the regression), the 3/8 of the observations of the largest values 
(upper part), and V4 in the middle. After fitting regression lines to the lower and upper part, the 
Goldfeld-Quandt test compares their respective residual sum of square (RSS) and degrees of freedom 
(n) in an F-test. F (n1, n2) = (RSS2 / n2) / (RSS1 / n1), where subscript 1= values from lower regression 
part, and subscript 2= upper part RSS and n. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected if the residual 
variances associated with the lower and upper part of the regression are equal. 48 The STATA command `heftest' was originally written following a 1983 article in Biometrika by 
Cook and Weisberg. The same test was derived by Breusch and Pagan in Econometrica (1979). In 
econometrics, the test performed by the 'hettest' command is known as the Breusch-Pagan test for 
heteroskedasticity. 
49 In the translog model, payer-specific marginal costs would need to account for the interaction term. 
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accounting approach; and y(i) = number of payer-specific curative consultations in HC. F- 
tests are performed to test the null hypotheses of no significant difference between payer- 
specific MC of consultations, and of no significant difference in respective MC across HC 
output levels. 
When calculating AIC using parameters and respective mean values of explanatory variables, 
implausible results are encountered. This is due to the "small number problem": insured 
consultations represent only about 20% of total consultations, but the AIC methodology 
allocates 100% of total overhead costs to insured consultations even though they use 
considerably less overhead costs. This problem does not occur when calculating AC 
following the step-down approach, where overhead costs are allocated to insured and 
uninsured patients, based on their utilisation of services. 
This analysis examines payer-specific AC; per curative visit following the approaches 
selected by Kass5° (1987), Dor and Farleys' (1996), and Dranove (1998), by dividing payer- 
specific recurrent costs C; by the total number of payer-specific curative consultations y;. 
(6) AC; = C1/y1 
F-tests are performed to test the null hypotheses of no significant difference between AC 
between the insured and uninsured curative consultations, and of no significant difference in 
AC across the three HC output level groups. 
Levels of short run product-specific returns to the variable factor (SPRVF) are analysed to 
examine HC capacity levels, following the approaches used by Dor and Farley (1996) and 
Dranove (1998). The percentage changes in payer-specific MC of consultations across HC 
output levels are compared. F-test results are interpreted by comparing MC as well as unit 
costs across output levels. 
so Kass calculated providers' total costs as the sum of the reported cost per visit multiplied by number 
of visit per category, TC =E (C; / y; ) * y; 
51 Dor and Farley did not report average incremental cost (AIC) as they encountered implausible 
results. 
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Additional insight is sought on HC technical efficiency by comparing the total number of 
curative consultation per staff per year across the three output groups and at their mean 
values. The total number of staff is estimated by dividing on a HC level the total personnel 
cost per month (including gross salary, bonuses, and primes) by RWF 30,000, an amount that 
corresponds to the average monthly gross personnel cost of a nurse or midwife in a HC. 
Studies estimate economies of scope52 to compare efficiency gains of joint or separated 
production, for example, of outpatient and inpatient care services (Somanathan et al. 2000). 
In Rwanda, providing care to either insured or uninsured patients is not an option, so this 
measure is not investigated. 
6.5 Results 
6.5.1 Findings from econometric models 
Findings are reported on the two cost functions as well as on the cost structure analysis. 
Sensitivity results of the second model are presented in the section thereafter. 
Model 1: Transcendental Logarithmic Functional Form 
Table 6.2 presents the parameter estimates resulting from the transcendental logarithmic 
functional form estimated with OLS regression. 
52 If calculated, the equation would be: Scope = {exp(1nTC ^) + exp(InTCCM^) - exp(1nTC^)) / 
exp(InTCA) 
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Table 6.2: Results: translog cost function model 1 (8/1999 - 7/2000) 
InTC Coef. Std. Err. t P> t 
InCM 2.568 . 430 1.060 . 
297 
InCNM 0.747 1.980 0.380 . 708 
nMHI 3.435 . 247 1.530 . 
134 
0.091 . 103 0.880 . 381 
nCM * InCM 0.057 . 323 0.180 . 861 
nCNM * InCNM . 141 . 125 1.130 . 
263 
nMHI * InMHI 0.380 . 290 1.310 ). 198 
nCM * InCNM ). 031 . 281 ). 110 
). 914 
InCM * InMHI . 472 . 580 . 
810 ). 420 
nCNM* InMHI 0.167 . 238 0.700 . 487 
cons 11.996 9.494 1.260 . 214 
N= 52, R-sq = 0.765, adj. R-sq = 0.708, F(10,41) = 13.35 
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity: 
chi2(1) = 0.03; p>chi2 = 0.857 
Ramsey RESET test: F(3,38) = 2.22; p>F = 0.102 
Due to the interaction and squared functional form, these parameters do not lend themselves 
to direct interpretation. None of the output terms is significantly related to TC, which 
hampers a meaningful interpretation of this model. The Breusch-Pagan test for 
heteroskedasticity returns a low and insignificant Chit value, which is consistent with the null 
hypothesis result of homoskedasticity found in the Goldfeld-Quandt test. Although the 
RESET test result is not significant and the null hypothesis of no model misspecification 
cannot be rejected, this value is higher than the RESET test result in the following log-linear 
model, suggesting that the translog functional form is more likely to be exposed to a non- 
linearity or a model misspecification problem. The model RZ of 0.765 is high for a cross 
sectional study. However, the insignificant t-ratios for all explanatory variables in 
combination with high standard errors suggest that there is model misspecification or 
multicollinearity, which is not captured by the test statistics. The Pearson Correlation Matrix 
in Table A6.1 shows high correlation between MHI and insured consultations (CM). The 
small sample size of 52 HC and the large number of regressors raise concerns about the 
remaining degrees of freedom and in combination with multicollinearity may account for the 
large variances. Other studies have found that a log-linear model performs almost as well as 
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a translog flexible functional form and is easier to interpret (Wouters 1993; Somanathan et al. 
2000). 
Model 2: Log-linear Functional Form I 
Model 2 presents a log-linear functional form to estimate total recurrent costs with OLS 
regression and by using the same data and variables. Table 6.3 presents results. All 
explanatory variables have a significant impact on total HC costs, except ownership. 
Table 6.3: Results: log-linear cost function model 2 (8/1999 - 7/2000) 
InTC Coef. Std. Err. P>jtj 
nCM . 399 0.133 . 000 . 004 
InCNM 0.519 . 080 . 480 . 001 
InPREV 0.212 0.104 . 040 ). 047 
nMHI 0.264 . 129 2.050 ). 046 
public 0.071 0.096 0.730 ). 468 
cons 8.372 ). 891 9.400 . 001 
N= 52 R-sq = 0.74 adj R-sq = 0.71 F(5,46) = 25.95 
reusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity: 
chi2(1) = 1.04 p>chi2 = 0.31 
RESET: F(3,43) = 1.27 p>F = 0.296 
The model behaves well with a R2 of 0.74. The parameter elasticity results show that a one- 
percent increase in uninsured consultations (1nCNM) increases total costs by 0.52%, whereas 
a one percent increase in insured consultation (InCM) leads to 0.4% cost increase. The 
insignificant Wald test result53 indicates that the null hypothesis of no significant difference 
between the cost impact of insured and uninsured consultation cannot be rejected. Preventive 
care visits affect costs significantly but to a lesser extent. HC total cost is a negative function 
of MHI pool size (InMHI), suggesting that a one percent increase in MM membership will 
cause total HC costs to decrease by 0.26%. This could mean that a larger MHI pool suffers 
from less adverse selection. The insignificant ownership dummy suggests similar overhead 
costs in public and church-owned HC. 
51 Wald Test after regression: Ho: 1nCM=1nCNM: F( 1,46) = 0.47, P<0.497 
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Although the Breusch-Pagan and the RESET test are both insignificant, implying that the 
model does not suffer of heteroskedasticity or misspecification, there appears to be high 
correlation between MHI size and the number of insured consultations (see Table A6.2). 
Kennedy (1997) suggests not to worry about multicollinearity if the variances are not 
exceedingly high and if the t-statistics are all greater than 2, which is the case as shown in 
Table 6.3. 
Model 3: Log-linear Functional Form II 
Model 3 in Table 6.4 is a slight modification of Model 2 (see equation 4). Following the 
methodology applied by Kass (1987), and on the grounds of high correlation between insured 
consultations (CM) and MHI pool size, the MII pool size variable is replaced by two proxy 
variables expressing the proportional revenue contributions in HC from MHI (PrMrev) and 
from user fees (PrNMrev). Table A6.3 shows that the correlation between (PrMrev) and 
insured consultations is considerably less (0.55). 
The logarithm of total HC recurrent costs (InTC) is regressed on the logarithm of insured 
consultations (1nCM), of uninsured consultations (InCNM), of preventive care services 
(InPREV), the proportion of capitation MHI revenue (PrMrev), the proportion of fee-for- 
service revenue from uninsured patients (PrNMrev), and on a facility ownership dummy (0). 
Table 6.4 presents results. 
The model behaves well with a R2 of 0.79. The elasticities of costs with respect to insured 
(1nCM) and uninsured consultations (1nCNM) are likewise positive and significant. The 
insignificant Wald test result54 indicates no significant difference between the cost-impact of 
these consultations. Analysis of the cost structure is needed to examine whether patients 
receive treatment of the same resource intensity, and where along the respective cost curves 
consultations are provided. 
54 Ho: (3(1nCM) = ß(1nCNM); F (1,45) = 0.18; P<0.673. 
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Table 6.4: Results: log-linear cost function model 3 (8/1999 - 7/2000) 
InTC Coef. Std. Err. t P> t 
InCM . 395 . 080 . 930 . 001 
InCNM . 327 0.101 
3.260 . 002 
InPREV . 148 . 083 1.800 . 079 
PrMrev 3.115 0.777 4.010 . 001 
PrNMrev . 049 ). 416 . 120 . 
907 
0.058 ). 087 0.660 . 510 
cons . 994 10.791 
11.370 . 001 
N= 52 R-sq=0.79 adj R-sq=0.763 F(6,45) = 28.33 
Breusch-Pagan for heteroskedasticity: 
chi2(1) = 1.24; p>chi2 = 0.266 
RESET: F(3,42)= 1.81; p>F = 0.161 
Provider costs seem to be significantly lower as their proportion of MHI revenue increases 
with a larger MHI membership pool. Under capitation payment, this may be a direct result of 
providers mitigating their financial risk related to MIR patients (e. g. adverse selection) over a 
larger MI-11 membership pool. Other explanatory variables, namely preventive care visits 
(1nPREV), the share of user fee revenues (PrNMrev) and HC ownership (0) are not 
significantly related to costs, suggesting that user fees do not appear to set any incentives to 
providers that would affect costs; and, there seems no relation between total costs and facility 
ownership (public or church-owned) or the total number of preventive care services provided. 
The test statistics show similar findings as in Model 2. The Breusch-Pagan and the RESET 
test are insignificant, suggesting that the two hypotheses of homoskedasticity and of correct 
model specification cannot be rejected. The higher F-statistics and R2 combined with three 
significant parameter results, lower standard errors and lower correlation factors, indicate that 
Model 3 provides more efficient estimates than the two previous models. 
The robustness of Model 3 is checked. Table 6.5 presents parameter results for three 
variations of Model 3. 
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Table 6.5: Results of variations of model 3 (8/1999 - 7/2000) 
Version 1 Version 2 ersion 3 
InTC Coef. Std. Err. Coef. td. Err. Coef. td. Err. 
InCM 0.363*** (0.08) . 329*** 
(0.08) . 405*** ( 0.100) 
InCNM . 357*** (0.099) . 368*** 
(0.102) . 404*** (0.128) 
InPREV 0.102 (0.084) ). 162 (0.103) . 140 (0.084) 
InINPAT . 037 (0.02) ). 014 
(0.043) 
InMHi 
PrMrev 2.906*** (0.763) 2.767*** (0.743) 3.471 *** (0.848) 
PrNMrev 0.095 (0.411) 0.226 (0.417) 0.023 
-0.073 (0.085) 0.105 (0.088) 1.304 1.321) 
nCM_O . 005 0.106) 
nCNM_O 0.168 (0.153) 
cons 9.221 *** (0.778) . 967*** (0.868) . 418*** 0.961) 
R-squared .8 .8 .8 
Nbr HC 52 7 2 
RESET (F) 1.4 1.09 1.59 
P> F . 257 . 366 . 207 
Breusch-Pagan 1.14 . 32 1.53 
P> chi2 . 286 . 574 . 216 
Note: HC=HC, C- total curative consultations, MHI=Micro-Health Insurance, MC-marginal costs, CM=insured 
curative consultation, CNM=uninsured curative consultation, O=Ownership. Significance test: *** Sig p<0.01; 
**Sig P <0.05; 
Variables that are not significant in Model 3 are included or excluded, to check for possible 
over-fitting of the model. Compared to Model 3, the first and second versions add the 
inpatient variable. Version 2 excludes HC with zero-values for inpatient care. Version 3 
excludes the inpatient variable and adds two interaction terms between the ownership dummy 
and insured or uninsured consultations. The three versions have similar parameter results that 
look in the same direction, and comparable standard errors and significance levels. 
Generally, the three versions behave well with R2 of 0.8. Test results for the Ramsey RESET 
and the Breusch-Pagan test are insignificant, implying the hypotheses of no model 
misspecification and homoskedasticity cannot be rejected. Wald test results suggest that the 
hypothesis, that insured and uninsured consultations are likewise related to total cost cannot 
be refuted. 
.. ý<... 
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Version 1 shows that the elasticity of TC with respect to inpatient services is insignificant. 
This may be because HC report few inpatient admissions and care provided by nurses during 
an inpatient stay in HC is limited, and mainly consists of patient observation. 
Version 2 includes the same variables as Version 1, but it excludes the five HC with zero- 
output inpatient services, which results in a smaller sample size of 47 HC. The parameters 
and test results are similar to those in Version 1. However, as expected, with smaller sample 
size and fewer degrees of freedom, standard errors increase slightly. 
Version 3 includes two variables that interact the ownership dummy with payer-specific 
consultations to examine whether church and public HC have different slopes expressed by 
different payer-specific MC of curative consultations. There is no significant difference 
between MC for payer-specific consultations between public and church owned HC. This 
could be a result of similar consultation-staff ratio55 in HCs, or similar production 
technologies (e. g. same salary levels, treatment protocols, drugs from same drug supplier 
(CAMERWA), etc. ). 
This comparison of parameter results of the three variations suggests that Model 3 presented 
in Table 6.4 behaves as well if not better than its three variations in Table 6.5, the translog 
Model 1, and the log-linear Model 2 in Table 6.3. Hence, Model 3 is used in this analysis. It 
appears to be the most parsimonious model that best describes the data generation process. 
Future research may try to include case mix adjusted utilisation of services, which might 
better describe the data generation process, and may strengthen the model's robustness if 
results are unchanged. 
ss This ratio equals: total curative consultation per year divided by total number of staff persons per 
year: In public HCs = 834; in church HCs = 857 consultations per staff person per year. 
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6.5.2 Cost structure measures 
Cost measures are computed based on parameters estimates from Model 3 (Table 6.4) and 
mean values of respective outputs, following the methodology applied by Kass (1987), 
Dranove (1998), and Dor and Farley (1996). Table 6.6 presents results. HC are ranked on the 
basis of total consultations and divided into three consultation volume groups. The `low 
consultation output' HC group includes 17 HC with an average of 2,788 consultations per 
year and an average MHI pool size of 1,191 insured. The `medium consultation output' HC 
group includes 17 HC with an annual average of 4,875 consultations, and an average MHI 
pool size of 1,141 insured, slightly smaller than for low-output HC. The `high consultation 
output' group includes 18 HC with an average of 9,942 consultations per year and a 
considerably larger average MIR pool of 2,617 insured. 
Table 6.6 shows MC and AC at the sample means for insured (CM) and uninsured curative 
consultations (CNM). Pairwise t-tests are performed to test whether there are significant 
differences (1) between the insured and uninsured in relation to their MC, as well as to their 
AC, and (2) between the three output groups (e. g. low vs. medium CM). Indicators on 
consultation-staff ratio reflect HC productivity. 
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Table 6.6: Cost measures in health centres, by visit output level 
Indicators Low C output Medium C output High C output 
(health centres) 17 17 18 
otal consultations per HC per year 
(C) 2,788 4,875 9,942 
/a of medium consultations 57% 100% 204% 
Range of consultations 1,806 - 3,604 3,654 - 6,052 6,170 - 15,737 
M: total MHI consultations per HC 
er year (mean) 690 1,001 2,142 
NM: total uninsured consultations 
er HC per year (mean) 2,098 3,874 7,800 
HI pool size (mean) per MHI 1,191 1,141 2,617 
/o of MHI at medium MHI pool 104% 100% 229% 
C MHI consultation, RWF 244 249 240 
C uninsured consultations, RWF 402** 322** 311* 
C per MHI consultation, RWF 617 628 607 
C per uninsured consultation, 
RWF 1,230*** 983*** 950** 
Number of total consultations per 
staff per year 719 816 987 
Number of total consultations per 
staff per day 2.70 3.07 3.71 
Note: HC data (8/99-7/00). C= total curative consultations, MC=marginal costs, CM=insured curative 
consultation, CNM=uninsured curative consultation, N=number of HC included. Costs are reported in 
RWF, Exchange Rate: USD 1=RWF 390 in June 2000. Difference between insured and uninsured 
consultations with respect to (a) MC and (b) unit costs, and within output level group, two-tailed test: 
*** Sig P<0.01; **Sig P <0.05; * Sig P <0.10. 
MC for uninsured consultations (CNM) are significantly higher than for insured consultations 
(CM), and in all three HC output categories56. The difference between MC for insured and 
uninsured consultations becomes smaller and less significant in HC with the highest output 
levels. It could be that providers with fewer patients are more likely to modify treatment 
intensity by payer-status, causing the uninsured to receive more resource-intensive and costly 
treatment than the insured under capitation. It could also be that HC with many patients 
spread their fixed cost over a larger number, causing MC as a linear function of AC per 
consultation to decrease. 
6 The null hypothesis Ho, that marginal costs for insured and uninsured consultations are the same, is 
rejected. Ho: mean (MC CM - MC CNM) = 0; t= -5.5407; P<0.001 for all HC. Low output HC: 
t= -3.2; P<0.01; Medium output: t= -2.14; P<0.05; High output: t= -1.96; P<0.058 
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Average incremental costs (AIC) have been estimated as well as AC per curative 
consultation. The two methods provide incompatible results. The econometric result for 
insured AIC is about four times the value estimated in the AC calculation. It reflects the 
problems arising when attributing total costs of a multi-product firm to a single output 
keeping all other outputs constant (Kass 1987; Dor and Farley 1996; Dranove 1998). 
The uninsured have significantly higher AC per consultation compared to MHI patients. 
Insured AC remain similar over all three levels of output, while they decrease for the 
uninsured with increasing HC output levels, suggesting returns to the variable factor (RVF). 
For both, AC are considerably above MC pointing to significant payer-specific returns to 
scale. Thus, all of the results seem to be consistent with the hypothesis that less generous 
capitation payment through MIR is associated with lower intensity health centre services. 
Because of the log-linear based calculation of MC, RVF are constant across the three output 
levels, and correspond to the regression parameters (elasticities) for insured and uninsured 
consultations. Therefore, payer-specific MC are compared across different output levels. F- 
tests are performed on the null hypothesis that MC are equal across HC. The insignificant test 
result combined with the very low consultation-staff per day ratio, indicate that RVF are 
equally positive in the three groups, and independent of output level. HC are providing care 
to insured and uninsured patients at less than full capacity. They could improve their financial 
sustainability by using idle resources. 
There appears to be a contradiction between the econometric result of no difference in cost 
elasticity between insured and uninsured consultations and the cost structure results of 
significant differences between insured and uninsured marginal costs. This contradiction is 
related to the overhead cost allocation problem in the step-down accounting approach used 
when calculating AC and MC, and the insufficient flexible log-linear cost function that does 
not identify whether cost elasticities differ at different output levels. 
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A comparison of HC payer-specific average revenue (AR) per consultation reveals that 
revenue from user fees is higher (RWF 661 per visit) than revenue from MHI including 
capitation and insured patients' co-payment per visit (RWF 496 per visit). These AR are 
considerably above their payer-specific MC, pointing to short-term profits in HC. AR from 
these private sources covers about 63% of the reported average cost for uninsured visits 
(RWF 1,052) and slightly more (80%) of MHI visits (RWF 617). The differences are paid by 
subsidies, implying that HC are not covering their fixed costs from patient revenues. This 
reflects the pricing policies in the public sector, which are designed to subsidise the provision 
of care with donor and government sources. However, because of higher AC per uninsured 
visit, uninsured visits consume more subsidies (RWF 391 per uninsured visit) than insured 
visits (RWF 121 per insured visit). This indicates that in a mixed payment system HC shift a 
larger proportion of costs per uninsured visit to donors and government sources because of 
the higher price/cost margins charged to MHI with capitation payment (Ellis and McGuire 
1993). 
This situation may create losers and winners and have sustainability implications that should 
be considered. For example, MHI may lose members, resulting in more risky membership 
pools with higher AC per visit or/and increased frequency of insured visits, causing cost 
recovery rates from insured visits to drop in health centres and more costs to be shifted to 
public funds. Also, due to their higher visit rates, the total cost of a member may be higher 
during the course of a year which will affect the overall costs of health facilities and place 
pressure on services. However, with increasing membership, the insured visit rate may 
decrease over time, and - ceteris paribus - average cost per insured visit and per MHI 
member in health facilities. To protect themselves against these financial risks, public health 
centres and the government might react against MHI, for example by negotiating higher 
cäpitation amounts per insured member. As a result, the poor may be excluded from MHI as 
premiums become unaffordable for them. Though, in a heavily donor-funded health sector 
like Rwanda, additional costs created in public facilities and shifted to the government may 
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most likely be picked up by donors, allowing the other partners - Mill, providers, the 
government and households - to be winners. 
The general pattern of payer-specific MC is consistent with the hypothesis that more 
generously paying uninsured patients have higher MC. It suggests that public and church- 
owned health centres have flexibility in responding to financial incentives. Hence, instead of 
cost-shifting to public and donor sources, HC could adopt a treatment strategy that brings 
payer-specific MC closer to the average level of reimbursement. But, as insured visits reflect 
only about one-fourth of total HC visits, the significant difference in payer-specific MC 
cannot only be explained with different efficiency levels driven by payer-specific treatment 
intensity. Other factors not addressed in the model may be related to MC, including under- 
supplying care to insured patients; differences in case-mix across payer groups resulting in 
less severely ill insured patients; and economies of scale in HC. The following discussion 
elaborates on these reasons and their possible association with payer-specific MC differences 
between insured and uninsured groups, considering the evidence that supports or refutes 
them. 
6.6 Discussion and conclusion 
Based on monthly routine data collected in 52 Rwandan health centres, the purpose of this 
analysis was to examine providers' cost structure; to identify the cost and efficiency impact in 
health centres of user fee payment and of MHI with capitation provider payment; and to 
discuss the implications of cost results in view of selecting a provider payment system when 
scaling up MHI. 
The theory about the responsiveness of public providers to financial incentives is weak. In 
developing countries, little evidence exists about the impact of health insurance and different 
provider reimbursement systems on behaviour, costs and efficiency of public providers 
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(Barnum and Kutzin 1993). Based on economic theories of insurance, this analysis expected 
two results. First, as the financial risk of insurance caused by members' adverse selection 
decreases with growing MHI pool size, a negative relationship was hypothesised between 
total cost in health centres and MHI pool size expressed by the proportion of MHI revenue in 
health centres. 
The second hypothesis was derived from studies conducted with payer-specific provider data 
in the USA. It was that providers behave as economic agents and adjust treatment intensity 
according to the expected payer-specific revenue sources (Dor and Farley 1996). Applied to 
the Rwandan context, the analysis hypothesised that HC behave in response to incentives set 
by capitation payment paid by MHI. Providers' behavioural response will lead to less 
resource-intense treatment for MHI patients, which - ceteris paribus - results in lower 
marginal costs when treating insured patients and contribute to economic efficiency in the 
production of care. If this less-intense treatment is within a given range of quality of care then 
this would suggest room for cost savings in the provision of care in health centres. 
The analysis employed an econometric cost function allowing identification of payer-specific 
outputs. In the absence of provider data on quality of care and treatment intensity by patient 
groups, findings from surveys conducted with focus groups and with patients following 
treatment were used to interpret results. 
There are five main findings. First, the analysis found a negative relationship between the 
proportion of MIII revenue and total cost in health centres. Under MHI with capitation 
payment, this may be a direct result of providers mitigating their financial risk related to 
insurance over a larger MM membership pool size. 
Second, results from the payer-specific cost analysis in health centres suggest no significant 
difference between the cost-elasticities of insured and uninsured consultations. 
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Third, marginal costs for insured patients are markedly lower than for uninsured patients who 
pay user fees. This evidence is consistent with the theory that providers behave as economic 
agents and adjust treatment intensity according to the expected payer-specific revenue. 
Fourth, uninsured patients report significantly higher AC per consultation than NU H patients. 
For both groups, average costs are considerably above marginal costs, pointing to significant 
payer-specific short-run returns to scale in public and church-owned health centres. 
Fifth, average revenue per consultation from MIR and from user fees are above the relative 
marginal cost, implying important short-term profits in health centres. However, the lower 
average cost recovery by user fee compared to MI-II suggests that providers shift a larger 
proportion of treatment cost for uninsured patients to government and donor sources, who 
subsidize the supply of medical care. 
The result of significantly higher marginal cost for treating uninsured compared to insured 
patients may be explained by phenomena other than provider response to different payment 
mechanisms: severity of illness; adjustment of treatment intensity; and returns to the variable 
factor. 
Economic theory on insurance suggests that adverse selection by more severely ill patients 
into the insurance pool would lead to case-mix differences between insured and uninsured 
patients. Adverse selection would result in higher treatment intensity and therefore higher 
marginal cost for the insured. However, the contrary was found in this analysis; suggesting 
that the insured may be less severely ill than uninsured patients. 
This result is supported by household and focus group survey findings. Insured individuals 
report about a five times higher probability of visiting a provider than the uninsured". In 
57 During the first MHI operational year (8/1999-7/2000), the following curative consultation rates 
were reported by capita per year in HCs in the three districts: Byumba: 1.16 curative consultations per 
MHI member per year, and 0.15 per non-member per year. Kabgayi: 1.52 visit per members, 0.27 
visits per non-members. Kabutare: 1.56 visits per member, 0.3 curative consultations per non-member 
per year. 
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addition, there seems to be a time-shift in seeking care. Uninsured patients interviewed in the 
patient exit survey spend significantly more time in bed before seeking care (5.5 days) than 
insured patients (4 days)" (Schneider et al. 2001a). According to HC nurses, insured patients 
are less severely ill because they seek care at the onset of illness and consequently need less 
intensive treatment (ONAPO 2000: p. 58). 
These observations imply that the severity of illness is influenced by the way patients pay for 
health care. However, testing for the effect of patients' severity of illness on costs requires 
additional payer-specific information collected from health centres on the occurrence of 
diagnoses, patient health status, and the duration of illness before they seek care. 
Alternatively, the incentives set by user fees and MHI with capitation payment could be 
driving different treatment intensities, leading to lower marginal cost for the insured and 
increased economic efficiency. This explanation leads to two possibilities. Either treatment is 
provided within or below a medically acceptable quality range. The latter case implies that 
under capitation payment, MHI patients receive sub-standard care. Providers deter patients 
from treatment or under-provide care to insured patients if they are expected to generate 
losses. Under-supplying treatment to insured patients will decrease marginal cost and lead to 
worse quality care. Under-supplying care also includes the situation where health centres 
refuse treatment to patients and refer them to the district hospital, which is reimbursed per 
episode of illness in Kabgayi, and per episode of illness as well as per service in the other two 
districts (see Table 3.2). The analysis did not dispose of the necessary hospital data to assess 
to what extent this situation has occurred. However, since increasing hospital costs reduces 
the revenue from capitation payment for health centres, the latter do have a financial 
incentive to keep hospital referrals on a reasonable level. 
On the other hand, providers may adjust their treatment intensity within the acceptable 
quality range, and provide less intense care, in anticipation of the capitation revenue from 
3e Ho: mean(NM) - mean(M) = dill= 0; t=2.27; P<0.024. 
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MHI. Insured patients' marginal cost will decrease without having a negative effect on 
quality. It suggests that MHI with capitation enhances efficiency in the provision of care. The 
health centre data set does not allow distinguishing between these two alternatives. Therefore, 
information from additional data sources will serve to interpret lower marginal costs in the 
context of quality of care. 
Sick individuals interviewed in the household survey judged the availability of drugs in 
health facilities as high, independent of their insurance status (Schneider and Diop 2001). 
Both insured and uninsured patients waited on average 20 minutes before seeing a nurse, and 
all patients reported equal compliance rates on variables such as "received lab test", "provider 
prescribed drugs", "staff informed about illness and how to take drugs", and about "patient 
satisfaction with treatment". However, patient exit interview findings suggest that insured 
patients have received all the prescribed drugs, whereas 10 percent of uninsured patients did 
not receive the prescribed drugs, which was due to uninsured patients not having the money 
to pay drug fees (Schneider et al. 2001 a). Focus group survey participants reported that when 
sick the uninsured only report to the provider the ailments for which they have the money to 
pay for, whereas insured patients report all symptoms as their treatment is covered by MHI 
(ONAPO 1999: p. 13). Patients' self-perception on having received "equally good" treatment, 
independent of payer-status, suggests that they might have been treated within the medical 
acceptable quality range, and providers might have followed standard treatment protocols; in 
contrast, poor uninsured patients are more likely to be skimped or dumped because of 
financial barriers caused by user fees. They reflect the majority of sick individuals. 
Still, differences in technical quality may exist that patients are not able to notice. There are 
no data available on the treatment intensity by patient to identify whether the lower marginal 
costs are caused by treatment intensity below or within the technical quality standard. 
Patients' self-perception about the quality of care level is not sufficient to conclude whether 
providers are under-providing care to uninsured patients. Other studies found that in a mixed 
financing system, under-provision of care is rather limited and providers may try, shifting 
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costs to other sources (Ellis and McGuire 1993). As Rwandan health centres are financed in a 
mixed financing system, this implies that instead of dumping and skimping insured patients, 
HC shift cost to other financing sources, such as donors and the government. 
A third explanation for lower MC of insured patients is that reduced financial barriers 
through insurance leads to greater utilisation by the insured and exploitation of short-run 
returns to the variable factor (SRRVF) in HC with spare capacity. This argument is supported 
by the fact that the difference between MC for insured and uninsured consultations becomes 
smaller in HC with higher output levels; and the consultation-staff ratio improves with 
increasing output level category, causing idle resources to be used. However, exploiting 
SRRVF will affect the marginal cost of insured and uninsured consultations equally. 
Figure 6.7 visualizes the three main arguments made above. MC per insured consultation are 
affected when providers adjust treatment intensity in response to first, the financial incentives 
set by capitation payment; and second, to a less severe case-mix among the insured related to 
the elimination of financial barriers in accessing care. Third, lower financial barriers lead to 
more patients and higher output levels in HC. Short-run returns to the variable factor can be 
reaped where idle resources exist. 
These explanations are competing for their relevance. The negative relation between the share 
of 1VIHI in total revenue and total HC costs suggests that a higher capitation amount as a 
function of a larger MHI pool mitigates the financial risk of a more severely ill patient case- 
mix through adverse selection. In addition, markedly higher average than marginal cost 
suggest that significant SRRVF exist in treating both insured and uninsured patients. 
Thus, the main factor that contributes to insured patients lower MC is less intense treatment 
in response to the incentives set by capitation payment, which may have been reinforced by 
insured patients' less severe case-mix, due to better access to care. The available data does 
not allow identifying whether less intense treatment has caused worse quality of care for 
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insured patients. However, the income-dependent consultation rates for the uninsured suggest 
that this is the case for poor uninsured patients who have been deterred from treatment. 
Figure 6.7: Factors affecting marginal cost of insured patients 
Less financial barriers in 
Capitation access to care through N UH 
payment 
IH 
HC adjust Lower More 
treatment to severity of consultations 
incentives case-mix in HC 
Less intense Reaping 
treatment SPRVF 
Lower MC and higher 
efficiency in production of 
care to MHI patients 
The weakness of this result is that there is no clear definition of the medically acceptable 
quality range. To assume a quality of care range based on findings from surveys of patient 
perceptions may not be enough to substantiate that insured and uninsured patients are treated 
within a medically acceptable range. Poor quality may not have been detected by the 
individuals interviewed in the surveys, which is supported by asymmetric information 
problems between patients and providers. 
These findings have equity implications, and give insights into the presumption of providers' 
cost-shifting behaviour when they benefit from multiple revenue sources. 
The health financing system described in this Chapter has divided the population into three 
groups. The generously-paying user fee patients, who can afford paying higher fees, tend to 
have significantly higher marginal costs than the second group, composed of the less 
generously-paying MHI members with capitation payment, and than the third group. They are 
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the majority representing about 70 percent of the district population, and are excluded from 
care as they cannot afford paying the price that covers their marginal costs of treatment. This 
exclusion due to financial barriers goes below the medically acceptable quality of care range 
and hampers equity objectives. 
This result gives insight to the development of the design of community-based health 
insurance. Under Mill with capitation payment, providers do not primarily shift cost across 
payment sources, as is alleged when FFS is selected. Rather, they adjust costs by adapting the 
resource-intensity of treatment to the expected payment source. This is a relevant result in the 
context of scaling-up MHI in Rwanda, which requires selecting a payment mechanism for 
health centres and district hospitals. Based on these arguments, and on the grounds of 
practical feasibility of administering capitation payment for providers and insurers, capitation 
payment is recommended under a Mill scale up. 
When scaling up MHI with capitation payment, health centres will most likely receive the 
same capitation amount for each MM member. But, over time, if capitation payment does not 
cover providers' medical expenditures for the insured and if health centres receive revenues 
from several payment systems, then they have less incentive to be productive, and may try to 
shift costs across different payment systems (Newhouse 1996); and providers might skimp on 
treatment of insured patients. Therefore, provider performance in health centres must be 
monitored and evaluated to ensure quality of care. 
This analysis and its findings contribute to current research on health financing in developing 
countries in three ways. First, it adds to the development of a methodology to identify factors 
that affect health facility costs and to assess the payer-specific efficiency impact of provider 
behaviour in response to incentives set by the provider payment in low-income contexts. 
Thereby, it supports the increasing demand for disaggregated data collected on service use, 
quality, finances and morbidity in the health sector. 
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Second, it provides the first payer-specific efficiency measures, such as estimates of marginal 
and average costs, and RVF in a low-income country by distinguishing between two provider 
payment systems: user fees paid by uninsured patients and capitation payment by MHI. 
Third, it demonstrates that differences in costs of treating insured and uninsured patients in 
Rwanda vary widely and are related to the expected payment source and tremendous RVF in 
underused health facilities. 
This study has weaknesses related to the data and methods used. The model used is not fully 
specified, nor is it tested rigorously. The data set consists of health centres observed over a 
fairly short and perhaps idiosyncratic time period. Panel data about quality of care and 
severity of illness, broken down by patients' insurance status would have enhanced the 
understanding of the relationship between provider payments and the resource-intensity of 
health centre care. Also, additional data is needed to define a model with case-mix adjusted 
service use. It would allow identifying whether there is a significant difference in the payer- 
specific patient case-mix and its cost relevance. Generally, future data collection in health 
facilities should include data on the technical quality of care to identify eventual 
underprovision of care. 
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6.7 Annex: Correlation matrices and summary tables 
Table A6.1: Pearson correlation for translog cost function 
I 
InTC InCM InCN InMHI ubli InCM InCNM MH12 InCM_CNM InCM_MH InCNM_H 
nTC 1 
nCM ý. 516 1.00 
nCNM . 797 . 351 1.000 
nMHl . 334 . 878 . 207 1.000 
public -0.479 -0.336 -0.437 -0.159 1.000 
InCM2 
. 528 . 996 . 359 . 873 0.351 1.000 
InCNM2 . 802 . 355 . 999 ). 217 0.440 ). 363 1.000 
MH12 . 347 ). 875 . 226 ). 996 0.174 ). 877 ). 235 1.000 
InCM_CN 0.754 . 895 . 730 ). 744 0.460 ). 897 ). 733 ). 752 1.000 
InCM_MH I . 453 . 965 . 302 . 965 -0.271 P. 969 ). 309 ). 969 . 851 1.000 
InCNM_HI 
. 649 . 848 . 654 . 874 0.348 . 850 
_ 
. 662 . 882 . 935 . 894 1 
Table A6.2: Pearson correlation for log-linear cost model 2 
InCM InCNM InPREV InMHI public 
InCM 1.000 
InCNM . 351 1.000 
InPREV . 307 10.277 1.000 
InMHI . 878 . 207 . 488 1.000 
public 0.336 0.437 0.115 0.159 1.000 
Table A6.3: Pearson correlation for log-linear cost model 3 
InCM InCNM InPREV PrMrev PrNMrev public 
InCM 1 
InCNM . 3508 1 
InPREV . 3074 . 2767 1 
PrMrev . 5526 0.3305 . 1633 1 
PrNMrev 0.0906 . 5424 0.1247 0.4833 1 
public 0.3363 0.4369 0.1151 . 1032 0.3246 1 
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Table A6.4: Pearson correlation for model 3, version 1 
InCM InCNM InPREV InINPAT PrMrev PrNMrev public 
InCM 1 
InCNM . 351 1.000 
InPREV . 307 ). 277 1.000 
InINPAT . 179 ). 120 . 276 1.000 
PrMrev . 553 0.331 . 163 0.003 
1.000 
PrNMrev 0.091 . 542 0.125 . 107 
0.483 1.000 
public 0.336 0.437 0.115 0.043 . 103 0.325 1 
Table A6.5: Pearson correlation for model 3, version 2 
InCM InCNM InPREV InINPAT PrMrev PrNMrev public 
InTC 
InCM 1 
InCNM . 346 1 
InPREV ). 352 . 226 1 
InINPAT ). 371 . 485 . 515 1 
PrMrev ). 575 0.309 . 214 0.009 1 
PrNMrev 0.104 . 530 0.192 . 147 
0.467 1 
public 0.332 0.422 0.131 0.182 . 084 0.355 1 
Table A6.6: Pearson correlation for model 3, version 3 
InCM InCNM InPREV PrMrev PrNMrev public InCM_ InCNM 
InCM 1 
InCNM . 3508 1 
InPREV . 3074 . 2767 1 
PrMrev . 5526 0.3305 . 1633 1 
PrNMrev 0.0906 . 5424 0.1247 0.4833 1 
public 0.3363 0.4369 0.1151 . 1032 0.3246 1 
InCM-p 0.2405 0.4275 0.0905 . 1618 0.3435 . 989 1 
InCNM-p 0.3316 0.3698 0.1061 . 0539 0.2892 . 995 . 9848 1 
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Table A6.7: Variables definition model 3, version 2 (N = 47), (8/1999 -7/2000) 
Variable Definition Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total HC costs (RWF) C 5,070,583 , 899,513 1,912,886 14,100,000 
Total number insured curative 
consultations M 1295 1322 126 1 
6434 
Total number uninsured curative 
consultation NM 391 759 1067 14107 
Total number preventive care 
visits PREY 310 971 1942 18570 
Total number of inpatient 
services (deliveries and 
admissions) INPAT 46 75 739 
/o of total revenue from MHI PrMrev ). 120 . 083 . 019 . 332 
/o of total revenue from user 
ees PrNMrev ). 534 . 122 . 253 . 773 
Owner (1=public, 0=church) ). 596 ). 496 . 000 1.000 
Log of TC InTC 15.302 ). 518 14.464 16.463 
Log of CM InCM . 826 ). 816 . 836 . 769 
Log of CNM InCNM . 212 . 600 . 973 9.554 
Log of PREV InPREV . 651 . 452 . 571 . 829 
Log of INPAT InINPAT . 225 1.119 . 693 . 227 
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Part IV: Balancing Equity and Sustainability 
Chapter 7: Discussion and Conclusion 
7.1 Overview of findings 
This thesis contributes new knowledge to the research on equity and sustainability of health 
financing in low-income settings by conducting quantitative analysis based on cross-sectional 
micro-data that have been collected from insured and uninsured groups during the Rwandan 
prepayment pilot phase. 
The analysis comprises three main components. It has examined the demand for health 
insurance; the impact on households of utilisation and financing of health care; and the cost 
and efficiency implications of different provider payment methods in health facilities. This 
last Chapter synthesizes findings from the analytical chapters and embeds them within the 
theoretical context presented in the literature review. Policy implications include deriving a 
MHI design to scale up MHI and improve equity and sustainability in the district health 
system. The limitations of this study are discussed, and recommendations are suggested for 
future research, before the conclusion. 
Ideally, a scale up process starts by judging different scale up options against the extent to 
which goals are met, given a country's institutional and socio-economic situation, and 
financial, organisational and political constraints in the overall system (Normand 1999). 
Scale up options of health insurance should be costed out in a financial model to estimate 
their financial implications (Solon and Capuno 1996; Cichon et al. 1999). This is not done in 
this thesis. Due to incomplete hospital data and health centre data from 1999/2000, results 
would not be valid to become the basis for costing out the expansion of prepayment schemes 
in Rwanda. Future research might focus on improving the data collection in the health sector 
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to investigate the additional amount of public resources needed, on top of member 
contributions, to keep MHI financially viable. 
7.1.1 Demand for health insurance 
Few attempts exist to understand demand for voluntary health insurance schemes in low- 
income countries. Others have argued that M11I is mainly offered in the formal sector, and 
that MHI premiums tend to be too high, which dissuades the poor from enrolling (Bennett et 
al. 1998). 
Reflecting the importance of equity in MHI enrolment, the first analytical Chapter reviewed 
economic and social theories on decision-malting to derive an analytical framework based on 
which the determinants of the MHI enrolment probability were analysed. A binary choice 
model was developed remaining consistent with expected utility maximization. It was 
hypothesised that the demand for MHI reflects individuals' risk aversion and demand for 
income certainty (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976; Schoemaker 1982). Following the poverty 
literature, it was expected that poor households would be less likely to insure, because they 
have to respond to more pressing current needs like food, than worrying about securing 
eventual future medical care (World Bank 1999). 
Results indicate no relationship between MliI enrolment and household income proxied by 
monetary expenditures; and that about 90 percent of the target population of 1 million chose 
to remain uninsured during the first operational year of MHI. The enrolment probability was 
determined by geographic variables, such as district of residence and distance to the health 
facility and to a lesser extent by demographic and asset variables. While poverty was the 
main reason for non-enrolment, precaution was the main reason members gave for enrolling 
in MHI, independent of their monetary expenditure classification. These findings indicate 
that households express similar risk aversion across socio-economic groups; and, that other 
reasons than risk aversion, may better describe poor households' insurance demand. They 
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include poor households' increasing risk aversion when moving closer to poverty, their credit 
constraints, lumpiness of assets, lack of social capital among family members and friends and 
trust in the health insurance system. 
As these results are not unambiguous in relation to the theories and findings reported by the 
development literature (Morduch 1995; Townsend 1995), the discussion focused on reasons 
related to statistical methods, the data, and omitted variables that may have contributed to the 
attenuation of the monetary expenditure effect. It concluded that the above result is related to 
the low level of income inequality in rural Rwanda, several omitted variables, and the choice 
of the underlying theory. Theories of decision-making under uncertainty are not based on real 
market decisions of the type examined in this Chapter. As suggested by state-dependent 
expected utility theory, the richer may have remained uninsured because the magnitude of the 
expected pay-off from MHI is not `good enough' for them (Phelps 1973). They might prefer 
paying user fees for hospital care provided by physicians instead of enrolling in Mill to 
benefit from basic care provided by nurses in health centres. 
The endowment effect and status quo bias, as well as the poverty-related depletion of social 
capital may have played a role in the enrolment decision. Focus group participants explained 
that they would rather "wait and see" whether MHl works before paying the annual 
enrolment fee (ONAPO 2000). It suggests that households do not know whether the benefits 
of being an MM member exceed the costs of paying annual premium (Kahnmann et al. 
1991). The observation that poverty has decreased the number of acts of solidarity among 
family members and friends may have affected poor households' insurance demand (Colletta 
and Cullen 2000). However, additional data is needed to substantiate this hypothesis. 
Based on these findings, the Chapter concluded first, that combining empirical evidence with 
decision-making theories may help in designing health insurance that responds to the needs 
of low-income groups. However, theories developed and tested in Western contexts may not 
necessarily be appropriate in low-income areas, and need to be interpreted accordingly. 
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Second, the income-independent demand for MIR does not mean that insurance is easily 
affordable for the poor. Rather, the poor may have endured additional economic hardship to 
insure and gain income certainty. Third, as suggested by the endowment effect and status quo 
bias, the decision to insure may be complicated for individuals, particularly in areas where 
insurance is a new concept and illiteracy rates are high. Hence, information on insurance and 
transparency in financial management plays a major role in building trust, and will help 
assuring the poor that paying premium is not a risky investment. 
7.1.2 Utilisation and financing of health care 
Due to the lack of cross-sectional household survey data in low-income areas, research on the 
equity impact under user fees and under health insurance has been limited. A study from 
Vietnam quantifies and compares over time the equity impact of out-of-pocket payments on 
insured households, broken down by provider level (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 2001). 
Empirically, equity in health care has been quantified in OECD countries, where a great 
emphasis was found on equity in delivery and financing of health care, and backed by 
governments through public financing and delivery of care (Van Doorslaer et al. 1993). 
In the second analytical Chapter, the egalitarian equity principle and the minimum standard 
approach served as a framework to examine and compare for insured and uninsured 
households (1) horizontal equity in utilisation; (2) vertical equity in financing; and (3) 
following the minimum standard approach, the extent to which health spending endangers 
households ability to purchase other goods (Culyer and Wagstaff 1993). In areas with high 
levels of poverty, the minimum standard definition may be more relevant than egalitarian 
equity principles (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 2001). 
Combining multivariate analysis with equality measures and the corresponding concentration 
indices (Van Doorslaer et al. 1999; Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 2001), the analysis focused 
on actual and need-adjusted utilisation based on indirect standardization methods for insured 
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and uninsured individuals. The focus of the health financing analysis was on the degree of 
progressivity and on the redistributive effect of health care payments among insured and 
uninsured households (Kakwani 1977; Aronson et al. 1994). The minimum standard 
approach served to compare in a short-run context the extent to which payments made for an 
episode of illness force insured and uninsured household income to drop below and further 
below the consumption poverty line. This approach has previously not been used to compare 
the impact of health spending on income of insured and uninsured households. 
There are three main findings. 
First, results indicate that MIR with utilisation levels at a significantly increased level 
achieves horizontal equity in utilisation. User fees cause utilisation to strongly correlate with 
the socio-economic background of uninsured individuals. 
Second, results on equity in health financing support findings from the previous Chapter on 
the demand for health insurance: the MHI premium level is too high for poor households. 
According to the Kakwani and the Aronson/Johnson/Lambert indices, the current MHI 
premium level causes regressivity in health financing and some re-ranking among insured 
households. Similarly, the Reynolds-Smolensky index is negative for total MIR including 
premium, suggesting a pro-rich income redistribution among MHI members. However, once 
the premium has been paid, MHI and user fees seem to contribute to proportionality in 
patients' out-of-pocket spending for an episode of illness. Under user fees, this 
proportionality result is reached at the expense of the poor being excluded from basic care. 
Third, results from the minimum standard analysis suggest that out-of-pocket spending per 
episode of illness has a similar small impact on the headcount and the normalized poverty 
gap for insured and uninsured households. Considering the significantly lower utilisation rate 
of uninsured individuals, this result implies that the poor uninsured do not seek care because 
they fear that paying user fees could leave them with insufficient cash to purchase other 
goods and services. Some insured households' pre-payment income still drops below and 
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further below the poverty line due to payments made for services and drugs received at the 
district hospital, which is not covered by M. Thus, the current MHI benefit package with 
mainly health centre coverage is too small to protect the socio-economic situation of the poor. 
This analysis has weaknesses. The lack of longitudinal data inhibits examining the 
association between equitable utilisation of health care and equal distribution of health 
(Hurley 2000), as well as the association between health spending and consumption 
smoothing over time (Morduch 1995). Equity in health financing measures need to be 
interpreted with caution when they are estimated based on one month of monetary 
expenditure data only. Also, measurement errors in the data set and incomplete data have 
affected the precision with which inequality levels were estimated (Deaton 1998). The self- 
assessed health status variable used in this analysis is limited in time and scope, and 
household income is proxied by monetary expenditures only. Therefore, the findings from 
this analysis cannot be used for comparison with other studies. Despite these limitations, the 
comparative results for insured and uninsured households appear to be robust. 
7.1.3 Cost and efficiency implications on health facilities 
The theory about the responsiveness of public providers to financial incentives is weak. And, 
in low-income countries, little evidence exists about the impact of health insurance and 
different provider reimbursement systems on behaviour, costs and efficiency of public 
providers (Barnum and Kutzin 1993). Other studies have suggested that MHI with fee-for- 
service (FFS) induces cost escalation and cost shifting to other financing sources, such as 
user fee-paying patients (Bennett et al. 1998). However, this hypothesis has not been 
researched. Similarly, the impact of MHI with capitation payment and user fees on provider 
cost and efficiency has to date not been compared. 
The third analytical Chapter focused on the financial incentives set by payment systems, 
providers' reaction to these incentives, and the cost and efficiency implications for health 
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centres. The hypothesis was that Rwandan health centres behave as economic agents and 
adjust the treatment intensity to the expected payment mechanisms: user fee or 1MHI with 
capitation payment. As a result, generously paying user fee patients, who can afford it, would 
receive more resource intensive care, than patients insured in a capitated plan (Dor and Farley 
1996). The analysis used routine data collected in 52 health centres during the first 
operational year of Mill (1999-2000). 
A log-linear cost function was employed that allowed identification of payer-specific outputs 
to analyse and compare the cost and efficiency implications of provider payment in health 
centres. Thereafter, the provider cost structure was examined for insured and uninsured 
patients. 
The main findings were: first, there appears to be no significant difference between the cost- 
elasticities of insured and uninsured consultations; and, second, cost structure analysis reveals 
that MHI with capitation provider payment leads to significantly lower marginal costs of 
treating insured patients, enhances efficiency in the production of care, and contributes to 
financial sustainability in the health system. These findings are related to the step-down 
approach of the accounting based cost analysis and the inflexible cost function that does not 
identify elasticities at different output levels. 
The discussion focused on the contribution of other reasons to this result, such as tremendous 
returns to the variable factor in underused health facilities; and less severely ill insured 
patients as they face fewer financial barriers to access to care. By using information from 
additional sources from patients and focus groups, concerns were addressed about whether 
treatment is provided within or below a medically acceptable quality range. 
The analysis concluded that in the first instance, the poor uninsured suffer from exclusion 
from care. The lack of data on technical quality of care and patients' severity of illness did 
not allow quantifying the extent to which the above results have been caused by worse 
quality of care delivered and patient case mix among insured and user-fee paying patients. 
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Thus, it is recommended that future research should try to account for these weaknesses and 
include measures on severity of illness and quality of care, broken down by insured and 
uninsured patients. 
7.1.4 Policy implications 
These findings have policy implications. First, to ensure horizontal equity in utilisation of 
health care in Rwanda and considering that user fees lead to utilisation that is strongly related 
to income, the policy response derived is scaling up MHI. Second, to improve equity in 
health financing, some form of means-testing should be applied to exempt socially 
disadvantaged groups from paying MHI premium, and support their enrolment with demand- 
side subsidies from government and donors and funds paid by the better-off. Also, to protect 
the socio-economic situation of low-income groups against financial shocks related to their 
need for care, it is recommended that the MIR benefit package be expanded to cover district 
hospital care. And finally, to respond to principles of financial sustainability, MHI should be 
designed with capitation provider payment to hospitals and health centres to encourage 
efficiency in the production of care. This requires monitoring and evaluating the quality 
performance of providers in an institutionalized process to prevent provision of care below 
medically accepted quality standards. 
The current health insurance situation in Rwanda further motivates a MIR scale up. The 
social health insurance scheme for public employees and their dependents (RAMA) is 
financed by government contributions and levies of five percent on public employees' salary. 
Since 2000, RAMA covers all care in Rwanda, leaving a 25 percent co-payment to the 
patient. Rwandans working in the private and informal sectors are excluded from RAMA. 
The political will to use MHI as a means to improve access to care for the uninsured has been 
expressed in the health policy of the MOH, and in several strategic documents of the 
Rwandan government (CNLS 2002; Ministry of Health 2002). 
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In the health policy literature, scaling up has mainly been discussed in the context of 
introducing universal coverage insurance in middle- and high-income countries (Solon and 
Capuno 1996; Cichon et al. 1999; Glied et al. 2002; Remler et al. 2002), and of scaling up 
HIV/AIDS programs to a larger geographic area (Binswanger 2000; ACTafrica 2001). Few 
MIR have been expanded to national level health insurance, and these have been mainly in 
middle- and high-income countries (Germany, South-Korea, and Japan) (Bennett et al. 1998), 
while experience on scaling up MIR in low-income countries is nonexistent. 
7.2 Paradigms of scaling up 
The development literature describes scaling up organisations in terms of `old' and `new' 
paradigms, and has been developed to focus specifically on NGOs. The `old' one is about 
scaling up through expansion, whereby non-governmental organisations (NGOs) become 
larger, more professionally managed and efficient organisations (Uvin et al. 2000). However, 
critics claim that NGOs lack a strategic link with governments and other organisations; and 
do not translate into sustainable national programs (Binswanger 2000). Therefore, the `new' 
scale up paradigm sees NGOs as contributors to a diverse civil society, where the state and 
NGOs become interacting partners (Clark 1991). `New' is that NGOs are well-managed 
organisations able to mobilize the participation of large numbers of people and to channel 
money to important activities. The state's role is ensuring the institutional framework and 
creating an enabling environment that fosters private initiative (Uvin and Miller 1999). Since 
many MHI are organized as NGOs, a MIR scale up may benefit from lessons learned in the 
development literature. 
The `new' paradigm involves organisational, quantitative, functional, and political scaling up. 
First, organisational scaling up aims to respond to six principles: (1) diversify funding 
sources to build a portfolio of stable and non-discretionary program funds from private and 
public sources; (2) increase the degree of self-financing, depending on the socio-economic 
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context and the private or public good character of the product; (3) build technical and 
managerial skills to strengthen the organisation's capacity; (4) develop organisational 
learning by feeding-back lessons into actions; (5) foster institutional variety by building 
operational links with other actors on a horizontal and vertical level; and (6) support 
participation and accountability to prevent bureaucratization and distance between leaders 
and members (Uvin and Miller 1999). An organisational scale up of MHI could include 
diversifying funding sources as well as skill building allowing members to participate in 
management. 
Second, quantitative scaling up includes organisations' structural growth by increasing 
membership, the geographic working area, and budget. Five different paths exist: (1) 
organisations spread as members adhere spontaneously; (2) they replicate when a successful 
program is initiated elsewhere; (3) nurturing is when well-funded outside agencies together 
with community participation promote scaling up; (4) organisations aggregate on a 
horizontal and vertical level and combine resources with other organisations; and (5) they 
integrate into existing systems (Uvin and Miller 1999). Quantitative scaling up of insurance 
includes spreading membership; replication in a different context; nurturing through technical 
and financial support; aggregation with other insurers; and integration of a small insurer into 
a larger system. 
Third, functional scaling up refers to program expansion. The number and types of activities 
are expanded due to increased demand by clients (push factors), or because of the availability 
of new resources (pull factors). Organizations grow through horizontal and vertical 
integration of activities (Uvin and Miller 1999). Horizontal and vertical integration occurs 
when the insurance benefit package will be expanded horizontally to cover the same benefit 
package in similar facilities; and vertically, when the insurance benefit package is expanded 
from basic care to cover hospital care. 
249 
Fourth, political scaling up consists of organisations moving beyond service delivery towards 
political empowerment of their members to change the structural cause of their social 
environment. It includes four components: (1) information and mobilization of people to 
lobby for changes; (2) networking with other organisations on issues of joint interest; (3) 
aggregating to federative structures aiming to influence policy making; and (4) direct entry 
into politics for example when grassroots organisations create or join a political party, or 
when they put up candidates from their own ranks, to move their issues on the local political 
agenda (Uvin and Miller 1999). An insurer with a large membership pool may become an 
interest group and could try to influence politics. 
7.3 Scaling up MHl in Rwanda 
This section derives a MM design. The insurance features introduced Chapter 2 are discussed 
in the context of the scale up types suggested by Uvin (1999), and egalitarian equity and 
sustainability principles. 
Success factors that appear to contribute to a successful scale up of organisations include a 
focus on simple goals, central coordination, decentralized and participatory mechanisms of 
planning and execution, and accountability of service providers to the population 
(Binswanger 2000). Applying these factors to Rwanda suggests that an MHI scale up could 
start on a district level and be eventually replicated in other districts; a central steering 
committee could be created to coordinate the scale up and evaluate the process; district level 
planning and implementation committees become partners to the central steering committee 
and the existing MIR; and health care providers actively participate in the process. This could 
be accomplished by re-vitalizing the structures at the MOH and within the districts that have 
been set up during the prepayment pilot phase (see Chapter 3). 
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Given Rwanda's socio-economic and legal context, two options exist to scale up MHI: 
vertical integration of MHI into RAMA the public health insurance system; or scaling up 
MHI to a district or national level. Both options face constraints. Integrating MHI into 
RAMA would lead to a social health insurance which usually relies on a formal sector 
economy. However, about 95 percent of the population living in the three districts are 
subsistence farmers (Ministry of Economics and Finance 2002). Hence, integrating MHI into 
RAMA would require technical capacity, political consensus, legal and organisational 
changes, and additional resources to finance the enrolment of those who could otherwise not 
afford it. This could be a future strategy Rwanda may want to prepare for. 
Meanwhile, Table 7.1 proposes a MHI design with universal district coverage, following the 
framework presented in Table 2.2 and Figure 2.3, and based on findings from this thesis. The 
first column lists the insurance features to be modified to address inequity and sustainability 
concerns in the current MIR. Then, the modified insurance features are presented for a MHI 
and the related components of scaling up are listed (second and third column). The last two 
columns show how a scale up of MHI might affect sustainability and equity in delivery and 
financing of health care. 
Table 7.1: Scaling up health insurance features 
Insurance MHI Model Scale up Impact of Scale Impact of Scale up 
Features types up on on Equity 
Sustainability 
Fund Progressive Organizational Diversify funding to Increases 
collection premium Quantitative build stable MHI membership among 
Mix of revenue revenue portfolio poor 
sources 
Fund Technical and Organizational Strengthen Provide access to 
management managerial organisational information to 
skill building capacity and change situation of 
learning poor 
Fund pooling Compulsory Quantitative Increase Prevents cream- 
enrolment membership skimming by MHI 
Prevents adverse 
selection by 
individuals 
Purchasing Capitation Organizational Accountability for Accountability for 
mechanism payment costs to limit costs to prevent 
Quality of care inefficiency unaffordable 
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control premium increases 
Benefit MHI coverage Functional Co-payment limits Vertical integration 
package of care moral hazard of hospital care to 
provided in expand MHI 
district benefits 
Co-payment Exempt poor from 
co-payment to 
prevent their 
exclusion from care 
This proposed MHI scale up model includes six components, which are further discussed: (1) 
progressive premium levels, and diversifying and increasing the MIR funding sources to 
subsidize MM enrolment for population groups exempted from premium payment; (2) 
compulsory MHI enrolment to spread membership to 100 percent of the districts population; 
(3) capitation provider payment to hospitals and health centres; (4) "upstream vertical 
integration" by adding district hospital care to the MM benefit package; (5) skill building and 
organisational strengthening of MHI executive bureau members; and (6) establishing the 
legal and organisational framework to implement the scale up of MI-H. 
7.3.1 Fund collection 
The above MIR design proposes expanding fund collection on two levels to respond to 
principles of egalitarian equity and sustainability. First, quantitatively by spreading MHI 
membership within the district; and second, organizationally by diversifying the sources of 
funding to build a portfolio of stable funds from members, government and donors (Uvin and 
Miller 1999). Also, it is suggested that the current flat-rate MHI premium be changed to a 
progressive rate: higher income groups contribute a higher percentage of their income to 
premium than poorer groups (Le Grand 1991), and the demand for MHI be subsidised. 
Demand-side subsidies can be allocated based on targeting subsidies to beneficiaries through 
ideal means testing; or a universal approach giving everybody a benefit regardless of socio- 
economic background. In between is targeting through key indicators that are less costly to 
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identify than income, but correlate with income (Besley and Kanbur 1990). Key indicators 
include: (1) population groups with high poverty incidence; (2) geographic areas with mainly 
poor inhabitants; and (3) poverty-relevant goods, such as treatment of communicable diseases 
on a district level (Nicholas and Zeckhauser 1982). 
In Rwanda, key indicators are suggested for targeting. MIR is a good that is mainly attractive 
to low-income groups who live in areas where the majority of the population is poor; and the 
MIII benefit package covers access to care in basic health centres and district hospitals, 
where the poor seek care. Characteristics of poor households identified in the HLCS and in 
Chapter 4 may serve as key indicators. These include: orphans, child-headed households, 
female-headed households, households headed by an illiterate person, large households, and 
household-heads who work as farm labourers. Alternatively, a universalistic approach could 
be employed, which provides subsidised MHI to all district inhabitants with the exception of 
the better-off with employment in the public or private sector, and business owners. 
Results have been rather mixed when it comes to evaluating the performance of the 
administrative capacity in charge of identifying the poor. Generally, these are political or 
administrative authorities from the community, or local committees appointed by the 
authorities (Gilson et al. 1995; Willis and Leighton 1995). On the other hand, the higher 
degree of transparency achieved through participatory poverty assessment (PPA) with 
community members may have its price, such as the social stigma attached to being identified 
as poor by community members and the eventual resulting psychic costs for households 
(Besley and Kanbur 1990). In Rwanda, key indicators could be communicated to all 
households in a transparent way for example by radio broadcasting, political and 
administrative authorities, church services, market places, community gatherings, the health 
centre, and the M RI office. 
MM can take the role of an intermediary, who channels subsidised membership cards to 
eligible groups. The government and donors could deposit funds into local bank accounts 
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over which the MIII managers have full control (Binswanger 2000). It would allow MHI 
managers to access incremental resources to ensure and finance enrolment. Upon enrolment 
of targeted beneficiaries, the MHI management team should be able to transfer funds to the 
MHI account, to pay providers. 
7.3.2 Fund management 
The objective of scaling up the MHI fund management function is to enhance the quality and 
effectiveness of the MHI management performance and sustain MHI activities on an 
expanding scale. With 7 percent of total revenue going to MHI administration per year, 
economies of scale in MHI administration seem not to be an issue that would indicate 
centralized MHI management. Also, insurance features can be designed to keep MAI 
administrative costs low. For example, capitation payment as the purchasing mechanism is 
less costly to administer than fee-for-service reimbursement, which involves detailed billing 
(Barnum and Kutzin 1993). 
The challenge of a democratically managed MHI is that elected leaders are not necessarily 
trained as managers, which may affect the insurance effectiveness. Hence, continuous 
capacity building is needed and the work of voluntary MIII may need to be formalized. This 
would involve recruiting the elected MHI committee members (president, vice-president, 
treasurer, and secretary) and technical staff either in part-time or fulltime positions, and 
paying them a salary59. 
MHI with high enrolment rates might find it organisationally easier to scale up. But in areas 
where enrolment rates are still low, it should be investigated to what extent this is due to 
reasons related to the management and administrative capacity of the MHI executive team. 
59 During the first operational year, the prepayment scheme of Bungwe hired its elected secretary in a 
part-time position due to the high workload of managing an MHI with more than 10,000 members. 
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7.3.3 Fund pooling 
Under a scale up with progressively set premiums, the rich who are low-risk individuals may 
have reservation prices below the progressively defined premium level. Under voluntary 
insurance, they may not enrol. Lower take-up rates among higher-income groups endanger 
redistributive objectives based on egalitarian equity principles and the financial sustainability 
in the insurance pool. Therefore, compulsory MIR enrolment is proposed in a scaled up MHI. 
Compulsory enrolment requires legal changes that need to be initiated by the government. 
Compulsory enrolment prevents adverse selection by members and cream skimming by the 
insurer, limits inadequate coverage that excludes individuals from health care and worsens 
their health status, which could lead to the spread of infectious diseases (Barr 1992); and ends 
`free-rider' problems by the uninsured who speculate that if they become sick, eventually 
they may be cared for at little or no cost to themselves (Cutler 2000). 
Introducing compulsory enrolment may create responses among individuals who do not want 
to enrol in MHI. Depending on how well these groups are politically organized, they will take 
actions to be exempted from MHI enrolment. 
7.3.4 Purchasing function 
The Rwandan MIR pay a monthly capitation amount to health centres and 10 percent of their 
total revenue to the MHI district federation who reimburses the district hospital on a fee-for- 
service and per case level for care provided to the insured (see Table 3.2). Findings from the 
payer-specific cost analysis in health centres presented in Chapter 6 suggest that MHI with 
capitation payment result in lower marginal costs of treating insured patients, enhance 
efficiency in the production of care and contribute to financial sustainability in the health 
system. During the pilot phase, hospital reimbursement by MHI was often delayed due to the 
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limited administrative capacity in hospitals, which led to late billing. Capitation payment to 
hospitals would be easier to administer for hospitals and for MHI. 
Thus, capitation payment to health centres and hospitals is proposed under a MIR scale up. 
However, to prevent perverse responses by providers to capitation payment such as avoiding 
high cost patients (Ellis 1998) and under-servicing less-informed patients, capitation payment 
should be combined with on-going monitoring and evaluation of quality of care in all health 
facilities. 
Financial analysis in health centres and hospitals is needed to prevent double-funding of 
public services from the supply and the demand-side. Some providers may have to consider 
restructuring their production of care to ensure an efficient response to an increased demand 
for care by more MHI members. Some health centres with MHI enrolment rates of more than 
50 percent already reported important increases in revenues from MM, allowing them to 
invest in better quality care60. Whether cost increases are caused by improved quality or 
provider rent-seeking behaviour needs to be monitored and evaluated continuously. 
7.3.5 Benefit package 
A functional scale up of the MIR benefit package through vertical integration of care 
involves expanding insurance coverage to include all care provided in district hospitals and 
health centres. The objective is to improve equity in delivery and financing of health care in 
district hospitals and health centres and to prevent that insured households' pre-payment 
income drops below and further below the poverty line due to their expenditures for services 
and drugs not covered by MHI. 
60 Bungwe health centre with a MITI pool of about 15,000 individuals used the extra revenue to 
construct latrines in houses of indigents, hire 2 more health centre staff and finance MHI awareness 
campaigns. 
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Greater insurance coverage less risk-bearing by the insured, and encourages moral hazard and 
supply-side induced demand by providers. Capitation provider payment limits supply-side 
induced demand. Co-payments charged to the insured, as well as health centres' gatekeeper 
function for hospital care, help balancing the marginal gains from increased risk pooling and 
the marginal losses from increased moral hazard (Zeckhauser 1970). In Rwanda, some 
population groups, such as poor patients who live further away from the health facility and 
pay higher transport costs, may need to be exempted from co-payments to ensure equity in 
utilisation and financing of care. 
7.3.6 Institutional sustainability 
An insurance scale up is affected by a country's institutional context, including area- and 
trade-specific living and working conditions of the population (Uvin and Miller 1999). In a 
low-income country, this may hamper the scale up process. Context inherent constraints 
include the lack of political consensus between partners; a health sector unable to respond to 
the increased demand of an insured population; inefficient management of health and 
financial information; and political instability. 
Rwanda's institutional and socio-economic context may hamper scaling up MIR. Constraints 
include the lack of a legal framework to make enrolment compulsory; the lack of a long-term 
health financing strategy for the health sector; the risk of political instability; low per capita 
income; high donor dependency; high illiteracy levels and low secondary school enrolment 
resulting in a lack of technical and organisational capacity mainly in rural areas. The 
strengths include a strong political commitment among all stakeholders in the public and 
private sector and among the population to scale up MHI. 
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In April 2003, participants who attended a three-day workshop to discuss the objectives and 
approaches of scaling up MHI in Rwanda61 concluded that a scale up needs the collaboration 
between the Ministry of Health (MOH), the Ministry of Local Administration, and the 
Ministry of Justice; and is based on four principles: risk-sharing, solidarity, equity, and 
member-managed organisations. Several recommendations emerged from the workshop. 
First, a replication of MHI in other districts requires technical and financial support and 
information of the population. Second, a national strategy needs to be prepared to support the 
scale up. Third, a national committee supports the dialogue on the sale up. Fourth, the 
development of networks between MHIs with banks, providers, organisations, local 
administration, and other health financing sources needs to be fostered. Fifth, a government 
unit responsible for the oversight of health insurance should be created. Sixth, institutional 
support includes the creation of an evaluation committee, technical and human capacities, and 
defining a national health financing strategy. 
Finally, resources are fungible. The scaled-up MHI might appear to be sustainable within the 
district but in fact, could be drawing resources from other sources, or cause patients to seek 
care not covered within the district. Thus, the financial implications of MHI with district 
coverage need to be monitored and evaluated within the national health system. It implies 
setting up a central data collection system in the health sector that distinguishes between care 
delivered and financed by insured and uninsured patients. 
7.4 Limitations 
Several limitations have to be accounted for in this thesis. 
Limitation 1: A long-term hypothesis would state that due to insurance coverage and 
subsequently better access to care, insured individuals will report better health, improved 
61 Atelier sur 1'elaboration du cadre strategique d'appui aux mutuelles de santb. Synthese des travaux 
du 15 au 17 avril 2003. Kigali, Rwanda. 
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productivity, and comparatively less danger to be drawn into chronic poverty compared to 
those without insurance. Although of interest, this thesis did not evaluate the impact of equity 
in utilisation of care on the health outcome of the insured population group or whether MHI 
membership has reduced differential in health status among the insured. The necessary 
longitudinal data are not available to analyse this question. 
Limitation 2: Household data were collected at the end of first MHI operational year. At this 
time, the insured had been, on average, enrolled for about six months, which ruled out 
conclusions on adverse selection based on members' health status. 
Limitation 3: Data collected in the household and patient exit interview survey on self- 
reported perception of health status may not reflect the truth of ill-health. Self-reported health 
status is influenced by interviewees' self-perception, reference system, risk attitude and other 
factors. While this self-assessed health status variable served to compare the insured and 
uninsured, it should not be used for comparison with other surveys. 
Limitation 4: The lack of provider data on quality of care and patients severity of illness 
limited the interpretation of findings in the cost analysis presented in Chapter 6. Future 
research should focus on providers' response to the anticipated payment system to detect 
eventual problems related to the quality of care. 
Limitation 5: The analysis did not dispose of the necessary data to examine issues related to 
organisational and human capacity building in the health sector and its implications for the 
organisational sustainability of MIR and health facilities. However, the impact of providers' 
and MIR performance on consumer trust and as a consequence, their enrolment decision has 
been discussed in a paper submitted to Social Science and Medicine (Annex Q. 
Limitation 6: The focus was on the population living in three rural districts. They share 
similar socio-economic conditions and medical access problems. Thus, subjects related to 
insurance coverage disparities within a country as a whole, leading to questions on 
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inequalities in health insurance coverage and in health outcomes in low- and middle-income 
countries go beyond the scope of this study. 
Limitation 7: In the absence of longitudinal household survey data, the analysis using the 
minimum standard approach did not allow any conclusion on the poverty impact of health 
spending through MIR and user fees. The poverty line just served as a theoretical measure to 
compare households' monetary expenditure levels before and after health spending. 
Limitation 8: The lack of data on utilisation, cost and financing of care in hospitals did not 
allow simulating the financial implications of a MHI scale up in a financial model. In 
addition, more recent health centre data would be needed for these simulations. 
Limitation 9: A conceptual approach served to address the tension between equity and 
sustainability in designing MIR. As there is only one data set available on one specific MHI 
design, it was not possible to quantify eventual tradeoffs between equity and sustainability by 
comparing different health insurance designs. 
7.5 Recommendations for further research 
Findings from this thesis have implications for future research in the context of community- 
based health insurance. 
First, in areas of high degrees of poverty, research on the demand for health insurance could 
focus on testing economic and social theories in the relevant real market situation. For 
example, examining the relevance of trust in poor households' enrolment decision based on 
quantitative data may yield new insight about decision-making under uncertainty among the 
poor and help developing policy measures that strengthen the trustworthiness of the health 
care system. 
Second, the availability of household survey panel data spanning over several years would 
allow assessing the long-run impact of insurance on individuals' health and well-being. 
Detailed consumption measures could enhance future research that compares the socio- 
economic implications of insurance and user fee payments in the context of consumption 
smoothing. Research could focus on examining the association between consumption 
smoothing and fairness of health financing and utilisation for insured and uninsured groups. 
Findings may help to support policy arguments and develop health financing reforms to 
protect poor households against the impoverishing effect of health spending. This is of 
particular interest for donors and governments in poor countries where debt-relief money is 
used to subsidize insurance enrolment of low-income groups. 
Third, comparative research could evaluate the cost and efficiency implications of MHI with 
FFS provider payment versus MHI with capitation payment. It would allow examining to 
what extent alleged cost escalations and cost shifting are caused by the provider payment 
system rather than by the insurance mechanism. Data collection should include measures of 
quality of care and patient case-mix in health facilities. If MHI with FFS contributes to cost 
increases and shifting, as has been suggested by other researchers, then capitation payment 
combined with monitoring and evaluation of provider performance may be the preferred 
provider payment mechanism when designing community-based health insurance in low- 
income countries. 
7.6 Conclusion 
This thesis has contributed new knowledge to the broader literature of community-based 
health insurance, which has so far mainly been descriptive. Reflecting the importance of 
equity and sustainability through risk sharing arrangements in Rwanda, the thesis extended 
previous analysis through the incorporation of econometric methods that have been used in 
high- and middle-income countries. 
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The analysis provided results on the demand for MHI, equity in utilisation and financing of 
health care, the financial implications of health spending on household income in terms of 
poverty measures, and the cost and efficiency implications of MIII and user fees in health 
facilities. Based on findings, a MIII design was derived to scale up MHI on a district level. 
This is new. Generally, health sector reform is suggested without the experience of a pilot- 
test and the results of detailed analysis from various data sources. 
Governments make frequent policy statements committing themselves to promoting equity 
and sustainability in health care and are increasingly turning to health insurance as a means to 
achieve this goal. The findings from this thesis may serve policy makers in Rwanda when 
scaling up prepayment schemes; and have policy implications for designing community- 
based insurance schemes elsewhere. Therefore, this conclusion presents three relevant MHI 
components that emerge from this analysis and are applicable to other low-income settings. 
First, to respond to egalitarian equity principles, health insurance that caters to low-income 
groups requires additional funds to finance enrolment of the poor, simply because they cannot 
afford to pay for their own health needs. 
Second, achieving financial sustainability through health insurance relies on a large enough 
participating population that lives in stable political and socio-economic conditions; and on 
an insurance design that enhances efficiency in insurance management and in the production 
and consumption of care. Donors and governments will be more willing to provide durable 
funds to well-managed MHI to ensure equity in financing and covering of full operational 
cost on a sustainable basis. 
Third, it is important to monitor and evaluate the performance of the health system to detect 
eventual deviations from reaching health policy objectives, and to prevent that the MHI 
system appears to be financially sustainable, but in fact is drawing resources from other 
sources within the broader system (McPake and Kutzin 1997). 
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Finally, the government provides the policy and institutional framework for health insurance. 
This may require developing a long-term health financing strategy that describes the role and 
responsibilities of the different actors: MHI, providers, the population, the government and 
donors. 
Equitable health financing is likely to be sustainable only if resources are pooled for those 
members of the society who are healthy and those less healthy, and for the affluent and the 
poor. Therefore, from the Rwandan government's perspective, the feasibility of other scale up 
options should be examined to create an insurance pool that shares the risk of all socio- 
economic groups in Rwanda. This could include building a pool between MHI, RAMA and 
private health insurance, into which RAMA and private insurance contribute a higher 
proportion per member than MHI, and that will be redistributed to low-income risk-sharing 
pools to finance health care of the poor62. 
Such health financing options require legal and organisational changes and the political and 
economic support of richer society members who express solidarity with the poor in Rwanda. 
It requires building public consensus on commitments to equity in utilisation and financing of 
health care and to a minimum standard health insurance that reflects a basic `safety net' for 
those who cannot support themselves. 
62 Similar to the health insurance system in Switzerland, where funds are re-distributed among private insurers based on age and gender criteria of enrollees. 
Annex A: Tables 
Annex Table 1: Rwanda development indicators, 1998 - 2002 
Foreign exchange 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
annual avera e: USD 1=RWF 312.3 334 390 440 460 
Annual % change 6.9% 16.7% 13.0% 4.5% 
end of ear: USD 1= 320.3 349.5 429.8 
CPI (Base 1989=100 1998 1999 2000 2001 (est. ) 
General CPI 380.8 341.2 348.44 
Annual % change -10.4% 2.1% 
Health and Education CPI 299 315.96 342.82 
Annual % change 5.7% 8.5% 
Population 1998 1999 2000 2001 (est. ) 
Population in million 7.883 8.109 8.434 8.679 
Growth rate % annual 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.9 
Female in % of total pop 53.5 53.4 53.2 
flno 1ý2r^1AAk 
GDP 1998 1999 2000 2001-05 12006-10 2011-15 2016-201 
Nominal in Mio current RWF 627,307 632 765 682,523 
Real GDP growth rate % 9.2 6.1 6 6.2 8.8 9.1 10.5 
Per capita GDP USD 250 
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Annex Table 2: List of all 52 MHI and HC: 18t year (7/1999 - 6/2000) 
Rank Name of 
MHI and HC 
Health 
District 
Owner Population In HC 
catchment's area 
Total MHI 
Members on 
6/2000 
First Year MHI 
Enrolment 
Rate 
1 Muyanza Byumba Church 7,088 3,911 55.18 
2 Karama Kabutare Church 10,621 4,389 41.32 
3 Bungwe Byumba Church 36,167 8,711 24.09 
4 Gisiza Byumba Church 13,024 3,067 23.55 
5 Rushaki Byumba Church 31,549 7,249 22.98 
6 Mulindi Byumba Public 21,686 3,795 17.50 
7 CS Kabgayi Kabgayi Church 23,143 3,835 16.57 
8 Kabilizi Kabutare Public 10,891 1,727 15.86 
9 Buramba Kabgayi Public 10,899 1,512 13.87 
10 Mbazi Kabutare Public 13,054 1,579 12.10 
11 Kivumu Kabgayi Church 14,215 1,693 11.91 
12 Ruhango Kabgayi Church 21,544 2,465 11.44 
13 Mukono Byumba Public 24,741 2,643 10.68 
14 Manyagiro Byumba Church 22,921 2,358 10.29 
15 Kivuye Byumba Public 13,107 1,155 8.81 
16 Tumba Byumba Public 19,815 1,640 8.28 
17 Shyogwe Kabgayi Church 10,509 828 7.88 
18 Rutare Byumba Church 27,964 2,086 7.46 
19 Mukoma Kabgayi Church 9,519 703 7.39 
20 Gishweru Kabgayi Public 14,823 1,028 6.94 
21 Rwesero Byumba Church 19,906 1,379 6.93 
22 Musambira Kabgayi Public 34,020 2,228 6.55 
23 Biwisige Byumba Public 11,021 690 6.26 
24 Nyarusange Kabgayi Church 23,738 1,483 6.25 
25 Kigogo Byumba Public 20,845 1,290 6.19 
26 CS Byumba Byumba Public 31,550 1,900 6.02 
27 Save Kabutare Church 33,108 1,949 5.89 
28 Buyoga Byumba Public 18,677 1,068 5.72 
29 Matyazo Kabutare Church 17,098 925 5.41 
30 Cyahinda Kabutare Church 23,954 1,234 5.15 
31 Ruhashy Kabutare Public 11,943 594 4.97 
32 Miyove Byumba Public 25,239 1,254 4.97 
33 Byimana Kabgayi Public 23,207 1,135 4.89 
34 Giti Byumba Public 23,862 1,127 4.72 
35 Gisagara Kabutare Church 25,331 1,086 4.29 
36 Sovu Kabutare Church 16,193 679 4.19 
37 Kinazi Kabgayi Public 21,583 855 3.96 
38 Rukozo Byumba Church 34,705 1,371 3.95 
39 Mushishiro Kabgayi Church 32,510 1,273 3.92 
40 Munyinya Byumba Public 29,151 1,117 3.83 
41 Rubona Kabutare Public 14,071 490 3.48 
42 Mbuye Kabgayi Church 20,757 708 3.41 
43 Rango Kabutare Public 7,323 218 2.98 
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44 Gitarama Kabgayi Public 33,256 897 2.70 
45 Rutobwe Kabgayi Public 28,908 761 2.63 
46 Musenyi Byumba Public 26,311 687 2.61 
47 Nyantang Kabutare Public 9,007 204 2.26 
48 Simbi Kabutare Church 27,838 575 2.07 
49 Gishamv Kabutare Public 22,591 447 1.98 
50 Maraba Kabutare Public 15,137 245 1.62 
51 Kizibere Kabgayi Church 18,901 260 1.38 
52 Nyabikenke Kabgayi Public 26,488 239 0.90 
Total Prepayment Schemes / Health Centres 
in Pilot District Sample Size 
1,085,509 86,742 7.99 
Note: Two health centres and partnering MHI are excluded from this sample because 
they only became operational towards the end of the pilot year. 
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Annex Table 4: List of PHR technical reports written on Rwanda 
PHR Reports Methodology Data source 
Schneider, P., F. Diop, and S. Descriptive analysis on design First six months 
Bucyana (2000). Developing and process and preliminary results insurance and 
Implementing Prepayment provider routine data Schemes in Rwanda. Technical 
Report No. 45. 
Schneider, P., F. Diop, D. Descriptive analysis based on 2 years provider data, 
Maceira, and D. Butera (2001). health centre and hospital data, one-year insurance 
Utilization, Cost and Financing of conducted in Excel data District Health Services in 
Rwanda. Technical Report No. 
61. 
ONAPO (1999). Etude sur les Interview report (French First focus group 
connaissances et attitudes sur le translation of Kinyrwanda) interviews 
systbme de pr6paiement et 
('assurance de maladie pour la 
santd au Rwanda. Kigali, 
Rwanda, Office National de la 
Population (ONAPO) in 
collaboration with Partnerships 
for Health Reform (PHR) 
ONAPO (2000). Qualitative Interview report (French Second focus group 
Survey on Beneficiaries and translation of Kinyrwanda) interviews 
Local Stakeholders of 
Prepayment Schemes in 
Rwanda. Kigali, Rwanda, Office 
National de la Population 
(ONAPO) in collaboration with 
Partnerships for Health Reform 
Schneider, P., F. Diop, and C. Summary of key findings and All data sources (see Leighton (2001). Pilot testing policy recommendations previous Table 3) Prepayment for Health Services 
in Rwanda: Results and 
Recommendations for Policy 
Directions and Implementations. 
Technical Report No. 66. 
Schneider, P., and Francois Diop Descriptive and statistical Household survey (2001). Impact of Prepayment methods report insurance 
Pilot on Health Care Utilization implications based on household 
and Financing in Rwanda: survey data, conducted in SPSS Findings from Final Household 
Survey. TE002 
i Note: an tnese repons are aownloaaable from the YH webpage: 
www. phrproject. com 
Annex B: Household Survey Questionnaire 
Module 1: Questionnaire on household socio-demographic and economic condition 
Module 2: Questionnaire on curative care seeking behaviour addressed to individuals 
who were sick during the 2 weeks prior to the interview. 
Republic of Rwanda 
Ministry of Health 
Partnerships 
for Health Reform (PHR) 
HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE 
AA1 TYPE OF SURVEY 
ii 
AA2 TYPE OF QUESTIONNAIRE SHEET OF 
1i 
IDENTIFICATIONAND DOCUMENTATION OFINTER VIEW 
IDNO1 
HEALTH REGION: 
IDN02 
HEALTH DISTRICT 
IDN03 COMMUNITY: 
IDN04 
SECTOR- 
IDN05 
NEIGHBORHOOD: 
_ 
IDN06 HOUSEHOLD ID NUMBER 
IDN07 NAME OF THE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD: 
DOC1 DATE OF INTERVIEW : DA Y MONTH YEAR 
DAY---/- MONTH: 
_1 
YEAR: 
_2000 _ 
0 0 
DOC2 
NAME OF INTERVIEWER: 
DOC3 LEADER OF OBSERVATION TEAM: 
SAIL DATE OF DATA ENTRY DAY MONTH YEAR 
DAY-J- MONTH--j-YEAR. ---2000- 
1 10 10 
SAI2 NAME OF DATA ENTRY SPECIALIST 
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N QUESTIONS RESPONSES GO TO CODE 
M308 Do you pay education expenses for 
any member of your household. 1. YES 
tuition, textbooks, copy books, 2. NO 
1 
boarding? 
7 
M309 For how many members of your 
household do you pay education 
expenses? 99. UNKNOWN 
M310 Do you pay education expenses 1. MONTHLY 
monthly, quarterly, or annually? 2. QUARTERLY 
3. ANNUALLY 
4. OTHER 
(SPECIFY) 
M311 How much did you pay last for 
education expenses in your 
household? 99999. UNKNOWN 
M312 Did you spend money to prevent or 
cure a sickness, or for delivery in 1. YES 
the last month in your household? 2. NO -4 M319 
M313 How much did you pay for 
consultations and treatments to 
traditional healers in the last month 99999. UNKNOWN 
in your household? 
M314 How much did you pay for 
consultations to health centres or 
hospitals in the last month in your 
h h ld? 
99999. UNKOWN 
ouse o T 
M315 How much did you pay for drugs to 
health centres or hospitals in the 
last month in your household? 99999. UNKNOWN 
M316 How much did you pay for drugs to 
pharmacies in the last month in 
your household? 99999. UNKNOWN 
280 
N QUESTIONS RESPONSES GO TO CODE 
M317 How much did you pay for 
hospitalization to health centres or 
hospital in the last month in your 99999. UNKNOWN 
household? 
M318 How much did you pay for other 
treatments or health (other than 
consultations, drugs and 
hospitalization) to health centres or 
99999. UNKNOWN 
hos ital in our last month in our p y y 
household? 
M319 Does a member of the household 
have a small livestock? 1. YES 
2. NO -4 M322 
M320 How many goats does the 
household have? 10.10+ 
M321 How many sheep does the 
household have? 10.10+ 
M322 Does a member of the household 
have a big livestock? 1. YES 
2. NO------4 M324 
M323 How many cows does the 
household have? to. 10 et plus 
M324 Is there a radio in the household? 
1. YES 
2. NO 
M325 Is there a bicycle in the household? 
1. YES 
2. NO 
M326 How many rooms are there in the 
patient's residence? 
M327 What material was used to build 1. HARD 
the main rooms in the house where 2. SEMI-HARD 
the patient resides? 3. CLAY 
4. STRAW 
5. OTHERS 
(SPECIFY) 
M328 What is the main material used for 1. CONCRETE 
the roof of the house where the 2. METAL SHEET 
patient resides? 3. CLAY 
4. STRAW 
5. OTHERS 
(SPECIFY) 
281 
Now, I will ask you questions about prepayment scheme membership. 
N QUESTIONS RESPONSES GO TO CODE 
M329 INTERVIEWER: 
VERIFY AT 1. YES 
QUESTION M 110 IF 2. NO 
THE HEAD OF 
HOUSEHOLD IS A 
MEMBER OF THE 
PREPAYMENT 
SCHEME 
M330 INTERVIEWER: 
VERIFY AT 1. YES, ALL---4 M332 
QUESTION M110 IF 2. YES, SOME 
ALL MEMBERS OF 3. NO, NONE--i M340 
THE HOUSEHOLD 
ARE MEMBERS OF 
THE PREPAYMENT 
SCHEME 
M331 Why are some 
members of the 
household not enrolled 
in the prepayment 
scheme? 
M332 What is the main 
reason your household 
is participating in the 
prepayment scheme? 
M333 How much did you pay 
to enrol members of the 
household in the 
prepayment scheme? 
I 
- 
L 
M334 What do you think of ----- 
the amount you 1. EASY 
contributed to the 2. SOMEWHAT 
prepayment scheme? Is 3. UNAFFORDABLE 
it easily affordable, 
somewhat affordable, 
or unaffordable? 
M335 How did you gain the 1. OWN MONEY 
money you contributed 2. GIFT FROM 
to the prepayment RELATIVE 
scheme? 3. BORROW 
4. TONTINER 
5. SALE OF 
AGRICULURAL GOODS 
6. SALE OF POULTRY 
7. OTHER (SPECIFY) 
N QUESTIONS RESPONSES GO TO CODE 
M336 Are sick members of the 1. YES, RARELY 
household covered in the 2. YES, FREQUENTLY 
prepayment plan? 3. NO 
M337 When your current 1. YES 
membership expires, would 2. NO 4 M339 
you renew it for the following 
year? 
M338 What is the highest amount 
you are able to pay to renew 9999 UNKNOWN END OF INTERVIEW 
your membership for the . 
following year? 
M339 What is the main reason you 
are choosing not to renew 
your membership for the 
following year? 
END OF INTERVIEW 
M340 What is your main reason for 
choosing not to enrol in the 
prepayment scheme? 
END OF INTERVIEW 
M341 Would you enrol in the 
prepayment scheme next 1. YES 
year? 2. NO 4 M343 
M342 What is the highest amount 
you are able to pay to enrol in 9999. UNKNOWN 
the prepayment scheme next 
year? END OF INTERVIEW 
M343 What is your main reason for 
choosing not to enrol in the 
prepayment scheme? 
END OF INTERVIEW 
Republic of Rwanda 
Ministry of Health 
Partnerships for 
Health Reform (PHR) 
CURATIVE CARE QUESTIONNAIRE 
AA1 TYPE OF SURVEY 
AAZ TYPE OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
"l 1 
IDENTIFICATIONAND DOCUMENTATION OF INTERVIEW 
IDNOI HEALTH REGION: 
IDN02 HEALTH DISTRICT: 
IDN03 
COMMUNITY: 
IDN04 
SECTOR: 
IDN05 
NEIGHBOURHOOD: 
IDN06 
HOUSEHOLD NUMBER 
IDN07 NAME OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD: 
NMAL NAME OF PATIENT: 
IDN08 
PATIENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER IN THE HOUSEHOLD 
QUESTIONNIARE 
DOC1 DATE OF INTERVIEW: DAY MONTH YEAR 
DAY: I MONTH: / YEAR: 
DOC2 
NAME OF INTERVIEWER: 
DOC3 OBSERVATION TEAM LEADER: 
SAIL DATE OF DATA ENTRY DAY MONTH YEAR 
DAY: 
_/ 
MONTH: YEAR 
SAI2 NAME OF DATE ENTRY SPECIALIST: 
284 
0 111] 
m IDNO 1 IDN03 IDN05 IDN06 IDN08 
I TTERVIEWER: 
REMINDER: FOR PATIENTS LESS THAN 15 YEARS OLD, ADDRESS THE 
QUESTIONS TO THEIR MOTHER OR GUARDIAN. THE QUESTIONS ARE ASKED 
AS IF ADDRESSED DIRECTLY TO THE PATIENT. IF THE RESPONDANT IS NOT 
THE SAME AS THE PATIENT, THE QUESTIONS WILL BE ASKED BY MAKING 
REFRENCE TO THE PATIENT AS INDICATED THE INTERVIEWER MANUAL. 
SYMPTOMS AND GRAVITY OF SICKNESS 
400 We are going to talk about how you felt when the sickness started 
SYMPTOMS TABLE 
No SYMPTOM Did you have When was the last Did the How many days 
(SYMPTOM) time you have (SYMPTOM) start did you have the 
when the sickness (SYMPTOM)? in the last 15 days? (SYMPTOM)? 
started? 
401 402 403 404 405 
MTH DAY 
01 FEVER 
02 HEAD ACHE r '. "r 
03 IRRITATION OF THE 
EYES 
04 STOMACH ACHE 
05 COUGH 
06 WATERY FAECES 
07 BLOOD-STAINED 
FAECES 
08 VOMITS 
09 WOUND 
10 OTHER. 
INTERVIEWER: 1. YES 1. AUGUST 1. YES 31 31 DAYS OR 
ASK IF THE PATIENT HAD 2. NO (GO TO 2. SEPTEMBER 2. NO MORE 
OTHER SYMPTOMS AND NEXT 3. OCTOBER 
IDENTIFY THE MAIN ONES SYMPTOM) 4. BEFORE 9. UNKNOWN 99 = UNKNOWN 
AUGUST 
9. UNKNOWN 
(GO TO NEXT 999. UNKNOWN 
SYMPTOM) I 
INTERVIEWER: 
USE THE CALENDAR BELOW TO DETERMINE DATES AND DURATIONS 
AUG $1! 1b4Q nmzmTiillEElSAT 
1 2 3 4S 
67 8 9 10 11 12 
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
20 21 22 23 24 2S 26 
27 28 29 30 31 
SEP Ia1S? 3lM 3M IW fMSAl 
12 
34 S 6 7 89 
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
OCT SM BM 31M M121 I 
1 23 4 5 67 
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
15 16 17 18 19 2021 
22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
No QUESTIONS / INSTRUCTIONS RESPONSES GO 
TO CODES 
406 When did the sickness start? 1. AUGUST 
2. SEPTEMBER 
INTERVIEWER USE THE CALENDAR ABOVE 3. OCTOBER 
TO SPECIFY THE DATE GIVEN BY THE 4. BEFORE 
RESPONDANT AUGUST 
999. UNKNOWN MONTHS 
DAY 
407 Did you inquire about treatments for this sickness? 1. YES 
2. NO 
.. 410 9. UNKNOWN 
408 Will you continue to search for treatments for the I. YES .. 410 sickness? 2. NO 
9. UNKNOWN 
409 What day did you receive treatment for the first time? 1. AUGUST 
2. SEPTEMBER 
NTERVIEWER: USE THE CALENDAR ABOVE 3. OCTOBER 
TO SPECIFY THE DATE GIVEN BY THE 4. BEFORE 
REBFONDANT AUGUST MONTHS 
999. UNKNOWN DAY 
286 
No 
QUESTION QUESTIONS / RESPONSES GO CODES 
INSTRUCTIONS TO 
410 Before receiving treatments, did you think the 1. NOT SERIOUS 
sickness was not serious. was serious, was very 2. SERIOUS 
serious, or you did not know? 3. VERY SERIOUS 
4. DON'T REMEMBER 
9. NO RESPONSE 
411 What was your main activity in the last month? 1. FARMER 
2. GOVERNMENT 
WORKER 
3. EMPLOYEE (COMPANY) 
4. SHEPHERD 
S. FISHERMAN .. 414 6. STUDENT ................... 
- 7. MINOR ................... .. 414 8. OTHER (SPECIFY) 
9. UNKNOWN 
412 In the last two weeks. did you have to interrupt or 1. YES 
stop your main activity due to the sickness? 2. NO ... 414 9. UNKNOWN 
413 How many days was main activity interrupted due 
to the sickness? 99. UNKNOWN 
414 In the last two weeks, did you stay in bed due to 1. YES 
the sickness? 2. NO .. 416 9. UNKNOWN 
415 How many days did you stay in bed due to the 
sickness? 99. UNKNOWN 
287 
ATTENTION 
INTERVIEWER: FROM QUESTION 415 TO 421, THE INFORMATION WILL 
RELATE ONLY TO TREATMENTS RECEIVED AT HOME BEFORE MAKING A 
VISIT TO THE HEALTH CENTER OR AN OUTSIDE TRADITIONAL HEALER 
INTERVIEWER: (READ TO RESPONDANT) I AM NOW GOING TO ASK 
QUESTIONS ABOUT TREATMENTS RECEIVED AT HOME TO CURE YOUR 
ILLNESS BEFORE MAKING A VISIT TO THE HEALTH CENTER. 
416 In the last two weeks, did you receive treatment at 1. YES 
home by a heath worker (doctor, nurse ... ), a 2. NO .. 420 traditional healer, or a friend? 9. UNKNOWN .. 420 
417 Who came to your house to provide treatments? 1. DOCTOR 
2. NURSE 
3. TRADITIONAL 
MIDWIFE 
4. HEALER 
5. OTHER (SPECIFY) 
9. UNKNOWN 
418 Did you pay the person you came to the house to 1. YES, WITH MONEY 
provide the treatment? 2. YES, WITH GOODS 
With money or goods? 3. NO ............................ .. 
420 
999. UNKNOWN ......... .. 420 419 How much money did you pay the person who 
treated you at home? 
INTERVIEWER. IF THE PAYMENT WAS MADE 
9999. UNKNOWN 
IN GOODS, ESTIMATE THE MONETARY 
VALUE OF THE PAYMENT. RWF 
420 Did you take any drugs you have at home in the last 1. YES 
two weeks? 2. NO 
9. UNKNOWN 
421A Did you send someone to buy or did you yourself buy 1. YES 
any drugs to treat your illness in the last two weeks? 2. NO .. 423 9. UNKNOWN 
421B Where were the drugs purchased? 1. PHARMACY 
2. MAGENDU 
3. IN THE MARKET 
4. HEALTH CENTER 
5. HEALER 
6. OTHER (SPECIFY) 
9. UNKNOWN 
422 How much money did you spend on the drugs in the 
last two weeks? 
9999. UNKNOWN 
... 414 
RWF 
288 
No 
QUESTION QUESTIONS I RSEPONSES GO CODES 
INSTRUCTIONS TO 
ATTENTION 
INTERVIEWER: IN THIS SECTION, THE INFORMATION WILL RELATE TO 
TREATMENTS RECEIVED OUTSIDE OF THE HOUSE IN THE LAST TWO 
WEEKS. 
423 Did you visit a doctor, a nurse, a healer, etc 1. YES 
outside of the house ? 2. NO .. 462 Did you go to a health centre ... to treat your 9. UNKNOWN illness in the last two weeks? 
424 Where did you go for treatment outside of the 01. PUBLIC HOPITAL 
house? 02. CERTIFIED 
HOPITAL 
03. PUBLIC HEALTH 
CENTER 
04. CERTIFIED HEATH 
CENTER 
05. DISPENSARY 
06. TRADITIONAL 
HEALER 
07. PRIVATE CLINIC 
08. HOME PRACTICE 
09. OTHER (SPECIFY) 
99. UNKNOWN 
425 What is your primary reason for deciding to go to 1. LESS EXPENSIVE 
... HEALTH CENTER INDICATED IN 2. CLOSE BY QUESTION 424... ? 3. COMPETENT 
PERSONNEL 
4. HABIT 
5. WELL EQUIPED IN 
MATERIALS AND 
DRUGS 
6. RELIGIOUS OR 
TRADITIONAL 
REASONS 
7. PREFERRED PPS 
CENTER 
8. OTHER (SPECIFY) 
99. UNKNOWN 
289 
No 
QUESTION QUESTIONS / RESPONSES GO CODES 
INSTRUCTIONS TO 
426 What do you think of the availability of drugs at 1. THEY RARELY HAVE 
this location ... HEALTH CENTER DRUGS INDICATED IN QUESTION 424... ? 2. THEY OCCASIONALLY 
HAVE DRUGS 
INTERVIEWER READ THE POSSIBLE 3. THEY ALWAYS HAVE 
ANSWERS IN THE NEXT BOX BEFORE DRUGS 
RECORDING THE CORRESPONDENTS 4. OTHER (SPECIFY) 
RESPONSE. 
9. UNKNOWN 
427 Who was the main person that provided the 1. DOCTOR 
treatments for you during your first visit to the... 2. NURSE 
HEALTH CENTER INDICATED IN 3. TRADITIONAL 
QUESTION 424... ? MIDWIFE 
4. HEALER 
S. OTHER (SPECIFY) 
9. UNKNOWN 
428 According to this person, what was your 01. MALARIA 
sickness? 02. DIARRHOEA 
03. MEASLES 
04. PNEUMONIA 
05. FLU 
06. COQUELUCHE 
07. GHONORRHEA 
08. CONJUNCTIVITY 
09. ACCIDENT 
10. COLD 
11. OTHER (SPECIF ) 
99. UNKNOWN 
429 How far away from your house is the first health 1. Less than 21an 
centre you visited? 2.2 -4 km 
3.4-6km 
INTERVIEWER SPECIFY THE HEALTH 4.6 -8 km 
CENTER INDICATED IN QUESTION 424 S. 8-10 km 
6.10 Ian and more 
9. UNKNOWN 
430 What fomt of transportation did you use to get to 1. BY FOOT ....... .. 432 the first health centre you visited? 2. CAR IF BY 
3. BUS OR TAXI FOOT 
INTERVIEWER. SPECIFY THE HEALTH 4. CANOE ONLY 
CENTER INDICATED IN QUESTION 424 5. BICYCLE/ 
MOTORCYCLE 
Indicate the two basic means of transportation if 6. OTHER (SPECIFY) 
he/she used only one, record that twice. 
9. UNKNOWN 
431 How much did you, you and those who 
accompanied you, pay for transportation (round- 
trip) to get to the first location where you received 9999, UNKNOWN RWF 
treatment? 
432 Did you and those who accompanied you spend 1. YES 
money on food and lodging? 2. .. 434 NO........................... 
9. UNKNOWN 
433 How much did you and those who accompanied 
you spend on food and lodging? 
9999. UNKNOWN 
RWF 
290 
No QUESTIONS / INSTRUCTIONS RESPONSES GO 
TO CODES 
434 How much time did it take to arrive at the first I. Less than 30' 
health centre you visited? 2.30 - 60' 
3. Ih- Ih30 
4.1h30-2h 
S. 2h00 - 2h30 
6.2h30 - 3h00 
7. More than 3h00 
9. UNKNOWN 
435 After arriving at the health centre, how long did 1. Less than 30' 
you wait before consultation with a member of the 2.30 - 60' 
health personnel? 3. Ih- Ih30 
4.1h30-2h 
INTERVIEWER: SPECIFY THE HEALTH 5.2h00 - 2h30 
CENTER INDICATED IN QUESTION 424 6.2h30 - 3h00 
7. More than 3h00 
9. UNKNOWN 
436 Were you hospitalized in this health centre? 1. YES 
2. .. 438 INTERVIEWER SPECIFY THE HEALTH NO ........................... 
CENTER INDICATED IN QUESTION 424 999. UNKNOWN 
437 For how many days were you hospitalized in this 
health centre? 
99. UNKNOWN 
INTERVIEWER SPECIFY THE HEALTH 
CENTER INDICATED IN QUESTION 424 
438 Were you advised to be hospitalized somewhere 1. YES 
else? 2. NO 
9. UNKNOWN 
439 How many times did you go to this health centre 
for treatment in the last two weeks? 
99. UNKNOWN 
INTERVIEWER: SPECIFY THE HEALTH 
CENTER INDICATED IN QUESTION 424 
440A Did you receive a prescription from this health 1. YES 
centre in the last two weeks? 2. NO 
9. UNKNOWN 
440B Did you pay or did someone else pay for the 1. YES 
treatments you received at this health centre? 2. 
NO ............................ . 455 INTERVIEWER. SPECIFY THE HEALTH 3. NO, MEMBER OF PPS 
CENTER INDICATED IN QUESTION 424 9. UNKNOWN 
441 Who paid for the treatments; yourself, someone in 1. PATIENT OR 
your household, a different relative, a friend, the MEMBER OF 
company you work for, or somebody else? HOUSEHOLD 
2. AN OUTSIDE 
RELATIVE 
3. A FRIEND 
4. EMPLOYER OF 
PATIENT 
S. PPS (MUTUELLE) 
6. OTHER (SPECIFY) 
9. UNKNOWN 
291 
No 
QUESTION QUESTIONS / INSTRUCTIONS RESPONSES GO CODES 
TO 
442 Did you pay for each consultation or just the first 1. EACH 
time you visited the health centre? CONSULTATION 
2.1ST CONSULTATION 
3. OTHER (SPECIFY) 
9. UNKNOWN 
443 Was the price of drugs included or did you pay for 1. DRUGS INCLUDED 
them separately? 2. DRUGS SEPARATE 
3. OTHER (SPECIFY) 
9. UNKNOWN 
444 Was the price of medical exam included or did you 1. EXAM INCLUDED 
pay for it separately? 2. EXAM SEPARATE 
3. OTHER (SPECIFY) 
9. UNKNOWN 
INTERVIEWER: REPEAT THE ANSWER TO QUESTION 439: NUMBER OF 
CONSULTATIONS AT THE FIRST HEALTH CENTER VISITED 
Now we would like to discuss payments made for drugs, exams, and other services 
during each consultation in the last two weeks. 
TABLE: PAYMENTS AT THE FIRST HEALTH CENTER VISITED 
CONSULTATION How much Did you How much did Did they How much Did you How much did 
did you pay receive any you pay for the perform did you pay receive you pay for the 
for drugs during drugs? any for the other other services? 
consultation? the exams? exams? services? 
consultation? 
445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 
I IST VISIT 
2 2ND VISIT 
3 3RD VISIT v"" 
4 4TH VISIT ý'r'ý 
5 5TH VISIT 
6 6TH VISIT 
RWF 1. YES RWF 1. YES RWF 1. YES RWF 
2. NO (GO 2. NO 2. NO 
TO 449) (GO TO (GO TO 
451) NEXT 
LINE 
No QUESTIONS / RESPONSES GO 
INSTRUCTIONS TO CODES 
453 Did you have to pay in goods for the treatments 1. YES 
received? 2. NO ............. .. 456 
9. UNKNOWN 
454 What was the monetary value of the goods given in 
exchange for the treatments received? 
9999. UNKNOWN 
RWF 
292 
No QUESTIONS / GO 
INSTRUCTIONS RESPONSES TO CODES 
455 Why didn't you pay for the 1. FREE CARE 
treatments received? 2. I DON'T HAVE THE MEANS 
3. I'M A FRIEND OR FAMILY MEMBER OF THE 
INTERVIEWER RECORD THE HEALTH WORKER 
FIRST ANSWER OF THE 4. I'LL PAY WHEN I FIND THE MEANS 
RESPONDANT 5. MEMBER OF PPS 
6. OTHER (SPECIFY) 
9. UNKNOWN 
456 Did you visit other health centres, 1. YES 
or traditional healer health worker 2. NO ............................................................... 
END 
, during the same illness in the last 9. UNKNOWN 
two weeks? 
INTERVIEWER: INDICATE IN ORDER THE OTHER HEALTH CENTERS VISITED 
AFTER THE FIRST VISIT? HOW MUCH MONEY DID THE PATIENT PAY IN EACH 
CENTER FOR CONSULTATIONS? DRUGS? AND SERVICES? 
TABLE: PAYMENTS MADE AT OTHER HEALTH CENTERS 
OrdER OF What type How much did How much did you pay for How much did you pay Did you visit 
visit TO of health you pay for drugs? for other services? any other 
OTHER centre? consultations? 8888. DIDN'T RECEIVE 8888. NO OTHER health centre? 
HEALTH (SEE code DRUGS SERVICE 
CENTERS BELOW) 9999. UNKNOWN 9999. UNKNOWN 1. YES 
(hc) 9999. 2. NO 
UNKNOWN 
457 458 459 460 461 462 
2 2NDHC tz* ý. `" , j_ ', 3 R'* ': 
3 3RD HC 
4 4TH HC ý. .. I kJ, . ''g__ 
TYPE OF HEALTH CENTER 
PUBLIC HOSPITAL 06. HEALTH POST 
CERTIFIED HOSPITAL 07. PRIVATE CLINIC 
PUBLIC HEALTH CENTER 08. TRADITIONAL HEALER 
CERTIFIED HEALTH CENTER 09. OTHER (SPECIFY) 
DISPENSARY 99. UNKNOWN 
END OF INTERVIEW 
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Annex C: Difficulties Faced During Data 
Collection 
Problems encountered during the data collection for the household surveys included 
constraints related to logistics, communication and identification of target households. For 
example, cars with interview teams broke down and needed to be replaced; difficult roads to 
the households prolonged the overall interview process; there were no laptops available that 
would have allowed interviewers to enter the data directly into the software whilst in the field; 
households identified in the sample frame had left their dwellings and moved to other areas; 
and sometimes it took longer than anticipated to conduct an interview, for example when the 
household head was absent working in the field and had to be found (Schneider and Diop 
2001). 
Difficulties also occurred when collecting self-reported monthly information from health 
centre managers and MHI presidents on the performance of their respective organisations. 
These were mainly related to delays in filling in the monthly reports, incomplete 
questionnaires and errors in recording. However, this situation considerably improved over 
time. Regular meetings were held with providers and the MHI manager to discuss the validity 
of data and analysis results. Participants appreciated this regular feed-back of information they 
had contributed. These meetings helped them to understand how reliable data can be used to 
derive strategies to improve their situation (Schneider et al. 2001a; Schneider et al. 2001b). 
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Annex D: List of Papers Submitted 
Trust in Micro Health Insurance. Submitted to Social Science and Medicine, June, 2003. 
Why should the poor insure? A review of theories on decision-making in the context of health 
insurance. Submitted to Health Policy and Planning. August, 2003. 
The contribution of MHI to horizontal equity in utilisation and fairness in health financing in 
Rwanda. Submitted to Health Economics. February, 2004. 
Provider payment reform in Rwanda: The cost impact of payments made by insured and 
uninsured patients in health centres (Co-authored with Kara Hanson). Submitted to Health 
Economics. October, 2003. 
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